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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING COALITION DYNAMICS IN MULTIPARTY CONFLICTS: AN AGENT-BASED
APPROACH WITH MULTI-OBJECTIVE SPATIAL MODEL
Qiwei Sun
Barry G. Silverman

Through this research, we explore the dynamics of coalition formation through agent-based
computational modeling with a focus on empirical applications. Inspired by a wide spectrum of
theories, we adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the problem.

Our solution entails an abstract formal model and an agent-based computational model. In the broader
context of competitive games, we view coalition dynamics as an outcome of rational choices made by
competitive agents. After building the intended simulation platform, we investigate the impact of
various input parameters on the coalition dynamics through computational modeling. Subsequently,
we explore some real-world scenarios to evaluate the model’s empirical value.

The validation work is done in two parts. First, we derive analytical solutions for some basic
interactions in the abstract model. Next, we develop an agent-based counterpart that extends the
formal model. By comparing the analytical solutions to simulation results, we verify the proper
implementation of the simulation platform. After establishing its structural validity, we examine the
model’s practicality, external validity, and extensibility in three empirical case studies.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement

The world we live in today is shaped by numerous things, yet among those few may claim a
commensurate significance as the formation of coalitions [Snyder 2013, Brown & Ainley 2009,
Sheehan 1996, Walt 1985] – no matter in times of peace or war, coalition dynamics have always played
a salient role in determining the outcomes of countless conflicts.

Give the importance of the subject, various theories of coalition formation have arisen from distinctive
fields of studies: from extensive-form game theory, onto the international relations paradigm, the
legislative coalition theory and the political economy theories of civil war. Despite the diverse range of
literature, a completely satisfactory theory for multiparty competitive games is lacking. This is
primarily due to two predominant limitations in current literature: First, many of the theories uses a
static game theory model in the study of coalition formation process, limiting the scope of analysis to
a singular coalition event or decision. In addition, as many adopted the formal mathematical modeling
approach, we often had to make simplifying assumptions that deprived the model of much empirical
significance, or otherwise become unable to find a tractable solution once complexity of the problem
increased.

A particularly important subject in the civil war processes is the theory of coalition formation – the
study of coalition formation extends beyond the context of civil wars and has always drawn immerse
scholarly interests in the past, as many theoretical works exist in an attempt to explain and predict the
dynamics of coalition formations: the cooperative and non-cooperative game theory approach, the
international relations paradigm (balance of power), the political economy theories of civil war, and
the legislative coalition theory (minimum winning coalition). The rich and diverse existing literature
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across these fields motivates this thesis in developing a model from preexisting theories in an attempt
to aid the understanding of the dynamics.

Our hypothesis is as following:

mn : The proposed model is able to predict equilibrium states and the relevant paths, thus

providing insights into the dynamics of coalition formations in the given context.
mo : The proposed model cannot help to predict equilibrium states or the relevant paths in the

given context.

As we shall elaborate in Chapter 3, we attempt to build a framework encompassing two versions of the
coalition dynamics model that shall:

•

consolidate the major theories in coalition formation, with consideration to the context of
intrastate conflict;

•

focus on the impact of multi-objective nature in competitive games, and allow
differentiation in agent attributes and decision-making mechanisms;

•

allow characterization of equilibrium states in the abstract version of the model;

•

explore the more complex dynamics in the agent-based version of the model.

These goals and tasks set forth the crucial considerations in the construction of our framework.

2

1.2 The Scope of Work

The primary goal of this work is to better understand the dynamics of coalition 1formation during
multiparty competitive games with objective and power considerations. Essentially, we attempt to
study the scenario when agents form coalitions based on each other’s goals and strength. While
multiparty competitive games can occur in various scenarios (from interstate warfare to strategic
corporate partnerships), we limit the scope of our empirical analysis to the intrastate setting.

Several theories exist to explain the coalition formation process in different contexts. In Chapter 2, We
review the most prominent theories and approaches from several distinct disciplines, with analysis in
relation to our proposed model. In later Chapters 3-5, we consolidate the idea of minimum winning
coalition, payoff2 distribution and bargaining process under one umbrella, and fully investigate the
dynamic characteristics of two variations of the model.

The primary focus of this work is to fully investigate the dynamics of coalition formation process,
through the analysis of the proposed model that synthesizes several prominent theories. This focus
has two profound implications. First, our efforts are mostly aimed to aid the understanding of the
dynamical process through formal and computational model that synthesizes existing theories
deemed most applicable to the context. This choice of focus is a natural decision since to propose an
entirely new set of theories on the formation of coalitions would require extensive empirical study and
training in social sciences. Second, the findings from this work would likely extend beyond the context

1 In large parts of the relevant literature, the terms “coalition” and “alliance” are often used interchangeably. However, according to some in the
realm of war studies and international relations [Christia 2012, Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011, Weitsman 2010], an “alliance” is treated as a more
formal partnership among the participants, often bound by a covenant or treaty and lasts longer in duration. In contrast, the coalition is often
formed as a temporary partnership as a response to a situation or a means to achieve a short-term objective, thus lasting often shorter than an
alliance. In our discussion, we will adopt the “temporal, utilitarian” version of the partnership concept, and therefore use the term “coalition” for
most of our discussion. But when we do mention “alliance”, the term is used only as an alternative form of “coalition” and does not necessarily
imply a “binding, long-lasting” formal partnership.
2 The terms “payoff” and “utility” will be used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. [Myerson 2013, Wolpert & Tumer 2001] The two
terms are coined in the context of macroeconomics and game theory models and are used to define the value (to be received) from a particular
outcome or choice to the agent in question.
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of intrastate conflicts. This optimism is largely established on the hope that the model would retain its
empirical validity when we make reasonable adjustments based on context-relevant coalition theories.

A final note on the scope of this dissertation is necessary: many brilliant works have been done on the
subject in attempts to explain the mechanisms behind the formation of groups in different scenarios.
This dissertation, however, is not about explanations of any historical event or social science
phenomenon but devoted to the study of complex coalition dynamics in a model built upon the
synthesis of prominent theories, empowered with new modeling methods and techniques.
Nevertheless, the fruits of our analysis may eventually in turn contribute to the general understanding
of coalition dynamics in the given context and beyond.
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1.3 Potential Contribution
The model is the first to consolidate both power and multi-objective factors in the extensive-form game
setting for the study of coalition dynamics. We synthesize major findings and assumptions from the
realm of international relations, party competition in legislative institutions and game theatrical
models to build an umbrella model that encompasses the major features of the widely accepted
coalition theories while adding our unique components in the abstraction model in the framework.
With the state diagram approach in analysis, it focuses on not only the stable states alone, but also the
evolution of the game to explore the path-dependency of the states.

In addition, our agent-based model is among the first to study coalition dynamics with comprehensive

consideration of alignment across multiple objectives (instead of single-issue focus for prevalent ABMs
[Silverman et. all 2015, BDM 2005, Abdollahian et al. 2006]), as well as the few to utilize Agent-Based
Modeling in a spatial theory [Laver 2011] setting to explore the dynamics in more complex scenarios.
Table 1.1 provides a comparative overview of our model on various aspects of coalition dynamics
versus existing ones. In essence, our model shall provide path-dependent solutions for stability
concepts in competitive games where each agent has its own ideal points in the multi-issue space.

Table 1.1: Comparative Overview of Different Models and Theoretical Frameworks
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1.4 Summary

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:

In Chapter 2, we first review relevant literature from the paradigm of international relations, party
competition in legislative institutions and game theory models. In addition, we briefly discuss the
historical development of computational modeling and agent-based modeling. At last, we review a few
related agent-based models and their limitations.

In Chapter 3, we begin by introducing basic elements for the abstract model: the ingredients of the
game, the utility-related 3 concepts and variations to the equilibrium concepts. We then discuss the
computational complexity of the abstract model and the motivation for building the Agent-based
Model. The concept of the State Tree representation is first introduced here.

In Chapter 4, we explore the abstract version of the coalition dynamics model through formal analysis.
We apply existing game theory methods to characterize possible equilibrium states and discuss the
limitations. We further examine some special instances of the model setup to establish a roadmap for
the agent-based model.

In Chapters 5 through 6, we offer a detailed introduction to the proposed agent-based model built on
the definitions and setup of the abstract model. We then discuss the experiment setup in detail and
determine the general themes of investigation. We also introduce the simulation environment and its
intuitive graphical user interface. Subsequently, we carry out large-scale computational experiments
in the simulation platform and investigate the impact of system- and agent-level input parameters on

The terms “payoff” and “utility” will be used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. [Myerson 2013, Wolpert & Tumer 2001] The two
terms are coined in the context of macroeconomics and game theory models and are used to define the value (to be received) from a particular
outcome or choice to the agent in question.
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different aspects of coalition dynamics. We mainly discuss the findings and their impactions mainly in
Chapter 6. At the end of our investigations, we share some notes on potential future improvements to
the experimentation process.

In Chapter 7, we begin by presenting the goals and challenges of applying computational modeling to
the real world. We then briefly discuss the validation methods and explain our choice of methods in
the context. Subsequently, we introduce the three selected case studies, and dive into important
technical details on modeling real-world coalition dynamics. We further explain how such technical
considerations motivate the consistent structure of presentation for the case studies. At last, we
conclude the chapter with some a preview to the expected learnings and recommendations.

In Chapters 8 through 10, we examine coalition dynamics and its related concepts in the context of the
Syrian Civil War, the governing coalitions in Israel’s Knesset, and the U.S. Presidential Election in 2008.
We conduct our own research and work with subject matter experts (SMEs) to determine the input
parameters into the model, propose themes of exploration and design necessary simulation
experiments. Through the case studies, we share a detailed walk-through of the experimentation
process and related design philosophies, conduct critical validation work on various aspects of the
model, and test its extensibility and agility in different situations.

In the final Chapter, we reflect on lessons learned, present important conclusions, and recommend
some future research directions.
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Chapter 2 Relevant Literature & Preliminary Work
Understanding coalition formation in multiparty systems is often highly valuable for a wide range of
political, economic and social issues – ranging from balancing of world powers, forming strategic
cabinet partnerships to predicting membership in social groups [Ding 2017, Weisiger 2016, Dragu &
Laver 2017, Riker 1973, Freeman 2004]. As such, many prominent theories have emerged in different
fields of study – such theories are generally founded upon the empirical observations or prevalent
principles in the field and limited to the analysis of certain aspects of the coalition formation process
in the context. Nevertheless, these studies from seemingly disparate fields lend us an interesting
perspective on the multi-disciplinary nature of the subject. Their complementary, and sometimes
contending views also serve as a true inspiration for this work, which is built on influential hypothesis
and theories including international alliance formation, political coalitions in cabinet government, and
competitive multiparty games.

In this chapter, we first examine major coalition theories in the international relations paradigm
(section 2.1), while focusing on their interpretations on coalition dynamics and stability. We then
introduce and discuss the coalition scenarios where participants have multiple objectives and attempt
to form coalitions based on their objective positions (section 2.2). Afterwards, we turn to the field of
game theory for the coalition dynamics model in both cooperative and non-cooperative settings
(section 2.3). At closing, we review the agent-based modeling paradigm (section 2.4), discuss the brief
history of ABM, computational modeling, and review three prominent agent-based models that are
precursors to this research.
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2.1 International Relations and War

Understanding and predicting the pattern of alliance dynamics has long been an important subject in
the study of international politics. The scholarly interests in the subject largely fall within three lines
of research: the motivations for the formation and disintegration of the alliances, the stability of
alliances and its influencing factors, and the relationship between alliance dynamics and occurrences
or termination of war. For the focus of this work, we limit this part of the literature review to the study
on theories concerning the first two lines, essentially, the questions of why and how alliances shift, and

how reliable a particular alliance structure would be.

Earlier theories on the subject [Weisiger 2016, Gibler Waltz 1979, Russett 1968] suggest various
settings and motivations for alliance formation. We find the proposed context from Russett [Russett
1968] to be a recurring one that is widely accepted: (1) There are three or more nations; (2) The
situation is at least partly competitive; (3) No single nation is in a dominant position such that it can
win by itself, such that it must be included in an alliance for the alliance (and therefore itself) to win;
(4) There is the possibility of a decision, usually a war, that would result in major payoffs or losses to
the nations involved. The last point is particularly important as the majority of alliance formation
theories are proposed to analyze war-time situations. In such situations, the alliances are formed
either in anticipation of war, or out of the urge to win the war. As a result, the theoretical treatments
of alliance dynamics here are mostly focused on the associated payoffs from alliance memberships in
international (wartime) conflicts.
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2.1.1 Why and How Alliances
Alliances Shift

In this context, several diverging theoretical perspectives exist in explaining alliance dynamics. Much
of the traditional literature [Wolfers 1959, Yost 1998, Russett 1994] suggests that shared
characteristics including aligned ideology and similar social, economic and political systems, serve as
a major motivation for alliance formation. The rationale behind the ideological-based theories often
entails following: for one, alliance with states of similar ideologies is a way to defined one’s principles;
for another, states sharing similar ideologies often find it easier to form bonds with each other;
additionally, some ideologies inherently promote alliance with its own believer member states
(communism, for example).

While such theories do help explain some observed patterns in coalition dynamics, there are a few
lingering issues over this school of thought. First, ideology and common interests remain elusive to
rigorous quantitative analysis. Second, since certain ideological similarities (such as totalitarianism)
are more likely to produce conflict rather than cooperation, the link between common interests and
ideological similarity seems fairly fragile. After all, as set of theories often fails to yield reasonable
explanations to large parts of the alliance shifts, it would at best only serve as a weaker cause for
coalition dynamics – some other factors, likely more influential, must also be at work [Walt
1990/1998].

In contrast to the ideological-based narrative, many [Liska 1962, Deutsch & Singer 1964, Riker 1973,
Brams & Fishburn 1995, Walt 1985] hold the view that alliances formations are largely motivated by
power considerations, arguing that the states form alliances as a response to threat. Large amount of
work looks into the motivations for the states’ alliances choices in the face of external threats: they
may choose to either balance, joining alliance that opposes the aggressive players, or to bandwagon,
joining alliance with the aggressive players. Several influential political scientists [Riker 1973, Walt
1988] further contend that size (of the warring parties, sometimes measured in aggregate power) is a
10

crucial consideration in coalition choices. The states would attempt to form a minimum winning
coalition (MWC). The MWC is defined as a collection of states that is just powerful enough to secure
the winning, but not too big such that the shared prize becomes small. Influenced by this point of view,
several game-theoretic models of alliance formation [Smith 1995, Jervis & Snyder 1991, Snyder 1990,
Wagner 1986] have been built to capture the interactions between states in the context of war.

Building on the power and balancing narratives (“balance of power” as they are commonly known),
more recent literature further explores the relationship between coalition formation and the
emergence of an external threat [Henke 2019, Weisiger 2016, Fordham & Poast 2016, Levy and
Thompson 2010, Gibler 2008]. These theoretical frameworks (mostly constructed as static or

continuous games, or regression analysis in more recent studies) are based on impressive deductive
reasoning and often produce outcomes that correspond well with empirical evidence.

Nevertheless, one constraint exists: as complexity increases with the number of states in the scenario,
the model’s dependency on the deductive reasoning would render it highly impractical. In addition to
this inherent constraint, the set of theories centered on “balance of power” have also been questioned
widely [Rasheed 2018, Schweller 2016, Brooks & Wohlforth 2008, Claude 1989] for its apparent
failure to explain some observed regional and international alliance formations, dubious adaptability
in today’s increasing more globalized, democratic world, and downright dismissal of the non-power
factors (ideology, norms, identity etc.) in play.

Inspired by the ideology- and power-based narratives and their respective limitations, some have also
proposed to combine the two sets of theories into a singular one. Among those, Gamson [Gamson
1962/1961] developed a formal model that was tested and validated with historical data, yet only in
the context of American nominating conventions. It was also believed [Russett 1968] that the
application of such a unified theoretical model to international politics would be a rather onerous task
– for the lack of available data to capture ideology similarity and payoffs, and the quantitative
11

complexity associated with such models. This belief is further strengthened as we examine some
models in the ensuing decades – for example, in Morrow’s spatial model of international conflict
[Morrow 1986], the analysis was limited to a “two-nation model” for concerns on “empirical
tractability”.

More recent studies [Ryan 2019, Haas 2014] in the international relations literature adopt a meta-level
theoretical treatment of different ideological positions; the model focuses on “number of prominent,
distinct ideological groups” and analyzes the coalition dynamics in “ideological unipolarity, bipolarity
and multipolarity” scenarios. Such meta-level theoretical treatment grossly overlooks how differences
in the ideological position arrangements, even as the same number of ideological groups, may
significantly impact the coalition dynamics. Fortunately, a more deliberate theoretical framework
exists, as we shall introduce in Section 2.2.
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2.1.2 Reliability of Alliances

It is widely acknowledged that due to the absence of governing authority to enforce or manage
alliances among nations (or members in comparable scenarios), the alliance arrangements are
particularly prone to opportunism and defection [Fenik et al. 2020, Niou & Zeigler 2019, Smith 1995,
Morrow 1994]. Although some states might have had hope of pacta sunt servanda (promises are
always kept) while joining an alliance, in reality such an arrangement would often only be honored to
the extent that it remains a favorable option – a promise often not kept [Mello 2020, Massie 2016,
Kegley and Raymond 1990]. Given the anarchic context and utilitarian nature of the alliance formation
process, we divert our attention to factors that would have caused the prior coalition arrangement to
lose its appeal. In an earlier study [Leeds 2003] of data on alliance commitments between 1816 and
1944, it is found that the commitments are unfulfilled in approximately 25% of the time.4

Upon closer examination of the data from the Correlates of War (COW) project [Izmirlioglu 2017, Small
& Singer 1982], the results show that both changes in power of member states and changes in domestic
institutions (shift in political interests) increase the probability of violating alliance commitments.
Additionally, it is found that the major powers and non-democratic states are more likely to fail their
alliance commitments. It is further believed that while the costs associated with forming and
abandoning an alliance may contribute to the stability of the commitment, they often pale in face of
power and political interests [Fearon 1994].

In summary, the reliability of an alliance commitment depends largely on how favorable it appears to
its member states, as compared to all possible alternatives at any given time. In case sufficiently
significant endogenous (political interests) changes or exogenous (power changes) occur, the measure

4 The Alliance Treaty Obligations and provisions (ATOP) data set by Leeds, Long and Mitchell was used; the authors find that of the 110 alliances
invoked by war between 1816 and 1944, the commitments were honored in only 82 of the instances, or 74.5% of the cases. [Leeds et al. 2002]
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of favorability often changes with them, thus leading to the failure to honor the existing commitments
– as better choices are now available [Parkhe 1998].

A series of recent tumultuous events further demonstrate the idea: in the late 2000s, we saw the
disintegration of the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” [Baltrusaitis 2010] as many member states
withdrew from Iraq [Mello 2020, Cantir 2011]; in 2016, many learned in disbelief of the UK’s decision
to withdrawal from the European Union following nationwide referendum [2016]; and as recently as
2017, we witnessed the incumbent U.S. President’s decision to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) [Trump 2017] and promotion of the “America First” ethos that upset many of its allies globally.
These notable defections from the international military, political and economic alliances serve as a
constant reminder of the fragility of international alliances throughout history, and the opportunistic
nature of the underlying decision-making process.

14

2.2 Legislatures and Elections

A plethora of literature exists describing coalition dynamics in the setting of legislatures and elections.
In particular, many have focused on developing theoretical frameworks to understand two most
relevant topics: (1) formation of coalition government [Dragu & Laver 2019, Frachino & Wratil 2019,
Dunleavy & Bastow 2001, Laver & Shepsle 1990] (in the spatial theory setting: in particular, the term

spatial theory here refers to the concept of objective space for legislative party competitions; it is not
to be confused with the concept of spatial statistics); and (2) estimation of utility associated with policy
ideological space and the bargaining process [Battaglini 2019, Evans 2018, Fujiwara & Sanz 2018,
Laver et al. 2011] (differentiating office-seeking vs. policy-seeking behaviors).

Before we look into the two branches of research interests, we hereby also provide a comparative
description of the premises in the legislature context versus those in the international relations
paradigm. The setup is often as following: (1) The players are political parties rather than states; (2)
The situation is often competitive; (3) No single party is in a dominant position such that it can win by
itself, so that it must form an coalition to win; (4) Only the members of the one and only winning
coalition receive rewards; (5) Once a settlement is reached (as the coalition becomes the incumbent
government), proper institutional arrangements are often in place to ensure the fair distribution of
rewards.
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2.2.1 Formation of Government and the Concept of Policy Space
Space

Most of the literature since 1960s in the realm of coalition formation in political institutions was
inspired by the work of William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions [Riker 1962]. It was among
the first to propose the concept of “size principle”: according to which, “in n-person, zero-sum games,
where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect
information, only a minimum winning coalition can occur.” The theory essentially proclaims that the
participants in such a game would always seek to join or form a coalition that is just powerful enough
to win the game but not too large to dilute the share of rewards from winning.

In the decades that followed, Riker’s “size principle” has been often used as an important theoretical
framework across numerous empirical studies [Holler 2018, Ofek 2017, Campbell et al. 2012, AlonsoMeijide & Freixas 2010, Kim 1989, Dodd 1974]. Meanwhile, its approach and premises are also
subsequently challenged by many either for its failure in predicting reasonably stable structures of
collation for scenarios with large number of participants, or its oversimplifications of the motivation
for forming coalitions.

Specifically, Butterworth [Butterworth 1971] refutes the necessity of minimum winning coalitions and
proposes the alternative concept of “maximum positive gainers” principle, which focuses on positive

payoffs rather than the number of players alone. Shepsle [Shepsle

1974] further reviewed

Butterworth’s challenge in the game theory setting, with alternative solution concepts including the
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set; through more
rigorous examination, Shepsle questions the soundness of Butterworth’s challenge while
acknowledging the ambiguous nature of the validity for Riker’s size principle, and concludes, “the
prospects for generalization [of the size principle], however, are somewhat less promising”.
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More recent empirical studies [Wolford 2017] on war-winning coalitions and postwar peace suggest
that alliance commitments and great power participation produce more surprising patterns of
coalition structures that cannot be full explained by Riker’s size principle. Latest research on legislative
bargaining [Casas & Gonzalez-Eiras 2019] further finds that repeated attempts to conciliate the
theoretical predictions (based on the size principle) with the evidence have simply failed. This finding
is further validated in ensuing chapters of this work where we present a case study on the Israeli
Knesset.

Aware of the deficiencies in the size principle, Laver and Shepsle [Laver & Shepsle 1994, 1990] argue
that the proposed allocation of cabinet portfolios is essential to the coalition bargaining process. They
analyzed coalition bargaining over credible alternatives of policy combinations in multiple dimensions
and applied the approach to real-world examples of coalition bargaining and formation. The setup of
the model is as follows: in a non-cooperative multi-party proposal game, each party has a unique
position in the policy space (two-dimensional as shown in Fig. 2.1), and assigns different utility values
to other positions in the policy space (in a descending manner for positions further away from its own)
with boundary. Only the policy positions within the boundary may be considered credible. The
positions deemed credible by multiple parties would therefore become possible policy portfolios for
consideration, thus leading to the corresponding forms of coalitions. In the cabinet setting, each party’s
size (number of seats) is also taken into consideration such that only certain coalition choices entail
enough seats to form the government, adding further constraints to the equilibrium conditions.
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Figure 2.1: A sample two-dimensional policy space

A sample two-dimensional policy space with three political parties, at BB, AA, CC positions respectively. Each party’s policy boundary is
represented by the arc centered at its policy position, and only policy positions (lattices) that fall within the bounds will be considered by the
party. [Laver and Shepsle 1990, Mexican Standoff]

The spatial theory approach to the analysis of coalition government offers an important alternative to
the oversimplifying “size principle” narrative. With consideration to actual ideology alignments, it
successfully explains a wide range of coalition dynamics from empirical observations.

Nevertheless, the Laver-Shepsle model has several technical and theoretical limitations:

-

Omission of sheer office-seeking behavior: its premises stipulate that the political parties seek
to implement its policy position through allocation of cabinet portfolios, but omits any
potential office-seeking motivations of the participants;

-

Fixation on lattice points: the setup of the model does not allow any form of compromises such
that an agreeable point exists away from the fixed lattice points (which corresponds to
discrete cabinet portfolio allocations), as the model assumes that individual office position
can’t be “split”, nor any pact could be made;

-

Insufficient description of utility computations: the model does not offer clear, systematic
guidance on utility computations.
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Such limitations have been noted in several ensuing studies on coalition politics [Dunleavy & Bastow
2001, Jun 2007, Goodhart 2013, Thomson et al. 2017]. While being a prominent theoretical
advancement, the Laver-Shepsle model stipulates highly restrictive, if not unrealistic, assumptions on
the coalition formation process, unchallenged power of ministerial offices in enforcing the party’s
policy, and empirically questionable approach to viewing utility allocations.

Next, we briefly discuss some relevant research work on utility computations in the spatial theory of
party competition and voting.
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2.2.2 Utility Associated
Associated with Policy and Ideological Space

Research work on policy spaces and voter preferences [Tiemann 2019, Kurella 2017, Crombez 1996,
Austen-Smith & Banks 1988, Baron 1991, Thurner 2000] proposes specific utility functions based on
the spatial theory of party competition and voting. In the multi-dimensional policy ideological space
setting, players are assumed to have their unique ideal positions, with Euclidean preferences over
different policy positions.

For the special case of unidimensional space, let rst be the ideal position for play W, then its preference
(measured by utility) over another policy position r′ may be represented as:

vw (rx ) = g(|rst − rx |),

Equation 2.1

where g is a strictly decreasing function, and since the range of input is [0, +∞), it is easy to see that
by construction that the player assigns maximum utility preference for its own ideal policy position,
and decreasing utility preference for policy positions with further Euclidean distances. A graph
representation of policy dimension is shown below, in Fig 2.2.

Figure 2.2: The Dilemma of Policy Dimension and Euclidean Preferences
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2.2.3 The Bargaining Process and Other Motivations for Coalition Formation

In the context of legislative or coalition government formation, the bargaining process often involves
the setting of public policies and assignment of government offices. In our prior discussion of the
spatial theory, much focus was given to the setting of public policies rather than the latter. Early
substantive work on legislative bargaining process was done by Baron and Ferejohn [BF 1989], which
later inspired a diverse range of Baron-Ferejohn style bargaining models for coalition formation.
According the work by Laver, de Marchi and Mutlu [Laver et al. 2011], a typical Baron-Ferejohn
bargaining model includes following:

… an exogenously determined and fixed set of disciplined political parties; an exogenous
automaton that determines a vector | that specifies the number of legislators, with }w
controlled by each party W ; and an exogenously determined quota ~ of legislators required
to pass any proposal. At the start of each round, one party is picked at random as the
formateur, with exclusive rights to make proposal to others. If the number of votes in favor
formateur
exceeds ~ , the proposal passes and its payoff immediately consumed (shared among its
proponents). Otherwise, the proposal fails, no payoff is generated, and a new round begins.
A prominent feature of the Baron-Ferejohn model is its inclusion of the formateur in the arbitrary nparty setting. Although the original Baron-Ferejohn model was illustrated in only a three-party
scenario, many extensions emerged upon its core principles in studying the coalition bargaining
process in such non-homogenous games [Laver et al. 2011] with greater complications. In such
settings, it is further deduced that parties always attempt to form coalitions based on the minimum
winning coalition principle, yet with the presence of formateur advantage 5. This added complexity
would lead to unexpected results for coalition dynamics in the non-homogenous games, thus further

The formateur advantage theory states that the party selected to actively make the proposal would get a higher share of payoff from the coalition,
should the proposal passes.
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5

challenging the fundamental assumptions regarding motivation and reward distribution in
homogenous games.

Figure 2.3: Observed party shares of cabinet ministries for formateur and non-formateur parties

Formateur parties marked X, non-formateur parties marked O (Source: Laver et al. 2010, STA replication dataset)

Fortunately, empirical evidences suggest otherwise, as shown in Fig. 2.3 above: the proportion of office
positions allocated to each government-forming party, after the bargaining process, tends to strongly
equal the proportion of legislative seats contributed by the party in the voting process. Essentially, the
(committed) normalized power in the bargaining process strongly determines the final distribution of
rewards, and it may be said with remarkable confidence, that the large volume of observations from
the real world suggests no existence of the formateur advantage from the earlier bargaining models –
an observation and belief often referred to as the Gamson’s Law of Proportionality [Gamson 1961,
Browne & Franklin 1973, Warwick and Druckman 2006].

The Gamson’s Law has profound implications on our analysis of the motivations in coalition formation:
essentially, it states that the division of rewards that are available as a result of a passed proposal, or
the winning of a credible coalition, to be predominately dependent upon a singular factor – normalized
22

power considerations. As this shall serve as an important empirical foundation to the theoretical
construction of our model in later chapters.
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2.3 Game Theory

The study of the coalition dynamics with the game theoretical approach largely flourished after the
publication of the monumental work Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and

Morgenstern [von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Shenoy 1979]. While most of the early research in
the n-person game theory primarily concerns themselves with payoff and utility predictions, they did
lay important groundwork for the notable amount of growing literature on coalition formation to this
date. As we survey the landscape of this field of research, we focus on the set of theories that primarily
has to do with the formation process of the coalitions.

Two distinct classical approaches exist to explain the coalition formation process [Chatain 2016]. The
first approach, emerged from the branch of cooperative game theory, is primarily concerned with joint
determination of a coalition structure and the allocation of the coalitional surplus among its members
(therefore the cooperativeness). Typical theories [Maali 2009, Aumann and Maschler 1964, Shapley
1971, Aumann & Meyerson 1988] in this area involve concepts of blocking, the stable set and far-

sightedness. An alternative and more recent approach, constructed in a non-cooperative setting, often
involves the proposal-making process for coalition formation. Essentially, at the beginning of each
round, some member creates a proposal for coalition; should all members involved in the proposed
coalition agree to accept it, the proposed coalition is formed; otherwise, the proposal is voided and the
round ends. [Miller and Vanberg 2013, Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Bloch 1996, Seidmann and Winter
1998, Bernheim et al. 1987] As one would expect, the non-cooperative coalition formation process
involves the notion of proposal games and Nash Equilibrium. In the following sections, we elaborate
on the two approaches and related concepts, and review general assumptions and concepts on perfect
information and equilibrium states.
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2.3.1 Cooperative Games

The Setting

Formally, let • be a set of players. A coalition is any nonempty subset of •. We may denote

coalitions by €, •, etc. In cooperative game theory, a characteristic function is then introduced,
which assigns a set of payoff vectors ‚(€) to every coalition €.

The payoff vector to a particular coalition € takes values in ℝ|„| , i.e. assigning a real number (value of
the payoff) to each player in the coalition €. This payoff structure assumes that each individual player
would have a unique payoff on its own, and the received payoffs are non-transferrable [Nowak et al.
1994, Sprumont 1990, Perry and Reny 1994]. Alternatively, we may adopt a different payoff structure
and corresponding characteristic function, under the assumption of transferrable utility - in such case,
the new characteristic function ignores individual payoffs and only assigns a payoff value to the entire
coalition, denoted as [(€), taking values in in ℝ.

The characteristic function, which defines the payoff to the players under any specific coalition
structure, is fundamental to many derivative concepts and definitions in the traditional development
of cooperative game theory. Essentially, the entire concept of joint determination of coalition structure
is built upon the idea that the players will have to agree upon some structure that would lead to a nondecreasing payoff for them as compared to the status quo. Naturally, as we study the dynamics of the
coalition structure, our primary interest lies in its equilibrium states – now we shall explore the
concept of the core.
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The Core and Stable Outcomes

Having introduced the concept of characteristic function, we now turn to a formal definition of the
equilibrium, namely the core. But first, we define a supporting concept of blocking as following:

Consider a coalition • ⊆ •, we say that the allocation of a coalition € ⊆ • is blocking that of •
if there exists an allocation † ∈ ‚(•), ‡ ∈ ‚(€), ‡ˆ ≫ †Š , where ‹ = • ∩ €, ‹ ≠ ∅.

Essentially, we say an allocation from a particular coalition would block that of another one if the
former can offer better payoff to any member in the later coalition. In the case of a transferrable utility
game, the concept is simplified to:

|ˆ|

|ˆ|

† is blocked if [(€) ⋅ |„| > [(•) ⋅ |•|,

Equation 2.2

which basically states that when the players in subset ‹ ⊆ • can collectively receive better allocation
by being in coalition alternative €, the allocation from € is blocking that of •.

The core of a characteristic function is therefore defined as the set of all unblocked allocations. And in
light of the concept of outcome stability, it is obvious that an outcome is stable only if all coalitions
manifested in it belongs to the core such that no coalition or members of a coalition is interested in
deviating from the outcome state.

Despite the importance of the core in tracing equilibrium states in cooperative games, it has several
limitations: for one, the core is not necessarily nonempty – and in that case, there is no specific set of
theories or heuristics in place to predict the outcome of the game; on the other hand, even if the core
exists and is nonempty – the concept itself is focused merely on the end-state rather than the dynamics,
as it omits path-dependency for any possible equilibrium states. In the words of Ray [2006], the core
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is too black-boxed a concept, for it fails to offer any predictions when it is empty; and even when it is
not, it tells little about the dynamics and how we get there.

Clearly, many were aware of these limitations [Konishi & Ray 2003, Chwe 1994, Dutta & Ray 1989, Ray
& Vohra 1999], and have attempted to build theories for the missing parts of the puzzle. These methods
range from (1) introducing the idea of farsightedness to account for both present and future states, (2)
eliminating and replacing characteristic functions altogether, to (3) evaluating possible coalition
structures not on payoff alone but also with the idea of “credibility”. Among all these attempts, there is
one simple yet immensely important idea – to study the coalition formation process as a noncooperative game.

It might be somewhat counter-intuitive as we think of the process and the very notion of coalition, and
questions would emerge in our mind: How would the process look in a non-cooperative game setting?
Is it even possible to form something cooperative in nature in a non-cooperatively manner? We explore
the answers as we review the process in a non-cooperative setting below.
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2.3.2 NonNon-Cooperative Games

Previously, we reviewed the cooperative approach to coalition formation, where the attention was
upon joint determination of coalition outcomes based on payoff defined by the characteristic function
in the game. The particular approach is largely influenced by the earlier work in the field [Aumann &
Dreze 1974, Staatz 1983, Bogomolnaia & Jackson 2002] and the widely accepted implication from the
cooperative nature of coalitions [Packer & Pusey 1982, Gamson 1961]: since the coalition emerges out
of a need to cooperatively achieve something, its formation should also be a cooperative process. It
does not take one much effort to see the fallacy in this reasoning – the purpose of an objective does not
necessarily dictate the nature of the means taken to achieve the particular objective. Therefore, we
turn to the study of the non-cooperative games, where the active players may decide their preferences
individually through proposal and negotiation. Correspondingly, the concept of blocking and core is
replaced by the bargaining process, during which the plausible proposals are proposed, then rejected
or accepted over time.

The Setting

A typical non-cooperative bargaining game [Bloch 1997, Ray & Vohra 1999, Fréchette et al. 2005] in
discrete time setting is described as such:

(i)

A set of players start out being without membership in any coalition (or may each be
treated as a singleton of coalition);

(ii)

At the beginning of each round, a pre-defined Bayesian protocol selects one player as the
proposer (often stochastically);

(iii)

The selected proposer of the round then shall freely make any particular plausible payoff
allocation to any subset of the players to form a coalition;
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(iv)

The proposal is passed onto each of the players in the proposed coalition in a sequential
manner;
a.

If all involved players accept the proposal, the proposed coalition is formed and the
players would leave the game, while the remaining players enter next round;

b.

Otherwise, the proposal fails, and the entire set of players move onto next round.

Accordingly, we write the formal model expression as follows:

Formally, let • be a set of players. A coalition is any nonempty subset of • . In the noncooperative bargaining process, a proposal is a pair (€, †), where † is the proposed allocation
to the players in the proposed coalition €. Recalling earlier assumptions in the cooperative
game with transferrable utility and no external payoff other than the value of the coalition
itself, we have ∑w∈„ iw = [(€).

The game is set in discrete time, so at the beginning of a round •, a player is selected as the
proposer according to a protocol. The selected player in • makes a proposal (€, †). Players in
€ respond sequentially according to the protocol with “accept” or “reject” options.

•

If no members of € rejects the proposal, then the coalition € is formed and the game
continues with the remaining set of players, • − € in round • + 1;

•

Otherwise, the proposal fails, and a new proposer is selected for the game continues
in round • + 1.

A few variations of the bargaining process exist. These variations are primarily due to different
assumptions for one or several of the following components of the model:
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•

Choosing the proposer: some models assume uniform probability in its random choosing of
proposers [Okada 1996, Baron and Ferejohn 1989] and the protocol is somewhat memoryless (in the sense it does not consider previous choices); others start with an initial proposer
and then selects any players who are the first to reject a current proposal to become the
proposer for next round [Chatterjee et al. 1993].

•

Elapse of Time: as the game proceeds in a sequential manner, most models [Chatterjee et al.
1993] simply assumes discrete time setting and each event takes one unit of time. Some
attempts to introduces a more sophisticated continuous time game and time-related discount
factor, to support an additional component on farsightedness so that players would prefer
proposals with payoffs in the near future rather than far future.

•

Binding or Non-binding proposals: while most models assume that once accepted by all
players, a proposed coalition is irreversibly formed [Okada 1996, Bloch 1996, Ray and Vohra
1999], some allows re-negotiation of existing arraignments. [Seidmann and Winter 1998,
Gomes 2005]

•

Approving the proposal: In the non-binding proposal setting, a closely related variation
involves how the proposal is approved – while most binding proposal models require
unanimous approval, some models simply require a majority vote.

•

Payoffs in the game: in the binding proposal setting, payoffs are immediately realized as the
coalitions are formed; however, with non-binding proposal games, the payoffs may be
distributed partially at each round, or only realized in the end, either by termination of the
game or reaching a stable outcome.
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2.3.3 Equilibrium States for the Game Theoretical Models

Given the amount and diversity of available literature, one can easily be lost in the wide range of
equilibrium conditions set forth across different game theoretical models. However, some [PérezCastrillo 1994, Harsanyi & Selten 1988] have also proven that given some reasonable prerequisites,
equivalent stable solution sets can be found in both cooperative and non-cooperative games. For these
reasons, we refrain from making a lengthy review of the formal definition or mathematical expressions
of equilibrium states that only hold for a particular model. Instead, we make a few summary remarks
on the generalized conditions for equilibrium states across most of the game theoretical models of
coalition formation thus far. This involves two fundamental notions, namely, Markov Perfect

Equilibrium and far-sightedness.
A prominent topic of research in extensive form games has been the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)
[Johari MS&E 336 Notes 2007, Doraszelski & Escobar 2010]. The MPE concept [Acemoglu et al. 2008,
Ray and Vohra 1998] is essentially a refinement of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium concept for
extensive form games where a payoff-relevant state space is readily defined. An MPE is a set of mixed
strategies for each of the players with following criteria:

•

The strategies bear the Markovian property of memorylessness, such that each player’s move
is only dependent on the current state of the game;

•

Each state only contains payoff-relevant information, such that the players would have no
information other than the payoff associated with each state, which prevents any externalities
or complication in payoffs;

•

The strategies always form the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium as well, i.e., each move
taken by the players must also be in accordance with Nash equilibrium of the state.

In the context of coalition dynamics, these criteria translate into following:
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•

Each player’s move shall only depend upon the current coalition topology (the past states are
always foregone);

•

The players are primarily concerned with the payoff associated with each coalition structure;

•

The players would always attempt to act in a way to maximize their payoff in the immediately
next state, regardless of possible moves by other players.

While many variations exist, the idea behind the equilibrium concept for such games is simple: an
equilibrium state is reached when no player can unilaterally make any move to improve its own payoff.
While bearing the risk of over-simplification, the MPE is a valuable concept as we have already been
able to prove its existence for most dynamic stochastic games, and the number of MPEs is often finitely
countable [Doraszelski and Escobar 2010, Maskin & Tirole 2001]. MPE further embodies three
philosophical considerations beyond its practical virtues, according to [Maskin & Tirole 2001]: first,
Markov strategies prescribe the simplest form of rational behavior; second, Markov constraints
emphasizes the notion that bygones are bygones; third, it embodies the principle that minor causes

should have minor effects – essentially, only those significant aspects of the past would have a
considerable effect on the status quo.

Despite its advantages, it is not difficult for one to foresee the limitations associated with the solution
concepts derived from the MPE setting: due to the sub-game Nash equilibrium constraint, we are
forcing players to be myopic in determining their moves. Specifically, since each move taken by the
players must never lead to a non-positive payoff change, the players bound by this myopic constraint
are deprived of the opportunity to take a short-term loss for a long-term gain: essentially, they would
ignore, or not be able to consider the reactions from other players when a particular move is taken. A
rather amusing real-world example illustrating the consequences of such myopic strategies would be
a typical college student spending most of the days leading up to the exam playing computer games for
the great joy it brings to him or her (instead of reading through the boring notes). The student would
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only start cramming for the exam shortly before, as the thought of failing the exam finally manages to
deter him or her from taking the joyful choice of playing computer games, and study finally becomes
the better choice. With reference to the equilibrium solution concepts reviewed earlier, we should be
aware that the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the core, or the Nash equilibrium concepts in
cooperative and non-cooperative games are all myopic in nature – in the sense that they are not only

“foregoing the past”, but also “ignoring the future”.
Therefore, we turn to the notion of farsightedness to derive a different set of solution concepts where
the future is taken into account. As mentioned earlier, the inception of this notion is largely motivated
by the scholarly dissatisfaction with the myopic nature embedded in the early models in both
cooperative and non-cooperative games [Chamberlin 1933, Harsanyi 1974, Chwe 1994]. Contrary to
their myopic counterparts, the proposed farsighted solution concepts characterize stable outcomes
based on a different set of conditions. The stable states are not stable due to the absence of immediately
profitable moves in the particular sub-game, but rather due to the fact that the farsighted players in
the game are able to recognize that their own (possibly profitable) deviation from the current state
would lead to multiple deviations for other players, which would further leading to a much less
desirable state.

To date variety of farsighted solutions have been proposed, ranging from the dynamic Markov process
approach by Konishi and Ray [2003], the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set and largest
consistent set solutions [Chwe 1994], the conservative and optimistic stable standards of behavior by
Greenberg [1990], and most recently, the Sub-game Perfect Consistent Set (SPCS) concept by Granot
and Hanany [2013]. As expected, this very notion has led to the discovery of highly valuable insights
that were unheeded in myopic models. For example, the games with the farsightedness condition often
have more stable states than their myopic counterpart [Chwe 1994]; in addition, under certain
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circumstances, the farsighted stable outcome differs notably from the outcomes in myopic settings in
terms of the final coalition structure.6

We will revisit the concept of farsightedness in Chapter 3, in order to incorporate it into our coalition
dynamics model and write its formal definitions in our setting.

6 In the work of Granot and Yin 2008, the unique farsighted stable coalition structure is the grand coalition, while the myopic stable outcome is a
merely a collection of singleton coalitions.
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2.4 The AgentAgent-Based Modeling Paradigm
2.4.1 A Brief History of Computational Modeling in Social Sciences

Since the dawn of the computer age, computational simulations have been widely used [Gilbert 1999]
in scenarios where mathematical modeling (sometimes referred to as equation-based modeling)
cannot help yield tractable solutions or handle the complexity of the problems. According to [Gilbert
& Troitzsch 1999], three distinct phases exist in the development computational simulations in the
field of social sciences: macro-simulation, micro-simulation, and agent-based modeling.

As the earliest of the three, macro-simulation models mostly consist of sets of differential equations,
and are primarily concerned with high-level dynamics and properties of the system. Essentially,
modelers in this paradigm utilize computing resources to construct and solve complex mathematical
but what is possible using closed form solution methods. Its applications span over topics including
labor markets [Bergmann 1990], population growth [Keilman & Brunborg 1995, Sheps 1971, Willigan
et al. 1982], traffic flows [Flötteröd & Nagel 2007, Helbing et al. 2002] and effects of government policy
[Cogneau & Robilliard 2004, Fukawa & Sato 2009].

With the advancement of computing technologies, micro-simulation emerged as a more refined
version of its macro- predecessor. In contrast to the macro model’s holistic approach, micro-simulation
is focused on modeling the dynamics between decision-making individuals in the system with a
“bottom-up strategy”. In a typical micro-simulation model, the system dynamics are simulated by
utilizing data from samples of individuals along with equations governing the interactions. The main
difference and refinement in the micro-simulation is that it allows the modeler to trace changes over
each individual of the population rather than the change at population level alone. [Macy & Willer 2002]
Nevertheless, one should not confuse micro-simulation with agent-based modeling: first, the microsimulation does not allow actual “social” interaction between individuals. Second, the decision-making
process is still governed at the system level with micro-level analytical simulations, rather than
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contained within each individual. Therefore, it is more appropriate to view micro-simulation as a
derived version of macro-simulation with distinct properties for each subset (or unit) of the
population.

The expansion of the agent-based modeling (ABM) approach came as a more recent development, as
ABM requires more advanced computational resources for its design and simulation. Yet the concept
itself can be traced back to the von Neumann probe in the 1940s – when the renowned mathematician
and physicist John von Neumann wondered if “a machine can be programmed to replicate itself” [von
Neumann & Burks 1966]. As a response to this query, Ulam and von Neumann developed the notion of
the cellular automaton [Ulam & von Neumann 1945]. A cellular automaton is a set of cells, where each
cell can be in one of multiple pre-defined states. Changes in the state of any particular cell depends on
its own prior states and the history of its neighboring cells [Janssen & Ostrom 2006]. The concept
became more widely known when it was adopted by Conway [Gardner 1970] in his design of the “Game
of Life”, demonstrating how complex global patterns can emerge as a result of local interactions
following a few simple rules. Despite the simplicity of these early concepts and models, they have laid
important theoretical foundations for the evolution of ABM and its rapid expansion in the past few
decades.
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2.4.2 AgentAgent-Based Modeling

The rise of the ABM paradigm is closely associated with several trends in both academia and industry
[Epstein 2006, Macal & North 2005, Bonabeau 2002, Parunak et al. 1998]. First, the increased
complexity of many systems in question essentially precludes the effectiveness of other modeling
methods. Second, for many real-world issues in analysis, there are now a greater amount of data
available at individual agent levels, thus making it possible to construct a more refined model. Finally,
such progress is further facilitated by the rapid advancement of computational power.

Due to ABM’s widespread applications, multiple versions of its core assumptions (definitions of the

agents) exist. According to the relevant literature and propositions by several prominent scholars in
the field [Silverman 2006, Macy & Willer 2002, Holland & Miller 1991], we reiterate key assumptions
(characteristics) of the agents as following:

•

Agents are selfself-contained and autonomous. An agent has its own behavior and decisionmaking capability. The system is not modeled at the global level, but from the uncoordinated,
local interactions among the autonomous agents.

•

Agents are interdependent. An agent often lives in an environment where it interacts with
other agents. The interaction may either be direct (such that its behavior changes that of
others) or indirect (such that its behavior changes the environment, which consequently
changes the behavior of others).

•

Agents follow rules and are (often) utilitarian. An agent generally follows a set of rules, simple
or complex. In addition, the agent is often designed to act in a manner that would help achieve
a particular objective, while the objective itself may vary from one scenario to another.

•

Agents can be adaptive and have memory. An agent can be designed to learn from its past
interactions and adapt accordingly. Its learning capability naturally requires some form of
memory.
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With these properties for individual agents, ABM simulation often leads to (unexpected) emergent
behaviors that bridges the relevance between the micro and macro levels. These properties make it
particularly suitable for modeling scenarios of greater complexity and deriving outcomes or patterns
for otherwise intractable problems. In the following section, we will now discuss a few agent-based
models that touch upon the subject of multi-objective nature in coalition dynamics.
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2.4.3 AgentAgent-Based Models on MultiMulti-Objective Coalition Dynamics

In this section, we review three agent-based models in multi-party competitive settings.

The first model, LeaderSim, is a simulation capability built on human behavior models. While
LeaderSim’s prototype did not contain explicit modules or algorithms on coalition dynamics, its leader
agents were able to shift the primary task (due to corresponding preference or priority changes) from
one category to another, based on the state of the game. The model lends us insights on the aspect of
multi-objectiveness for multi-party competitive games.

We then look at a model with over two decades of development by Bueno de Mesquita (“BDM”), from
the field of computational social sciences. We discuss its premises and the expected utility, a concept
of great significance, in the context of multi-party competition/negotiations. We selectively discuss
some of the model’s algorithm’s and its mathematical background, due to a lack of comprehensive
publication7 on the details. Despite its limitations, the BDM model introduces us to the basic concepts
of utility, stochastic process and position that will be adapted in our own model.

Lastly, we look into simulation platform named Senturion. Due to its similarity to the BDM model, we
primarily review its simulation workflow in search of inspiration for building our own baseline agentbased model.

7

Due to his intellectual property concerns, BDM does not publish the full extent of this model
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2.4.3.1 PMFserv,
PMFserv, SocioSocio-Cultural Games and LeaderSim

To address the challenges in improving realism of socially intelligent agents, Silverman et al.
[Silverman 2004; Silverman, Johns et al. 2006] introduced a state-of-art Human Behavior Model (HBM).
Their HBM paid particular attention to personality and cultural values along with physiological effects
on individual and group decision-making processes. To pursue this goal, they assessed the state of the
practice, and integrated human performance moderator functions (PMFs) from four domains of
human behavioral literature [Cassenti 2009]: psychobiological; personality, culture and affect; social;
and cognitive. From there, Silverman et al. built the unifying architecture based on existing PMF
theories, and the PMFserv library as the cognitive modeling framework to implement these theories
in modeling & simulation.

In order to further model and test competing hypotheses on the dynamics of real world conflict
situations, Silverman et al. developed the research agenda for improving simulation of socio-cultural
games. In the socio-cultural setting, the game focuses on agents in different groups: Each group (and
its members) is then characterized by its own set of norms, values, and social interactions; the group
also has a leader that dedicates its members’ collective actions or other aspects of life (such as resource
allocation). The groups and leaders built in PMFserv are then put in competitive settings for more
detailed observation.

In this context, Silverman et al. also created a software prototype called LeaderSim [Silverman 2009],
where the world scenarios and action sets are implemented in their simplest possible forms to test the
core ideas of the theory. In its primitive version, LeaderSim game was made of a world containing at
most 3 abstract territories, each with different categories of resources. Each of the territories is
controlled by its own leader, who is endowed with a set of 3 hostile and 3 non-hostile actions in the
game. Each leader’s values and personality traits are represented systematically through a GSP tree
(Goals, Standards, and Preferences). The GSP tree of each leader then determines its utility functions,
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essentially forming a unique, personality-like strategy/action profile for each leader in simulation. We
have included a detailed GSP tree for a fictional leader below, in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4: A GSP Tree Structure Example
“Weights and Emotional Activations for Richard the Lionheart While Sieging and Ransoming the Town of Acre During the Third Crusade”
[Silverman 2004, LeaderSim technical report]

In the actual simulation, each leader would apply a given set of rules with reference to its own GSP tree
to evaluate the most profitable move for itself and carry it out (with a probabilistic element to its
outcome/effects). To the modelers’ delight, the AI agents were observed to be behaving akin to actual
world leaders with similar traits [Silverman et al. 2007, Silverman & Bharathy 2005]. In addition, there
were intriguing findings from the simulated runs that while the GSP trees of the leaders were fixed,
their preferred set of actions evolved with the elapse of time.
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One observation showed that one leader would forgo continued hostile actions against another, when
the latter became weaker after earlier rounds of defeats. This recurring phenomenon naturally
generated lasting interest in exploring the underlying drivers of the dynamics in such scenarios and
led to further development in the PMFserv framework. Almost a decade later, with the increased
complexity in its successor models (StateSim) 8 , the earlier LeaderSim and its system dynamics
undoubtedly inspired and guided this research to study how multi-objectiveness would influence the
coalition dynamics.

8 We provide a detailed overview of its successor model, StateSim, in later chapters where we test and embed our Coalition Dynamics model on
the StateSim platform.
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2.4.3.2 BDM Model

Some in the field of computational social/political sciences have made similar endeavors in
formulating tractable models to explain and predict group decision outcomes. Among them, Bueno de
Mesquita (often abbreviated to “BDM”) has received most attention and recognition for his model of
group decision-making, based on the expected utility theory. The research began in the 1980 with
BDM’s first paper on his theory of expected utility and discussion on interstate conflicts, followed by a
series of publications on model descriptions, model revisions, case studies until early 2000s [BDM
1980, BDM 1984, BDM 1986, BDM 1994, BDM 1997, BDM 2004].

A thorough examination of the BDM model has often proven to be an uneasy task. Due to intellectual
property concerns (the ownership of the BDM model and relevant source code remains with his former
firm), BDM cannot publish the detailed algorithms of the model. This barrier has imposed quite some
difficulty for fellow scholars [Scholz et al. 2011, Gallagher & Hanson 2015] who attempt to replicate
the results. In their analysis of the BDM model, Scholz et al. even found that “significant errors and
obfuscations occur in the process to replicate the model and results from the BDM 1997 paper and
later work”. Nevertheless, Scholz et al. are the first to conduct a highly comprehensive review and
analysis of the BDM model, and managed to derive a working model and software that reproduces
BDM’s earlier results with adequate accuracy. For the rest of this section, we will briefly discuss the
BDM model in terms of its core ingredients, input-output relations and related equations. We will focus
on the version studied (and successfully replicated) by Scholz et al. 2011 for the discussion.
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Basic Ingredients

BDM treats a single issue in a metric scale, and a position on the scale would correspond to a state of
the issue. In his own description of this setup in the multi-party negotiation scenario for emission
standards [BDM 1994],

The term hw represents each nation’s preferred state, measured in years, by which emission
standards should be applied to medium-sized automobiles as revealed at the outset of
discussion on the issue.

At initialization, each agent W holds a position hw on the issue, representing their most preferred state
of the issue. Each agent is also endowed with capability ]w on a metric scale, representing the agent’s
overall capability to influence the process of negotiation. A relevant concept of salience `w is further
introduced, to represent the agent’s willingness to exert influence during the process of negotiation
over the particular issue. In this setup, we assume the product of salience and capability ]w ⋅ `w would
represent the agent’s ability to influence the process of negotiation over the particular issue.

BDM then models the pair-wise contests between agents as a sub-process of the overall negotiation
process. For a selected agent W, it would be presented with the choices to: (1) challenge the other agent
” to adopt its own position hw , with probability of failure/success; or to (2) not challenge agent ”, facing
the possibility of ” ’s other moves that can either make W better or worse. A detailed binary tree
representation illustrating this sub-process by Scholz et al. is presented below:
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Figure 2.5: The Possible Moves and Outcomes of the Sub-process [Scholz et al. 2011]

In Fig. 2.5, agent W, ” starts with their initial position hw , h• , and –, ~, •, ` (with subscripts) along the
arrows represent probabilities associated with each move or outcome, and v (with subscripts)
represent the utility (if realized) associated with each outcome. The expected utility is therefore
characterized by the interaction of both the probability and utility associated with each move. For
example, the expected utility for agent W to challenge agent ” would be:

— w ˜v™š›œœ•žŸ• • = `• ⋅ ¡–ww ⋅ v¢w + ˜1 − –ww ⋅ v£w ¤ + ˜1 − `• ⋅ v¢w

Equation 2.3

The decision-making mechanism for each agent is fairly straightforward: the agent would always
choose the move with highest expected utility at each round.
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Utility Computation, Probability and Median Voter Position

As we have reviewed in preceding paragraphs, the value of expected utility depends on both the utility
and the probability associated with each outcome. Since several variations of the equation sets exist,
we will not review any particular set of equations, but rather to give an overview on the relationships
between these values and given parameters in the model.

An agent’s W view of the utility for a particular outcome depends on the state of the model, as well as
its original position hw . The negative utility associated with failure in challenging another agent
depends on the salience and capability of the agents involved, as well as their respective positions. For
the event/outcome probabilities, the probability depends on the salience and capability of the agents
involved and their respective positions. In the actual negotiation process, such challenges are settled
by “voting” and the outcome is computed through a voting model.

The voting model also leads to an important observation (in part inspired by the Median Voter Theory
[Black 1958]), stating that in a majority election with multiple agents, the agents would always move
towards a median optimum that most agents find to be least unfavorable.

Alliance Probability

BDM also proposes the concept of alliance probability, an estimator based on the ratio between
supporting and resistive votes, as a measure of the probability of winning a bilateral contest. Despite
its name, the concept does not consider multi-party competition or multi-coalition (more than 2
alliance groups) scenarios, which are indispensable settings for studying alliances. Thus we find term
misleading, and argue that its definition is of no relevance to the concept of alliance or coalition in our
model.
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Inspiration from the BDM Model

The BDM model has several limitations: First, it is single-issue focused with no consideration for
scenarios when multiple issues exist (a curious setting which makes the coexistence of “capability” and
“salience” concepts seemingly redundant). Second, it studies dynamics based on bilateral moves and
utility considerations. Third, given our focus on coalition dynamics, the model yields very limited
insights on the evolution of different coalition groups in a competitive setting.

Nevertheless, the BDM model does provide inspiration to our model with its core elements including
capability, salience, position, as well as its concepts on expected utility and strategy profile in agent
moves. The median voter position concept also serves as an important inspiration and theoretical
support to the idea of negotiated group position in our model, as we discuss in detail in Chapter 3.
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2.4.3.3 Senturion:
Senturion: A Predictive Political Simulation Model
Model

The interest in understanding the influence of competing party’s varying objectives over coalition
dynamics extends beyond the academic realm. With increasing complexity and frequency of intrastate
and interstate conflict situations, the desire to better predict and understand coalition dynamics also
quickly grew among the defense and intelligence community.

A number of models and theories have been developed in this context, utilizing computational
modeling approach to address the challenge. Among them, the Senturion platform developed at the
National Defense University was recognized as one that is capable of predicting with considerable
accuracy in a number of scenarios simulated with the U.S. Department of Defense.

According to the released report in 2006 [Abdollahian et al. 2006], Senturion utilizes an agent-based
modeling approach to analyze the political dynamics in a wide range of contexts, and predict the
evolution of objective positions9 of competing parties over time. The model synthesizes several set of
political science and microeconomic theories including game theory, decision science, spatial
bargaining and microeconomics to devise the decision-making rules for its agents.

In its setup, Senturion considers each agent’s core interests and corresponding objective positions, as
well as their capability to influence the outcome over a particular process. For a given issue, Senturion
simulates the iterative decision-making process among agents with varying level of interests and
influence on the process. The model further assumes that all agents behave in a way that shall
maximize their interests, and seek to join or create coalitions to support their interests (a borrowed
concept from the game theoretical coalition models).

9 The original term in the report is “policy position”, which is essentially the equivalent notion of objective position, as described earlier in this
work.
48

Since the exact mathematics behind the mentioned concepts or the algorithms are not available (while
some may claim they are very similar to those in the BDM model) [Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia

Group, Inc. US No. 07-1596 (2009)], we will primarily focus on the conceptual workflow of the
simulation for the rest of this section.

In the Senturion framework, the conceptual workflow of the coalition dynamics surrounding a single
issue entails following:

•

Initialization: system is initialized with agents’ effective power10 and objective position;

•

Initial Iteration of AgentAgent-based Rules: system computes winning coalition or median position
on the issue, evaluates each agent’s risk profile, and generates a set of intermediate states;

•

Intermediate Dynamics: following the events from earlier rounds of iterations, the
intermediate states are analyzed;

•

Further Iterations: system analyzes evolution from initial states, re-applies the rules and
generates a final state;

•

Anticipated Outcome: when no further dynamics are observed (or by other criteria), the
stable state is then regarded as the anticipated outcome;

•

Interpretation of Outcomes: the final collective objective position is analyzed; and depending
on the position distribution of agents, conflict is predicted.

The graph representation of the initial state, intermediate dynamics, and anticipated outcome are
illustrated in Fig 2.6 below. We also include a more continuous, time-series representation of a
concrete example, on the subject of Palestinian leadership transition from the report.

In the released Senturion report (Fig. 1), Effective Power is defined as the product of Influence (the total power of an agent) and Importance
(the concern the agent has over the issue in study). This setup is very similar to our model, except that the Senturion model discusses dynamics in
a single-issue context, without analyzing possible coalition dynamics across multiple issues.
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Figure 2.6: The Dynamics of Power and Position [Abdollahian et al. 2006]

The Senturion has been applied to a wide range of scenarios and claims to have generated a track
record of making accurate predictions in its case studies and uncovering subtle or unexpected coalition
dynamics focusing on objective positions. While the model does simulate scenarios with multiple
issues, it does not actually study the coalition dynamics simultaneously across these multiple issues.
The utility and objective position is computed individually, and therefore it may lead to contending
outcomes: members in a coalition for shared interest in one issue may be competing in another.
Therefore, we are not able to learn anything about coalition dynamics from the Senturion model.
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2.5 An Interesting Framework: Multidimensional Bargaining Using KTAB
2.5.1 Overview

We are obliged to also mention a similar, though independent, endeavor in this area. It is the King

Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis, also known as
“KTAB”. The toolkit is an open-source platform that allows systematic analysis of Collective Decision-

Making Processes (CDMPs) through agent-based modeling [Wise, Lester & Efird 2016].

Specifically, the authors introduce the concept of CDMP to define the specific branch of problems
involving decision-making among multiple actors. In their own words [Wise, Lester & Efird 2015]:

.. Collective decision-making processes are those in which a group of individual actors interact
to arrive at a single decision (for the group).

Furthermore, the authors stipulate that CDMP entails one core characteristic: interaction. For example,
the uncoordinated price bidding by individual buyers and sellers in commodities market, for example,
would not constitute a CDMP. Collective Decision-Making Process must entail some form of direct

interaction among the participants, where they deliberately coordinate with others to jointly influence
the outcome of the scenario. In particular, CDMPs should involve actors exercising influence in an
attempt to gain a desirable outcome, and CDMPs themselves as strategic interactions in which the
decisions of the actors affect the payoffs for all involved [Morgan 1984, Wise, Lester & Efird 2015].

In the following sections, we first present the basic setup of the KTAB platform, then clarify in detail
how such this framework omits to address several crucial aspects of modeling coalition dynamics. It is
important to emphasize here, that the shared traits between the KTAB platform and our model largely
originates from the shared inspiration and adaptation of critical and widely-cited work on spatial
models [Laver & Shepsle 1990] and collective voting [Bueno de Mesquita 1984a]. Further, the
51

semblance is strictly limited in scope as we intend to investigate an entirely different aspect of the
problem – coalition dynamics.
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2.5.2 Basic Setup

Following the Agent-based Modeling approach, the KTAB platform begins with defining four features
of each actor, listed below.

•

Position: one (or several) spectrum of choices are first constructed, and then each actor has a
position that represents its most preferred set of choices.

•

Influence: the actor’s ability to influence the outcome (a proxy parameter for the power of the
actor if it is fully motivated to utilize its power to influence the outcome)

•

Salience: the indicator of how important the issue is to the actor

•

Exercised Power: a derived quantity from the composite of the actor’s Salience and Influence,
similar to “effective power” of an actor

To extend their initial unidimensional model, Wise et al. then introduced their multi-dimensional
framework [Wise et al. 2016] that includes multiple “Practical Spectrum of Plausible Positions”
(PSPPs). This extension allows users to model more complicate CDMPs that require more than a single
dimensionality of positions. A graphic illustration of the multi-dimensional PSPPs from the original
report is shown in Figure 2.7 below.

As a part of this extension, the authors further introduce the concept of Salience to capture how much
importance an actor attaches to each dimension of a PSPP. This allows actors to have a preference for
one PSPP over another, adding further level of granularity to the model.
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Figure 2.7: Three Dimensions of Practical Spectrum of Plausible Positions [Wise et al. 2016]

A discerning reader may discover later, in Chapter 3, that our Coalition Dynamics model bears a fair
level of resemblance to the setup details described above – a coincidence that we do not seek to veil.
As stated previously, the duo’s resemblances originate from the very fact that they both are built upon
the predominant work in the subject of Spatial Theory (on voting, legislative institutions and
ideological positions, etc.). Furthermore, such semblances are strictly limited in scope, and are
outweighed by their divergent approach in modeling dynamics – which we shall elaborate in the
following sections.

We have specifically included this brief review of the KTAB work out of concern that some might
confuse the duo for their shared basic elements. We sincerely hope that the reader, after thoroughly
reviewing this section, may be able to discern the two for their distinct and fundamental differences in
their modeling of dynamics and applications.
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2.5.3 Using KTAB to Model CDMPs

The primarily objective of modeling Collective Decision-Making Processes (CDMPs) with KTAB is to
understand the dynamics of bargaining and the final collective decision along some Practical Spectrum
of Plausible Positions (PSPPs) [Wise et al. 2015, 2016]. In particular, the authors extensively discuss
two aspects of the CDMPs: the voting theorem and bilateral negotiation.

Voting Theorem

In their multi-dimensional KTAB platform, Wise et al. proposes a more nuanced, probabilistic view of
voting mechanism, the Probabilistic Condorcet Election (PCE). This model is a direct response to
various limitations they saw in Median Voter Theorem [Black 1948], as well as an upgrade from the
Central Position Theorem [Caplin & Nalebuff 1991] that was used in their unidimensional KTAB
platform [Wise et al. 2015]. The key features of the PCE include:

•

Proportional voting instead of binary voting

•

Modeling of multi-dimensional questions

•

Variety in utility curves for individual actors

•

Probabilistic outcome instead of deterministic outcome

Any individual actor may then exert a discretionary level of influence to advocate for a particular
option (a position from the Practical Spectrum of Plausible Positions). At any given moment, the state
of the model € is then defined as the set of options being advocated, € = {¦§ , ¦¨ , … , ¦ž }. Accordingly,
each actor ” has its own utility valuation _• (€) = ∑w∈ª _• (¦w ) ⋅ –[¦w |€] for any given state, which is
computed based on the actor’s own utility valuation of individual options in the set, and its respective
likelihood in that state.
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Since a CDMP can be modeled as a discrete process, each step, each actor independently selects its next
position (to advocate) to maximize its gain in expected utility. And the equilibrium is achieved when
no actor can improve its expected utility given the current state.

Bilateral Negotiation

[Wise et al. 2016] suggest to model how one actor may induce changes in position of another actor by
introducing the concept of a negotiation round. Specifically, each negotiation round is formalized with
four sub-procedures outline below:

•

Assessment:
Assessment Each actor develops its own perspective on the current state and each other’s
preferences.

•

Target:
Target Each actor then assesses a target actor which would be most beneficiary for itself to
influence through the negotiation round.

•

Proposal:
Proposa The actor then develops a proposal of new joint positions that it and the target actor
may adopt, assuming it may increase the utility of both actors.

•

Resolution:
Resolution The actors then evaluate all available proposals, and select the one that induces
best utility change.

The bilateral negotiation is the primary mechanism for iterative state change in the multi-dimensional
version of the KTAB framework. For the brevity of this review we omit the length mathematical
discussion on how utilities are calculated throughout the scenario.
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2.5.4 KTAB vs Coalition Dynamics Model

It is fair to conclude that the semblances of KTAB and our Coalition Dynamics model are confined to
their shared agent-based modeling approach. At closing, we observe three major differences between
the duo:

•

Modeling
Modeling Objective: the KTAB platform is primarily concerned with predicting the consensus
of some collective decision-making process that involves bargaining and voting. On the
contrary, the Coalitions Dynamics model, for its namesake, is designed to model the evolution
of coalitions in a competitive scenario, with focus on the topology of the states and its
dynamics.

•

Dynamical Process: as a result of its objective, the KTAB’s modeling of dynamics is mostly
focused with “exerting influence” and “achieving most preferred outcome”, with excessive
attention on bargaining. However, our Coalition Dynamics model adopts a simplified yet
validated approach for negotiation process, and diverts its focus on the coalition dynamics.

•

Limitations (and the lack thereof): the KTAB bilateral negotiation mechanism does not
consider how more than two actors may reach a census or compromise (instead it then resorts
to a group probabilistic voting procedure), nor does it study the path continuity of state
evolution. Yet the simplified negotiation process in the Coalition Dynamics model allows for
efficient modeling of compromises among multi-agents of varying number. The Coalition
Dynamics model also offers an in-depth investigation of the path-dependent nature of state
changes.

Next, we present a comparative review of the agent-based models in the field of coalition dynamics,
alongside our proposed Coalition Dynamics model.
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2.6 A Comparative Review of ABM on Coalition Dynamics

As we come to this chapter’s closing, we find it necessary to present a comparison of the three
theoretical frameworks (BDM, Senturion and KTAB) alongside our proposed Coalition Dynamics
model. Specifically, we summarize in Table 2.1 their key characteristics in following four aspects:
modeling focus, basic configurations, spatial-utility considerations, and dynamical processes.

The table presents the prominent differences between the Coalition Dynamics model and the surveyed
ones. This further strengthens our claims in Section 1.3 (“Potential Contributions”), where we argue
that the proposed model is properly focused on the dynamics in coalition formation, capable of
handling more complex scenarios, built upon empirically sound spatial-utility considerations, able to
offer path-dependent solutions.
Now, let us examine the proposed model in greater detail.
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Modeling Focus
Model

SpatialSpatial-utility
Considerations

Basic Configurations

Dynamical Processes

What is being modeled

Number of
Issues11

Number of
Agents

Number of Turns

Factors in Utility
Computations

Changes per Turn

Coalition Dynamics

BDM

Pairwise negotiation process

Single

Two

Single12

Position, salience,
capability

Agent’s position

Omitted

Senturion

Group negotiation process

Single

Multiple

Multiple
(limited)

Not specified

Agent’s position

Examined at
terminal state

KTAB

Group negotiation process and
likelihood of conflict

Multiple
(limited)

Multiple

Multiple

Distance (unspecified)

Voting decision

Examined at
terminal state

Multiple

Multiple

Multiple

Position, weights,
power, coalition
topology

Coalition topology

Path-dependent,
State Tree
representation13

Coalition
Dynamics Model

Coalition dynamics in
competitive settings

Table 2.1: A detailed comparison of relevant ABM models

This is also referred to as the objective space dimension in our proposed model. Details can be found in Section 3.2.2.
BMD model does not entail any discrete-event simulation and instead provides a likely outcome directly.
13 Instead of using Monte Carlo simulation to model different outcomes, we propose the State Tree representation which records the entire state space (or a complete subspace for a preset boundary) and therefore are
able to the complete set of transitional states leading up to any particular outcome state. Details can be found in Section 3.4.2 and Section 7.5.2.
11
12
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Chapter 3 The Model
3.1 Introduction

Thus far, we have reviewed a good amount of prominent theories on the subject of coalition dynamics.
There is no denying that many others have managed to develop advanced theoretical frameworks to
study different aspects of this important phenomenon in different settings:

•

first, the balancing versus bandwagoning model from the international relations that is
primarily about the influence of normalized power over coalition formation [Walter 1988];

•

the spatial models of political competition with endogenous parties, which introduces the
concept of ideology space and the associated payoffs and the need to form minimum winning

coalitions [Smith 1995, Jervis & Snyder 1991, Snyder 1990];
•

lastly, the formal models in cooperative and non-cooperative games, where most efforts are
devoted to the characterization of equilibrium states under varied assumptions and settings
[Konishi and Ray 2003, Chwe 1994, Granot and Hanany 2013].

However, each of the models shows its own limitations when we search for one that properly models
the real-world problem of intrastate conflicts. For one, the more refined, empirically constructed
models are often based on static game theory or deductive reasoning [Budge 1994, Glaister & Buckley
1996, Walt 1985] – thus limiting the feasibility to derive solution concepts once the complexity of the
problem increases; on the other hand, the formal mathematical models [Sung & Dimitrov 2007, Bloch
& Diamantoudi 2011, Ray & Vohra 1999, Yi 1997] that study coalition dynamics in extensive form are
rarely concerned with the empirical details from their real-world counterpart.

The original motivation for our work, as stated earlier in Chapter 1, is to study coalition dynamics in

multiparty competitive games where agents have several objectives, with consideration to the context
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of intrastate conflict. A comprehensive study of the subject would only be possible if we manage to
develop a unifying framework that: (1) bridges the gap between the empirical-based and formal
mathematical models, (2) defines the solution concepts within the unifying framework, and (3)
includes important concepts such as the minimum winning coalition, the core, and farsighted stable

sets. Specifically, we intend to build a theoretical framework that shall:

•

consolidate the major theories on the subject of coalition formation, with reasonable
assumptions that are related to the context of intrastate conflicts;

•

allow characterization of equilibrium states in the formal model, built upon the idea
of the extensive form non-cooperative games;

•

extends the existing theories and models to explore the impact of multiple issues on
coalition dynamics;

•

utilize the agent-based approach and the capability of computational modeling to
validate or derive solution concepts under more complex settings.

These goals set forth the crucial considerations in the design and validation of our framework. In
addition, given the context of our study, we hold the following assumptions for coalition dynamics in
multi-party intrastate conflicts:

•

coalition formation is largely motivated by utilitarian needs rather than ideological

similarity / identity alignment; [Christia 2012, Bawn 1999]
•

due to insufficient institutional enforcement, switching sides can be inexpensive and
frequent [Christia 2012, Walter 1999];

•

the payoff from being in any particular alliance is closely associated with the alliance’s

position on issues (expected payoff when the alliance) and its normalized power
(likelihood of securing the promise in an interstate conflict) [Laver et al. 2007, Baron
1991, Frohlich 1975, Gamson 1964];
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: we begin with an overview of the model, followed by
basic definitions and notations in the general model; in section 3.2, we introduce some fundamental
concepts and elaborate with examples. We then discuss some variations in settings and solution
concepts for the general model in Section 3.3. In section 3.4, we present a brief review of the
computational complexity associated with the solution concepts in the abstract model, followed by a
discussion on the motivation and necessity to utilize the ABM approach to study coalition dynamics.
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3.2 Overview of the
the Abstract Model

In this work, we examine the rational aspect of coalition formation in the setting of non-cooperative
extensive form games with an endogenous payoff structure. The term rationality originates from game
theory, decision theory and classical economics, for which we assume that every participant in the
game consistently acts to achieve the optimal expected outcome for itself.

In practice, we simplify the problem of coalition formation to its game theory form, and further specify
the payoff allocation to be based on both the coalition structure and pre-defined player characteristics,
primarily inspired by the work on ideology spatial-theory and power considerations: the participant
decides to join, stay or breakaway from a particular alliance, in order to maximize its expected utility.

Before we present the model in detail and discuss its solution concepts, we first introduce several
important notations and concepts: the basic ingredients and settings for the general model, then the
definitions for terms including Objective Space and Negotiated Position for the Alliance to illustrate
and quantify the notion of Realizable Utility. Then we discuss the idea of Normalized Power and its
influence over chances of winning and complete the definition of Expected Utility.
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3.2.1 Basic Ingredients

We consider a dynamic model of coalition formation and borrow some of the expression from the game
theory models. Let • = {1, 2, 3 … , R} be the set of R total players in the game. A coalition € is defined
as a nonempty unordered subset of •.

Remark.
Remark. The smallest possible coalition is a singleton, consisting of only one player; the largest possible
coalition is simply •, consisting of all the players in the game. The coalition containing all players is
also sometimes referred to as the grand coalition in the setting of the multi-party parliamentary system
or cooperative games.

Definition.
Definition Recalling the concept of partition in set theory, we define coalition structure as a partition
« of •. Essentially, « is an unordered set of nonempty subsets (the coalitions) of • such that every
player in • is exactly contained in one of the subsets. In our model, we also refer to a particular

coalition structure as the state of the game. We further let ¬ denote the set of all possible coalition
structures, or states of the game.

Remark. In order to count the number of all possible coalition structures (i.e. the cardinality of the set
¬), we turn to the concept of Bell numbers in combinatorial mathematics for a shortcut solution.
Essentially, the Bell numbers count the total number of possible partitions of a set. Specifically, -ž
counts the number of partitions of a set that has exactly R elements. We will spare ourselves the
R
detailed deductive proof here, and directly write its recursive definition as -ž®§ = ∑ž²³´ ¯ ± -² . The
°
first twelve Bell numbers are as following: -´ = -§ = 1, -¨ = 2, -µ = 5, -¶ = 15, -· = 52, -¸ =
203, -¹ = 877, -º = 4140, -» = 21147, -§´ = 115975, -§§ = 678570, -§¨ = 4213597. An asymptotic
bound for the Bell numbers has been established in a more recent study [Berend & Tassa 2010] has
established as: -ž < ¯

´.»¹¨ž

ž

± . Without regard to feasibility of the states in the game (so all possible

½¾(ž®§)

64

partitions considered), it is easy to see that the number of possible coalition structures increases at an
astronomical rate: with only a dozen players in the game, there would be already over 4 million
possible states in the game! We will revisit this topic when we discuss the issue of computational
complexity in our agent-based model experiment setups.

Definition.
Definition In our model, we say a state «• is one-player different from «² if and only if there exists
exactly one player W ∈ •, such that by moving the W in one of the following ways in «² , it becomes
equivalent to «• (vice versa):
•

Move W from one coalition to another in «² ;

•

Move W from a singleton coalition of itself into another coalition in «² ;

•

Move W out of a coalition to a singleton coalition of itself in «² .

We may then write «• ↔ «² , as the notion of one-player difference is symmetrical.
§

Remark.
Remark The one-player difference concept is constructed with regard to the coalition structure itself
and without consideration of any payoffs or player strategies. Essentially, it helps to discern states that
only differ from each other by the move of a single player. In later sections, we will show that the one-

player difference is a necessary yet insufficient condition for a target state to be reachable from
another state (that is one-player different from the target state) in a Markovian sense when only one
players is allowed to move at a time.

Definition.
Definition Building upon the concept of one-player difference, we say a state «• is n-player different
from «² if and only if we are able to identify an ordered list containing only the minimum number of
necessary states {«§ , «¨ , … , «žÁ§ } such that

«• ↔ «§ , «§ ↔ «¨ , … , «žÁ¨ ↔ «žÁ§ , «žÁ§ ↔ «² , ; we
§

§

§

§

further mandate that there must exist no other ordered list containing less than R − 1 states for the n-

player difference to hold. The concept corresponds to the notion of shortest path between nodes in an
undirected graph when only one player is allowed to move at a time.
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In a similar expression to one-player difference, we write «• ↔ «² .
ž

Example.
Example Let • = {1, 2, 3} be the set of three players in our game. A possible coalition structure can be
«´ = Â{1}, {2}, {3}Ã, in which each player is in a coalition of its own. With Bell number -µ = 5, we may
simply list the set all possible states for the game, ¬ = {«´ , «§ , «¨ , «µ , «¶ } as following:
«´ = Â{1}, {2}, {3}Ã; «§ = Â{1, 2}, {3}Ã; «¨ = Â{1, 3}, {2}Ã; «µ = Â{1}, {2, 3}Ã; «¶ = {{1, 2, 3}};
Recalling the definition of n-player difference,14 we have: «´ ↔ «§ , «´ ↔ «¶ , ÄÅ].
§

¨

Definition.
Definition We say a state «• is one-player reachable from «² if and only if «• ↔ «² , and for the player
§

W ∈ • that enables the one-player difference, W has non-negative utility change (i.e., W does not prefer
«² over «• ) and in the case that W is joining a new coalition, W’s proposal to join must be approved by
the group (addition of W to the coalition brings non-negative utility change).

To this point, we have outlined the basic ingredients of our coalition dynamics model, in terms of its
dynamics and agent’s decision space. In the following section, we introduce the utility-related concepts,
to illustrate how the agents make their decisions to join or leave coalitions.

14 The concept of n-player difference between the states is equivalent to the shortest path concept in directed graphs, where the nodes represent
possible states of the game, and the directed edges represent a “one-play reachable” relationship.
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3.2.2 UtilityUtility-related Definitions and Notations

We now examine the other crucial aspect of our model – the utility-related concepts that govern the
motivations driving the players’ choices of coalitions in the competitive game.

Normalized Power
We consider power as the dominating factor over the outcome of intrastate conflicts (not the outcome
of the competitive game) [Karl & Sobek 2004, Biddle 2010], namely, the chance of winning against
another player or coalition in the intrastate setting. Its empirical counterpart can come in many forms:
for example, the main components and contributing factors to power can be the number of seats held
in a legislature, or scale of military, economic and political resources in regions of conflict. In the scope
of our formal analysis, we are primarily concerned with impact of power on coalition dynamics. Given
its nature of specificity, we defer the discussion for the components and contributing factors to the
concept in specific scenarios of analysis in Chapter 6.

In our model, we use normalized power to determine the probability of winning in the competitive
setting, and thus also use it to compute the expected utility of any particular coalition. Further, we
denote the normalized power of a player W as Sw ∈ (0,1], which is a normalized value by dividing the
power value of each player by the maximum value observed in the group (with the most powerful
player with a normalized power value of one). Since the normalized power of a coalition is simply the
sum of those of its members (we will omit the idea of synergy here), we then write the normalized
power of a coalition € as S¢ = ∑w∈„ Sw .
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Objective Space

We adopt the core concept from spatial theory models in the field of party competition and voting
[Hinich and Munger 1996, Budge 1994, Laver & Schilperoord 2007] with consideration to the context
of intrastate conflict. Similar to electoral competitions, the groups in intrastate conflict scenario often
carry diverging stances on a range of issues (apart from their universal desire to survive or win). With
empirical evidence [Sambanis 2004, Fearon & Laitin 2003, Collier & Hoeffler 1998], we may assume
without loss of generality that each of their objectives can be aligned in a finite set of Objective

Dimensions. With each Objective Dimension representing a particular spectrum of all available
alternatives in the scenario, with the more diverging extreme stances on both ends. In our model, we
denote the position of a player W in the n-dimensional Euclidean Objective Space as ÆÇ ∈ ℝž . We
illustrate the concept in the Figure 3.1, where 2 objective dimensions exist in the scenario, and four
agents are plotted:

Figure 3.1: Groups in a 2-dimensional Objective Space
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Add--on for the Agent
Agent--Based Model: Weights on Different Dimensions of the Objective Space
An Add

It is fair to assume that agents may have varying levels of commitment and concern over different
objective dimensions. In the case illustrated in Fig. 3.1 above, the green agent at position (0.8, 0.2)
might have more concern over the “Religious-Secular” dimension than the “Democratic-Totalitarian”
one. If so, it should value positions along the horizontal dimension more. This setup effectively alters
the agent’s sensitivity to distance along different dimensions. As a result, an agent may perceive
different utility values for the same level of difference (between itself and the point for evaluation) in
separate dimensions with different “levels of commitment and concern”.

Since the variation cannot be captured by the Euclidean distance alone, we hereby introduce a new
concept named weights. Essentially, an agent would assign different weights to each dimension of the
objective space as a proxy variable for its commitment and concern 15 over different objective
dimensions. This is also known as salience in the BDM model [BDM 2004]. Consequently, it will affect
the negotiation process and utility computation, which we discuss in following sections.

We set forth the following constraint so that the sum of an agent’s weights over all dimensions always
sum up to unity: For an R-dimensional objective space, an agent a would have an R-dimensional vector
ÈÉ such that oÊ ⋅ ÈÉ = 1.

Understandably, the weights must be given at first. They may either remain stable or fluctuate during
the process. Due to this added complexity, we might limit ourselves to the unweighted version
(without weight considerations) in the formal mathematical model to ensure the existence of a
tractable solution. Such a version without weight considerations may be considered as a special case

15 In the context of our model, it is fair to assume that commitment and concern are highly correlated, if not equivalent. The former describes the
level of willingness to devote one’s efforts to an objective, and the latter describes one’s valuation of the importance over an objective. In the
context of rational players, the players would always be more willing to commit to objectives they value more, all other things being equal. We
would therefore use the weights to represent both commitment and concern in this model.
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§

of the weighted version, where every agent’s weight over each dimension is simply set to be in the
ž

R-dimensional objective space. We shall explore the generalized case with weights added in the agentbased model, as computational modeling would allow such level of complexity. In following sections
where concepts involving weights are defined, we will outline the equations for both the weighted and
the unweighted versions of our model.
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Negotiated Position for a Coalition

As the different groups attempt to form a coalition, a composite position will emerge as the outcome
of negotiation for the coalition. As a proxy for bargaining power, normalized power plays an important
role in the negotiation process [Wolfe & McGinn 2005, Steinberg 2002, Fagre & Wells, Jr. 1982]. A
coalition’s negotiated position can be computed as the “center of mass” [Ofek 2017, Shamir 2017,
Chella et al. 2004, Grofman 1982] with each of its member group’s power and position considered.
Similar to its counterpart from physics, the equation would be:

Æ„ =

1
Ë Æw Sw
S„
w∈„

Equation 3.1

where S¢ =∑w∈„ Sw is the sum of power of all the member groups, Sw is the power of the member group W,
Æw its position. For the weighted version, we write for the negotiated group position on dimension Ì
as:

p„,Í =

1
Ë Æw Èw,Í Sw
∑w∈„ Èw,Í Sw
w∈„

Equation 3.2

where Sw is the power of the member group W, Èw,Í is the weight of agent W over dimension d, Æw,Í its
position in dimension d.

We further write the linear algebra form of the negotiated group position in the R -dimensional
objective space as:
Æ„ = dWf\(Î ⋅ ÏÐ Ñ )⨀Ó,
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Equation 3.3

where Î = [Æ§ | Æ¨ | ⋯ | ÆÕ ] is a R × Y matrix of position vectors, ÏÐ = [S§ ×§ | S¨ ×¨ | ⋯ |Sµ ×Õ ] is a
§

Ú∑Ü∈ß ÛÜ,ÝÞÜ ä
ã is a RR × Y matrix of weight vectors multiplied by normalized power of each agent; Ó = Ù
⋮
§
Ù
ã
Ø∑Ü∈ß ÛÜ,á ÞÜâ
dimensional vector consisting of composite commitment in each dimension.

Realizable Utility

As the negotiated composite position for the coalition is settled, each player in the coalition would then
determine the value of its membership. Due to the necessity of making compromises in the negotiation
process to form a coalition, understandably the player will expect a composite position that is less
desirable as it deviates from the player’s own. We write realizable utility as a function of the Euclidean
distance between the position of the coalition and the player:
_w,„ = g˜d(Æ„ , Æw ) ≤ _w

Equation 3.4

Where _w is the maximum realizable utility player W enjoys by being on its own (thus making no
compromises), g is a non-increasing function over [0, +∞) and g(0) = _w , created to capture the
relationship between realizable utility and distance in objective space. The exact form of the function
g will be discussed in later sections.

To this point, one may wonder, if the membership in a coalition means making compromises and
settling for some coalition’s objective position that is often less favorable, why would any sensible
player ever attempt to join a coalition? This question leads to our ensuing discussion on expected
utility.
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Expected Utility

In multiparty competitive games, the outcome of the coalition formation process is always an
important concern for the players’ choice of coalition moves [Hartzell et al. 2001, Joshi & Mason 2011,
Greenhalgh 2005]. Given the significant influence that the power of coalitions has over the outcomes
of intrastate conflicts, we choose to incorporate the power considerations from the field of
international relations to complete our definition of expected utility in our model.

Specifically, in the context of intrastate conflict, being alone is rarely a wise option (except for the few
very powerful players) – for the simple fact that the weaker players often face a much higher threat of
defeat or elimination. Therefore, we propose a definition of expected utility based on realizable utility
and normalized power of the coalition as in Equation 3.5:

O¡_w,„ ¤ = _w,„ ⋅ \(Ð„ )

Equation 3.5

or in its extended form with earlier definition for realizable utility,
O¡_w,„ ¤ = g˜d(Æ„ , Æw ) ⋅ \(Ð„ ),

Equation 3.6

where \ is a function created to capture the positive correlation between power of the coalition and

likelihood to fulfill its promises to the members.

Now, we have almost completed the construction for the utility concepts in our model. In later sections,
we introduce some variations and refinements, and discuss their impact on the dynamics of the model.
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3.3 Variations in Strategies and Equilibria

As discussed earlier in section 2.3, many variations of the strategy profiles for agents exist for a game
theoretical model of coalition dynamics. The choice of strategy profiles for the agents or the general
assumptions regarding the model could drastically alter the characteristics of potential equilibrium
states [Baron & Bowen 2013, Bloch 1996, Berheim et al. 1987, Konishi et al. 1997]. We discuss five
most common variations, as shown in the Table 3.1 below.

Solution Concept

Decision Horizon

Collaborative
Moves

Transferable
Utility

Voting Procedure

Allowed Moves

Nash

Myopic

1-player

TU

Simple Majority

NC, Non-Binding

Pareto

Farsighted

N-player joint

Non-TU

Unanimous
Approval

Partially Binding

Table 3.1: Possible Variations of the Strategy Profiles / Stable States

Solution Concept:
Concept: Nash vs.
vs. Pareto

Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in multi-party non-cooperative games, in which that no player
can act unilaterally to improve its own payoff. This solution concept entails the underlying assumption
that the agents would be indifferent to the utility changes of others, and constantly seek to act in a
(selfish) way that would maximize its own payoff.

On the other hand, a Pareto optimal equilibrium is a state in which that no player can act unilaterally
to improve its own payoff without making others worse off. The solution concept assumes that agents
would behave in a way that does not harm others, and benefit itself. The agents are assumed to be good
Samaritans.
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Decision Horizon: Myopic vs.
vs. Farsighted

In the extensive form games, agent’s utility calculations are often based upon the immediate next-state
conditions. In such settings, we say the agent’s decision horizon is limited to the immediately next
move and thus myopic in nature. However, the farsighted agents are able to compute the utilities
associated with a decision by considering not only the immediate next move, but also the utilities of
the possible states that may evolve from the altered state due to the chosen next move. Typical models
with farsightedness assume agents can look 2 steps ahead, but the actual decision horizon can extend
beyond 2 steps.

Collaborative Moves: 11-player vs.
vs. N-player joint

In our previous definition regarding n-player difference (Section 3.2.1), we have proposed that the
overall coalition structure changes with only 1 player at a time in the discrete-time setting. The
underlying assumption to this setting is that the agents are not able to make collaborated moves, i.e.
conspire to join to leave any coalition at the same time. An alternative to this assumption would be Nplayer joint move, for which the agents may collaboratively move in a way that improves their payoff.

Transferrable
Transferrable Utility: TU vs.
vs. NonNon-TU

The variation is most commonly embedded in cooperative game models. Essentially, when
transferrable utility is allowed, the agents may transfer part of their payoff from a particular coalition
structure to members in its coalition, as a means to motivate or appease them to be in the particular
coalition. Some TU games further assume that the payoff from a coalition is evenly divided among its
members. For non-TU games, each agent would strictly only consider its own payoff related to any
75

coalition. The real-world counterpart of such interaction can be found when gifting (transfer of
monetary assets, allocation of cabinet posts) occurs so that a coalition may become feasible. [Sprumont
1990, Arnold & Schwalbe 2002, Shi & Temzelides 2004]

Voting Procedure: Simple Majority vs. Unanimous Approval

The voting procedure describes the process [Ray 2007] through which an agent’s proposal to join a
coalition is reviewed by the target coalition group. The strictest form, “Unanimous Approval”, requires
all existing members of the target coalition group to approve the proposal for it to be accepted. Voting
by “Simple Majority” only requires half or more of the existing members to accept the proposal.
Understandably, the more relaxed voting procedure would lead to easier formation of new coalitions,
and greater level of dynamics in coalition moves.

The proposal-acceptance process is an integral part of the strategy profiles and likely has significant
impact on coalition dynamics.

Allowed Moves: NonNon-Binding vs.
vs. Binding

Despite the “temporal” nature of coalitions, some [Hyndman & Ray 2007, Acemoglu et al. 2008] assume
that the membership in a coalition should carry certain obligations, such that the members may be
prevented from leaving the current coalition to join another one. The non-binding coalitions are the
ones which allow its members to defect at anytime they wish, with no requirement to obtain approval
from their peers in the current coalition.
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It is worth noticing, however, while the decision to leave a coalition may be non-binding and carried
out at the will of the agent itself, the decision to join a coalition should be subject to approval of the
new coalition group. Either by unanimous or majority vote, an agent must obtain the group’s approval
prior to joining the group and forming a new coalition.

Finding the Equilibria:
Equilibria: Lost in Variations?

Despite the good number of variations (with the five mentioned above, there are in total 2¸ = 64
possible stable state concepts), we limit our search and exploration of equilibrium states to a selected
few based on two factors: computational complexity and empirical relevance.

For example, a reasonable choice of equilibrium concept may be: Nash (the agents are selfish, as in
most intrastate wars), myopic (so the decision/exploration space is smaller), 1-player move (smaller
decision space, agents unlikely to collude), Non-TU (recall Gamson’s Law in Section 2.2.3), Voting by
Unanimous Approval (more restrictive on proposal-acceptance), Non-binding (the coalitions are
temporal, especially when non institutional enforcement is available). A more extensive discussion on
this topic is in Chapter 4.
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3.4 A Discussion on Computational Complexity
3.4.1 A Simple Algorithm

With the concepts of reachability and expected utility, it is fairly easy to conceive a straightforward
algorithm that simply does the following16, shown in figure 3.2:

Exhaustive Listing
Based on set partitioning theorem, list all possible states of the game (coalition structures)

Utility Computation
Compute expected utility for every agent in each listed state

State Graph Plotting
Plot the state graph based on 1-player reachability definition (Section 3.2.1)

Equilibrium Discovery
From the initial state, search for possible end-node (stable state) or cycle (oscillating states).
Figure 3.2: A “simple” algorithm for equilibrium discovery

We elaborate on the algorithm with the aid of a mock state graph as shown in figure 3.3 below. In the
mock state graph, each node represents a state of the game (i.e. a corresponding coalition structure),
and each directed link represents a 1-play reachability relation between the states. When the initial
state is 1, the game will end in 5, which has no outbound links, and therefore a stable state. Similarly,
when the initial state is 0, the game may either end in 5 or 2, depending on the actual path originating
from 0.

16 The algorithm is constructed exclusively for the following stability concept: Nash, myopic, 1-player move, non-TU, NC and non-binding. However,
with minor adjustments (either concerning utility computation or state diagram plotting), it may be applied to other variations of the stability
concept shown in Section 3.2.3.
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Figure 3.3: A mock state graph

To this point, one may wonder: If we are able to find equilibrium states with such ease, what is the

need for an agent-based version? To answer this question, we return to our earlier remarks on Bell
Numbers [Berend & Tassa 2010], and review the computational complexity associated with the
algorithm in Section 3.2.1.

Given a set of R players, the first step of the “simple” algorithm would require -ž operations to list all
the possible states. The second step on utility computation would require us to conduct for each state
another R operations, thus a total of -ž ⋅ R operations. In the third step, we must first construct an
undirected version based on 1-player difference concept by review all possible connections, which
requires a total of -ž ¨ operations. This is then followed by a utility comparison to determine
reachability which requires a maximum of -ž ¨ operations. The last step involves path finding in a
directed graph (which we shall discuss in detail in Chapter 4), but for now we only need to know in
the case that we only search for end-nodes with no outbound links (stable states) and determine their
reachability, the best case would be å(log R ⋅ -ž ) . Overall, the “simple” algorithm actually has a
staggering computational complexity of å(-ž ¨ ) ! For R = 12, we need more than 1.7 × 10§µ
computations to find the equilibrium states for one set of initial condition.

79

Figure 3.4: The “Simple Algorithm” Procedure17

Figure 3.5 a/b: Growth rate at å(-ž ¨ )! [a: n=0 to 10, b: n= 0 to 20]

While the algorithm is correct, we need to consider the scale of the problem and efficiency of the
computation: it is not necessary to search through the entire state space or to plot the entire state
graph to discover the stable states from a given initial condition. Thus we may develop an
implementation named the “State Tree approach” based on two important ideas on elimination and

17

The small unlabeled circles correspond to the many more states not fully illustrated in this figure.
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finiteness: for one, many states (and their subsequent states) can be eliminated by the reachability
condition alone from the initial state; for the other, the simulation may simply not require that many
iterations (runs / path length) to reach that many possible states.
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3.4.2 The State Tree

In contrast to the “simple algorithm” procedures illustrated in Figure 3.4, the state tree approach takes
advantage of the elimination and finiteness concepts. In the rooted directed tree, each node is a state
(may occur repeatedly in the same tree), and each directed link indicates reachability. At every level,
we only need to list all 1-play different states, then eliminate non-reachable states (based on nonnegative utility change rule) and get the reachable states at the level (from a state in the preceding
level).

Figure 3.5: The “State Tree” Procedure

The approach illustrated above in Figure 3.6, in its resemblance to Breadth-First-Search [Rong &
Hansen 2006], greatly improves the computational performance in discovering equilibrium states or
tracking evolutionary dynamics. Given a set of R players, assume for any state that on average a small
fraction (l) of the 1-player different states are reachable. That leaves l ⋅ R subsequent states (at next
level). In the average case, at level Å , there are (l ⋅ R)æ states, and thus this requires (l ⋅ R)æ ⋅ R
operations to list all possible subsequent states (prior to elimination by reachability).
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Thus in the average case, the total number of operations needed to explore to level Å would be

R + (l ⋅ R)§ ⋅ R + (l ⋅ R)¨ ⋅ R + ⋯ + (l ⋅ R)æ ⋅ R = R ⋅

(l ⋅ R)æ − 1
l⋅R−1

Equation 3.7

Recalling the concept of finiteness, we may simply limit Å to a reasonably small number Å• 18. We further
note that best case performance can be achieved when only one reachable state exists at each level,
and the worst-case performance occurs when l = 1. Thus, we write its computational complexity as
in Table 3.2:

Worst Case Performance

å(R ⋅

(R)æç − 1
)
R−1
R⋅Å

Best Case Performance
Average Case Performance

R⋅

(l ⋅ R)æç − 1
, l ∈ (0,1)
l⋅R−1

Table 3.2: The Computational Complexity of the “State Tree” Procedure

The State Tree approach clearly outperforms the “Simple Algorithm” with its significantly greater
computational efficiency and more structured solution, thereby making the otherwise burdensome
simulation much more feasible.

Here, we would also mention an approach named Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR), which shares some
conceptual design components with our proposed State Tree approach.

18 Tracing back to the original motivation of this work, we note that even for most chaotic and unstable intrastate conflict scenarios in the real
world, coalition changes occur at a reasonable interval (often by weeks, if not months). Thus a reasonable number of iterations, should we decide
that such changes occur on a bi-weekly basis, can be chosen as 25-30 per annum for the period of interest.
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3.4.3 The Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) Method
Method

The FAR method was developed by Russell Rhyne in the 1970s [Rhyne 1974, 1981, 1998] to “assess

potential future scenarios descriptive alternative, comparably plausible lines of evolution of the
contextual pattern within a given social field such as a city or nation or the world”.

More recently, the FAR method has been adapted and used by various government agencies, defense
departments, and political think-tanks [Gallasch et al. 2018, Schmid et al. 2014, Malhotra et al. 2014,
Stephens 2006] to derive a set of plausible future states for particular scenarios of interest. Despite
minute differences in configuration and data, these models generally adhere to the four-step
procedure proposed by the original architect Russell Rhyne [Rhyne 1974]:

•

Evaluate
Evaluate the future:
future: form an initial view of the alternative futures that could unfold

•

Construct the possibilities:
possibilities: establish Sectors that represent the dimensions for areas of interest
within the scenario, fill in Factors that are alternative states within each Sector; the matrix of
each Sector and its respective Factors forms the Whole Field descriptors of all possible
configurations.

•

Eliminate anomalies:
anomalies: eliminate illogical or conflicting factor pairs, and reduce the Whole Field
descriptors to include only plausible configurations.

•

Plot the interconnections:
interconnections: position the plausible future states onto a “tree” to understand the
transitional characteristics of the scenario

In practice, the modelers often use a Faustian tree for the final step of the FAR method. The Faustian
tree [Forder 2014] is essentially a tree-like graph that enables visualization of a morphological analysis
and the logical interconnections between various factors. As we can see in the sample Faustian in Fig.
3.7, each individual box corresponds to a plausible future state with a short “narrative title” describing
the status. Furthermore, the long list of letters with numerical subscripts indicates the specific
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alternative state (i.e. Factor) in each dimension (Sector). For example, è§ é· •µ … denotes the factor 1

of sector R occurred in this state, and so forth. Often a Sector/Factor table is built prior to Faustian tree
to aid analysis, as shown in Fig. 3.8 below.

Figure 3.6: A Sample Faustian Tree [Forder 2014]
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Table 3.3: A Sample Sector/Factor Table [Duczynski 2000]

Despite the FAR method’s intellectual merit and practical utility in analyzing complex scenario
dynamics, it is important to beware of the method’s inherent limitations. First and foremost, as a
largely qualitative analysis method, some sub-procedures required can easily become an enormous
undertaking: for example, in the sample sector and factor table above (Table 3.3), there are a total of
4 × 5 × 3 × 5 × 4 × 4 × 3 = 14,400 possible future states. It is definitely no easy task to manually
examine individual plausibility. In addition, despite some topological and conceptual similarity
between of the Faustian tree and our State Tree approach, the Faustian tree is merely a visualization
tool and does not offer any tangible assistance to reduce the complexity of the issue. At the algorithmic
level, the FAR method is essentially a sophisticated version of the “Simple Algorithm” mentioned in
Section 3.4.1.

It is our hope that a discerning reader would not confuse the FAR method with the proposed State Tree
algorithm for computational simulation, for they only share limited semblances in basic concepts and
visualization. And hereby we conclude Chapter 3 with such reassuring thought.
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Chapter 4 Mathematical Validation
Validation & Tuning
4.1 Introduction
From preceding chapters, we have established a theoretical framework for coalition formation in the
non-cooperative setting, along with the spatial model determining the utility valuations based on
coalition topology for each agent. We also examined possible variations of agent strategy profiles with
competing concepts of equilibrium for coalition dynamics.

In this chapter, we intend to enrich the established model and derive some interesting properties both
in spatial and dynamical interactions. The motivations for doing so are twofold: first, as we concretize
the proposed framework, we will be able to add empirical relevance and explore specific properties of
the model in the given setting; second, the derived properties in spatial and dynamic interactions from
the abstract model are not only of intrinsic merit in themselves, but also guides our agent-based model
in interaction heuristics.

To achieve these goals, we start by selecting relevant equilibrium concepts in our context, then provide
definitions and specifications for the basic ingredients of our model. With all necessary pieces in place,
we look into the spatial aspect of the model first, based on the concepts of power, position, and related
utility. Afterwards, we answer some important questions on evolutionary dynamics of coalition
formation. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2, we review the proposed setup
of the model, with more details and specifications. We also explain our motivation based on empirical
relevance for these specifications. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we explore the spatial and dynamical
properties of the model. At closing, we discuss the implications of these findings in the real-world
coalition dynamics setting, and their impact on our agent-based computational model.
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4.2 Definitions and Specifications
Essentially, we have established a framework to study coalition formation where agents are rational,
coalitions are non-binding, information is transparent, and decisions are based on an endogenous
utility function determined by three factors: power, position, and coalition topology.

The setup involves three important assumptions, which we will re-iterate here:

1.

The agents are rational: they always seek to maximize their own expected utility;

2.

The coalition is non-binding: there are no costs associated with joining or leaving any
coalition;

3.

The information is transparent: every agent is always fully aware of the coalition topology,
each other’s properties at any time of observation.

Remark.
Remark. We briefly discuss the motivation and justification for these three assumptions here:

(1) While some behavioral economists might disagree [Goldelier 2014, Thaler 2005] with our

rationality assumption, we argue that given our context, such decisions are mostly made
collectively within the high ranks of a group, a process that would often lead to rational
choices. In addition, we may also consider a survival bias in the context of intrastate conflicts,
in which frequent irrational, suboptimal decisions that bear negative utility will often lead to
the failure, if not extinction of a group [Cvitanić et al. 2011, Miljkovic 2005]
(2) Our model assumes the non-binding nature for two reasons: for one, according to [Stinnett &
Tir 2009, Christia 2012], due to lack of institutional enforcement, coalitions are often only selfenforcing, i.e. the agent only stays in a coalition when it believes the current coalition
membership yields highest possible utility in the given coalition topology. In addition, the non-

binding assumption reduces the friction of coalition dynamics, as agents are free from moving
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constraint such as punishment due to betrayal. This increases the activity levels over the
course of the simulation.
(3) Lastly, information transparency ensures us that each agent has identical observation of the
state of the game and each other’s properties, i.e. power & position. The empirical evidence
supporting this assumption comes from the fact that in most intrastate conflict scenarios, the
groups often openly declare their objectives and coalitions [Reynal-Querol 2002, Kaufmann
1996]. In addition, the advancement in information technology and intelligence sources often
ensures that their normalized power values are often widely known by others as well.

Now, let us revisit some basic elements proposed in Chapter 3.
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4.2.1 Review of the Basic Elements

Thus far, we have again outlined the basic ingredients of our coalition dynamics model. To spare a
lengthy repetition of Chapter 3 (and in particular, Section 3.2.1), we provide a summary of notations,
parameters and functions in Table 4.1 below.

ë

BASIC NOTATIONS
set of R total agents

ì

coalition, defined as a nonempty, unordered subset of •

í

unordered set of nonempty subsets (the coalitions) of • such that every
agent in • is exactly contained in one of the subsets. In our model, we
also refer to a particular coalition structure as the state of the game

îï

normalized power of an agent W, Sw ∈ (0, 1]

position of agent W in the n-dimensional Euclidean Objective Space, ÆÇ ∈
ℝž

Æð

weight vector of agent W in the n-dimensional Euclidean Objective Space,
subject to oÊ ⋅ Èw = 1

ñï

FUNCTIONS
normalized power of a coalition € as the sum of the normalized power of
its members

îò = Ë îï
ï∈ì

o
Ë Æï îï
îì

negotiated group position, where S¢ =∑w∈„ Sw is the sum of power of all the
member groups, Sw is the power of the member group W, Æw its position.

o
Ë Æï ñï,Ì îï
∑ï∈ì ñï,Ì îï

negotiated group position on dimension Ì in the weighted version, where
Sw is the power of the member group W, Èw,Í is the weight of agent W over
dimension d, Æw,Í its position in dimension d

Æì =

pì,Ì =

ï∈ì

ï∈ì

óï,ì = ô˜õ(Æì , Æï ) ≤ óï
O¡óï,ì ¤ = óï,ì ⋅ ö(Ðì )

realizable utility as a function of the Euclidean distance between the
position of the coalition and the player

expected utility based on realizable utility and normalized power of the
coalition, where ö is a function of the likelihood to fulfill/win based on
power

Table 4.1: Summary of notations, parameters and functions in the proposed model
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4.2.2 Relevant Functions

Realizable Utility
The realizable utility function is introduced to establish the relationship between (1) an agent’s
perceived utility for some objective position and (2) the point’s distance from the agent’s. Specifically,
we propose some basic characteristics for the function:

•

The function is strictly decreasing in its domain [0, +∞)

•

The range of the function should include both positive, zero and negative values

•

The first derivative of the function

õ£

õÍ

is strictly increasing in magnitude

Remark. We have already explained the motivation for the first point. For the second point, we argue
that since the utility for holding one’s own position must be positive and finite, with the function being
strictly decreasing, the utility must become zero and negative at some point in its domain. This also
corresponds to the simple notion that beyond a certain extent of difference, conforming oneself to
something would often yield negative utility (not only “a less positive utility”). Finally, the third
characteristic is inspired in part by the Marginal Utility Theory [Kauder 2015] which states that as
wealth grows, the impact of a given increment of wealth falls. In our case, we argue that as the distance
between two objective points decreases, the agent’s perception of the utility change for a fixed distance
change becomes less sensitive.

For our model, we specify the function in the one-dimensional case as g(S) = 1 − d ¨ . Accordingly, we
normalize the agents’ positions in all objective dimensions to [−1, 1]. The choice of this function thus
leads to simplicity in the multi-dimensional case. As the total utility is a sum of all utilities along each
dimension, we further derive the utility as a function of distance d in the R-dimensional space19:

19

The proof is trivial: essentially, g(d) = ∑žw³§(1 − dw¨ ) = ∑žw³§ 1 − ∑žw³§ dw¨ = R − d ¨
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g(d) = R − d ¨

Equation 4.1

Likelihood of Fulfillment/Winning
In light of previous power-related theories in coalition formation, we would not introduce further
complexities20 to this function on likelihood of fulfillment, and simply write:

\(p„ ) = p„ = Ë SW
W∈€

Equation 4.2

Where Sw is the normalized power of agent W, and Sw ∈ (0, 1]. Since all spatial-utility considerations
involving \(p„ ) are strictly linear, we are not too concerned with the exact values of Sw or p„ in so far
as they properly capture the proportional relationships of the agents’ power values.

We are omitting two major factors that may lead to non-linearity with this simplification. The first is synergy effect from coalition, which means
that the power of a coalition may be greater than the simple sum of the powers of its members. The second is the complexity involved in estimating
odds of winning based on power (in various contexts). However, as most of the previous studies have safely omitted them on the premises that
their effects are limited, we have made the same choice for the sake of simplicity in our model.
20
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4.2.3 Choice of Agent Strategies and Equilibria

Based on the proposed three assumptions (rational agents, non-binding membership, transparent

information), we narrow down the choices of agent strategy profiles for the agents from the earlier 5
variations in Table 4.2 below. We highlight the selected choices in underlined text.

Solution Concept

Decision Horizon

Collaborative Moves

Transferable Utility

Allowed Moves

Nash

Myopic

1-player

Non-TU

NC, Non-Binding

Pareto

Farsighted

N-player joint

TU

Partially Binding

Table 4.2: Possible Variations of the Strategy Profiles

For the decision horizon, we choose to make our agents myopic. There are two reasons for this
particular choice: for one, the process of coalition formation is often so chaotic that what comes next
is often very challenging, if not impossible, to predict. [Kahan & Rapoport 2014, Osborn & Hagedoorn
1994, Christia 2012] In addition, from the simulation perspective, allowing myopia would lead to
greater level of dynamics in the game.

For the collaborative moves, we would only allow 1-player moves in our setting. For that the colluding
actions are unlikely due to the non-committing nature of coalition formation, for collusion is an
inherently cooperative and committing act.

In summary, we would specify the strategy profiles for agents in our model as following:

The agents are myopic and thus only concerned with the immediate future; they do not collude, share
payoffs, or form binding coalitions. In this setting, any possible stable state must be a Nash Equilibrium
such that no agent may act to unilaterally further increase its (expected) utility.
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4.3 Spatial Properties

In this section, we are primarily concerned with the joint effects of agents’ spatial positions and power
on utility perceptions by various agents. We begin by studying the simplest form of interaction in our
model between two agents, followed by utility perceptions involving coalitions, and then develop some
generalized forms for some of these findings.

4.3.1 Interaction between the Duo

We first examine the utility perceptions in a system of two agents in R-dimensional space, with uniform
weights across all dimensions. Let us denote the position for agent 1 and 2 as Æo , Æ÷ , normalized power
as S§ , S¨ respectively. Therefore, the distance between the two is d§,¨ = øÆo − Æ÷ ø. Since there exist only
two possible coalition states for the given setup, namely «§ = {[1], [2]}, «¨ = {[1, 2]}, we explore the
utility difference between the two states.

We may write S¨ = a ⋅ S§ , with (a ∈ (0, +∞). We have following properties for the coalition of the duo:

•

The coalition of the duo € ≔ [1,2]

•

The normalized power of the coalition S„ = (1 + a) ⋅ S§

•

The negotiated group position of the coalition Æ¢ =

ÞÝ ÆÝ ®ÉÞÝ Æú
(§®É)ÞÝ

The distance between the negotiated position for the coalition and agent 1 is therefore:

d¢,§ = øÆo − ÆÓ ø = ûÆo −

S§ Æ§ + aS§ Æ¨
aÆ§ − aÆ¨
a
û=û
û=
⋅d
(1 + a)S§
(1 + a)
1 + a §,¨

Equation 4.3

Similarly, we denote the distance between the negotiated position for the coalition and agent 2 as:
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d¢,¨ =

1
⋅d
1 + a §,¨

Equation 4.4

Based on the power-utility-related concepts and functions defined in preceding sections, we have:

•

Expected Utility for agent 1 to be by itself _§ = R ⋅ S§

•

Expected Utility for agent 2 to be by itself _¨ = a ⋅ RS§

•

Expected Utility for agent 1 to be in coalition €, _§,¢ = üR − ¯

•

Expected Utility for agent 2 to be in coalition €, _¨,¢ = üR − ¯

¨

É

⋅ d§,¨ ± ý ⋅ (1 + a)S§

§

⋅ d§,¨ ± ý ⋅ (1 + a)S§

§®É

§®É

¨

Based the self-interested and utility maximization nature of the coalition formation process, in order
for the coalition € to form, the following two inequalities must hold: _§,¢ ≥ _§ and _¨,¢ ≥ _¨ .

Expand the two inequalities and we get:

üR − ¯
R−

¨
¨
a ¨ ⋅ d§,¨
a
⋅ d§,¨ ± ý ⋅ (1 + a)S§ ≥ RS§ ⟹ (R + aR) −
≥R
(1 + a)
1+a

1
⋅d
1 + a §,¨

¨

⋅ (1 + a)S§ ≥ aRS§ ⟹ (R + aR) −

¨
d§,¨
≥ aR
(1 + a)

Equation 4.5

Equation 4.6

We further re-write the above inequality requirements in Eq. 4.5 – 4.6 as:

d§,¨ ≤

ž⋅(§®É)
É

§

and d§,¨ ≤

or alternatively, É ≥

ú
ÍÝ,ú

ž

R ⋅ (1 + a)

− 1 and a ≥

ú
ÍÝ,ú

ž

−1

Equation 4.7

Equation 4.8

To explore the impact of power ratio on “coalition-forming” distance, we plot the two inequalities in
Eq. 4.7 for the one-dimensional space without loss of generality. As shown in Fig. 4.1 below, as the
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power ratio increases between (0, 1], the upper limit for the distance between the duo is √1 + a. The

upper limit then reaches its global maximum when a = 1, and d§,¨ Õ› = √2. Then in the range (1, +∞),
the upper limit on distance converges to 1.

Due to the linearity of the √R coefficient in the inequalities (R ∈

®

), we conclude that the arguments

of the maxima (values of a for boundary conditions) remain same in value, and the global maxima for
R-dimensional objective space is simply d§,¨ Õ› = √2R.

Figure 4.1: The Distance vs. Power Ratio Curves

Now, we explore the impact of distance on “coalition-forming” power ratio in one-dimensional space.
Let us first plot the two inequalities in Eq. 4.8. As shown in Fig. 4.4, for the distance in range (0, 1], a is
free to take any positive value. As the distance increases beyond 1, we soon realize that with respect
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¨
to d§,¨
−1 ≤α≤

§

ú Á§
ÍÝ,ú

, the maximum distance between the duo at which a possible a value may exist

is d§,¨ Õ› = √2R , with a = 1.

Figure 4.2: The Power Ratio vs. Distance Curves

We may easily deduce following observations based on the findings above:

Observation 4.1 Coalition-Forming Boundary in Objective Space. In duo-agent interactions, there exists
a maximum distance dÕ› , beyond which that the two agents would never form a joint coalition,
regardless of their normalized powers.

Observation 4.2 Maximum Distance Condition. In duo-agent interactions, the maximum coalitionforming distance dÕ› is achieved when and only when the normalized power ratio between the duo
is 1 (equal-power agents).
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In addition, we find the impact of the distance and power ratio over expected utility to be:

_§,¢ = üR − ¯

É

§®É

¨

⋅ d§,¨ ± ý ⋅ (1 + a)S§ , such that

õ
a ¨ S§
õ
a ¨ + 2a
_§,¢ = −
⋅ 2 ⋅ d§,¨ < 0,
_§,¢ = S§ R −
d
(a + 1)¨ §,¨
õd
1+a
õa

Equation 4.9

Equation 4.10

The constancy of the sign of first derivate with respect to distance and power ratio suggests two simple
conclusions: other things equal (caeteris paribus), the shorter the distance, the greater the expected
utility. When the distance is sufficiently small (d§,¨ <
agent, the greater the expected utility. For d§,¨ >

ÞÝ ž(É®§)ú
É ú ®¨É

ÞÝ ž(É®§)ú
É ú ®¨É

), the greater the power of the other

, as the power of the other agent increases,

the expected utility decreases. At last, we present the 3D surface and contour plot of the function _§,¢ =
üR − ¯

É

§®É

¨

⋅ d§,¨ ± ý ⋅ (1 + a)S§ , set at S§ = 1, R = 1 in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The 3D Surface and Contour Plot of _§,¢ = ü1 − ¯

É

§®É
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¨

⋅ d§,¨± ý ⋅ (1 + a)

4.3.2 Shifting away from the Negotiated Positions: Zones of Agreement?

In the duo-agent interaction case examined above, we assume that the negotiated position of the duo
is a single fixed point in the objective space that is determined by the duo’s position and power. This
is also the assumption in the proposed Coalition Dynamics model due to its abstraction (inspired by
Gamson’s Law). However, the real-world negotiations are not necessarily always perfect reflection of
the participant’s power distributions, and concessions can sometimes be made. Therefore, we feel
obliged to devote this section to investigate the scenarios for coalition formation beyond the perfect
“negotiated position” setting.

Re-using the basic setup from the preceding section, let us denote the position for agent 1 and 2 as
Æo , Æ÷ , normalized power as îo , î÷ respectively. Therefore, the distance between the two is d§,¨ =
øÆo − Æ÷ ø. There exist only two possible coalition states, namely «§ = {[1], [2]}, «¨ = {[1, 2]}. We shall
examine the set of objective positions in the R-dimensional space for which the coalition of the duo
(state «¨ ) yields greater utility for both agents.

We may write î÷ = a ⋅ îo (a ∈ (0, +∞), with following properties for the coalition of the duo:

•

The coalition of the duo € ≔ [1,2]

•

The normalized power of the coalition S„ = (1 + a) ⋅ S§

•

The feasible group position of the coalition Æ¢

The distance between the negotiated position for the coalition and agent 1 is therefore:

d¢,§ = øÆo − ÆÓ ø

100

Equation 4.11

Similarly, we write the distance between the negotiated position for the coalition and agent 2 as:

d¢,¨ = øÆ÷ − ÆÓ ø

Equation 4.12

Based on the power-utility-related concepts and functions defined in preceding sections, we have:

•

Expected Utility for agent 1 to be by itself _§ = R ⋅ S§

•

Expected Utility for agent 2 to be by itself _¨ = a ⋅ RS§

•

Expected Utility for agent 1 to be in coalition €, _§,¢ = R − øÆo − ÆÓ ø

•

Expected Utility for agent 2 to be in coalition €, _¨,¢ = R − øÆ÷ − ÆÓ ø

¨

⋅ (1 + a)S§

¨

⋅ (1 + a)S§

Based the self-interested and utility maximization nature of the coalition formation process, in order
for the coalition € to form, the following two inequalities must hold: _§,¢ ≥ _§ and _¨,¢ ≥ _¨ . Expand
the two inequalities and we get:

[R − ‖Æo − ÆÓ ‖¨ ] ⋅ (1 + a)S§ ≥ RS§ ⟹ [R − ‖Æo − ÆÓ ‖¨ ] ⋅ (1 + a) ≥ R

[R − ‖Æo − ÆÓ ‖¨ ] ⋅ (1 + a)S§ ≥ aRS§ ⟹ [R − ‖Æo − ÆÓ ‖¨ ] ⋅ (1 + a) ≥ aR

Equation 4.13

Equation 4.14

We further re-write above inequality requirements (for the coalition € to exist) as:

d§,„ ≤

É⋅ž

§®É

and d¨,„ ≤
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ž

§®É

Equation 4.15

and for a feasible point € to exist in the Euclidean space,

d§,„ + d¨,„ ≥ d§,¨

Equation 4.16

It is trivial to prove that for the uniform R-dimensional uniform objective space, the set of acceptable
coalition position € from each agent’s perspective is a R -dimensional ball (and its boundary,
accordingly, a (R − 1)-dimensional sphere). In order for the duo-agent coalition to form, there must
exist at least one point that is located in both agents’ R-dimensional ball of acceptable positions.

Revisiting Eq. 4.15 and Eq. 4.16 above, we find two properties of the boundary conditions:

max d§,„ =

a⋅R
= √a ⋅ max d¨,„
1+a

max(d§,„ + d¨,„ ) = ˜√a + 1 ⋅

R
= max d§,¨
1+a

Equation 4.17

Equation 4.18

Proposition 4.1
4.1 Maximum Feasible Point Distance. In the duo-agent scenario, when we consider the
entire set of feasible objective positions, the maximum distance from a feasible coalition position is
greater for the agent with weaker power.
Remark.
Remark. The proof for here is trivial given max d§,„ = √a ⋅ max d¨,„ , where S¨ = a ⋅ S§ . Nevertheless,

the finding is rather fascinating as it does properly reflect the real-world coalition forming process:
often the weaker agent is willing to make greater compromise since it receives greater benefit by being
in a strong coalition than the stronger members of the coalition do [Kawaguchi et al. 2011, Kersten &
Noronha 1998].

We examine the maximum objective distance between the duo in the relaxed setting, and find:
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d§,¨ ≤ ˜√a + 1 ⋅

Consequently, for g(a) = ˜√a + 1 ⋅

ž

§®É

R
1+a

Equation 4.19

, we have:

arg max g(a) = 1, and max d§,¨ = √2R
É∈ℝ

Equation 4.20

Curiously, this result regarding maximum coalition-forming distance is identical to that from the
preceding section, where the coalition position is fixed at the “negotiated position”. However, a deeper
look reveals their differences. We plot the feasibility curves (maximum coalition-forming distance as
a function of a) for the unidimensional case in Fig. 4.4 below.

Figure 4.4: Feasibility Curves for “Negotiated Position” and the Relaxed Case
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From the observation, we conclude that when the duo does not have to settle at the fixed “negotiated
position” in the objective space, the maximum coalition-forming distance between them is then always
greater. Due to linearity, this also extends to the R-dimensional case.

Proposition 4.2
4.2 Coalition Forming with Relaxation from the “Negotiated Position”. When the agents are
not forced to agree to the unique “negotiated position” but are free to explore a feasible objective
position, the coalition-forming distance is greater. Alternatively speaking, the duo may be able to form
a coalition at a distance that was previously unfeasible for the fixed “negotiated position” case.

Remark. This particular finding is a result of the constraint imposed by a fixed point “negotiated
position”. In the spatial model, the fixed point does not necessarily fall into the zone of mutually
acceptable positions (or mathematically speaking, the intersection of the duo’s set of acceptable
positions), even if such a zone exists.

Not quite to our surprise, the relaxation from the fixed negotiated position enables the formation of
coalitions that are unfeasible in previous settings. Consequently, we cannot help but wonder, what
might happen should we further relax the conditions? While our original stipulation for the abstract
model excludes the Transferrable Utility setting (see Section 3.1 for a details), the findings above
somewhat compels us to take a deeper look in the next section.

104

4.3.3 Transferrable Utility: A Greater Level of Relaxation

When transferrable utility (TU) is allowed in the duo’s interaction, the conditions for a feasible
coalition are further relaxed. Effectively, TU makes it possible for one agent to transfer some utility to
another if the “giver” still perceives a positive utility change even after the transfer. Essentially, in so
far as a point in the objective space exists such that there is net combined positive utility increase for
the duo (even as one of them perceives a loss), the coalition is feasible.

Reusing the previous setup, we have following representations for the utility levels:

•

Utility for agent 1 to be by itself _§ = R ⋅ S§

•

Utility for agent 2 to be by itself _¨ = a ⋅ RS§

•

Utility for agent 1 to be in coalition €, _§,¢ = R − øÆo − ÆÓ ø

•

Utility for agent 2 to be in coalition €, _¨,¢ = R − øÆ÷ − ÆÓ ø

¨

⋅ (1 + a)S§

¨

⋅ (1 + a)S§

With the transferrable utility mechanism allowed, for the coalition € to form, only one simple
inequality needs to hold: _§,¢ + _¨,¢ ≥ _§ + _¨. Expand this inequality and we get:

¨

2R − øÆo − ÆÓ ø − øÆo − ÆÓ ø

¨

⋅ (1 + a)S§ ≥ (1 + a)RS§

Equation 4.21

Given S§ , a ∈ ℝ® , we further simplify above inequality requirement (for the coalition € to exist) as:

¨

R ≥ ø Æo − ÆÓ ø + ø Æo − ÆÓ ø
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¨

Equation 4.22

Replacing the above notation by the distance between the feasible point and either agent’s position,
for a feasible point € to exist in the Euclidean space, we have:
¨
¨
d§,„
+ d¨,„
≤R

Equation 4.23

d§,„ + d¨,„ ≥ d§,¨

Equation 4.24

A quick analysis of the above two inequalities show that the first is essentially the set of points with a

circle of radius √R in the first quadrant, and the second is the set of points above the line i = d§,¨ − h
in the first quadrant. Without loss of generality we set d§,¨ = 1, R = 1, let f = d§,„ , Q = d¨,„ and plot
the inequalities in figure 4.5 for a more clear illustration.

Figure 4.5: The Two Inequalities, Plotted
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It is not difficult to foresee that the two lines must have at least one overlapping point in order for one
feasible set of solutions to exist. It so happens that in order for such a point to exist, the distance
between the origin point and the line of i = d§,¨ − h must be no greater than the radius of the circle,
√R. Employing basic algebra and we have:

√2
d ≤ √R ⟹ d§,¨ ≤ √2R
2 §,¨

Equation 4.25

Essentially, max d§,¨ = √2R regardless of the values of a (or other parameters).
Again, this result on maximum coalition-forming distance is identical to the those two from the
preceding sections, where the coalition position is fixed at the “negotiated position” or relaxed in the
non-TU case. However, if we plot the feasibility curves (maximum coalition-forming distance as a
function of a) for the unidimensional case in Fig. 4.6, we easily see the differences.

‘Figure 4.6: Feasibility Curves for “Negotiated Position”, the Relaxed Position and Transferrable Utility Case
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From the observations, we arrive at proposition 4.3 regarding the impact of Transferrable Utility on
coalition dynamics in a duo-agent scenario. This phenomenon remains valid due to the linearity of the
inequality conditions, as in preceding sections.

Proposition 4.3
4.3 Coalition Forming Transferrable Utility. When transfer of utility is allowed so the
agents only need to seek a feasible point that brings net combined positive utility for the duo, the
maximum distance at which a coalition is feasible becomes irrelevant to their power distributions and
solely depends on the dimensionality of the objective space. So for an objective space with given
dimension, the maximum distance at which the duo may form a coalition becomes a constant, and is
always greater than or equal to those found in non-TU scenarios (and the equality only holds for the
extreme non-TU case when the duo has equal power).

Remark. This finding on transferrable utility condition brings important implications for the coalition
dynamics. It further relaxes the criteria for which a coalition may be formed. In particular, it shows
that the coalition-forming distance is extended with such relaxation, as the intuition suggests. The
transferrable utility condition clearly enables a greater level of freedom in coalition formation process.

Foreseeably, the TU condition increases the system dynamics as more coalition structures become
feasible. The transfer of utility action also has valid connections to the real-world actions, where a
certain form of gifting (monetary assets, cabinet posts or other valuables) occurs to foster the forming
of a coalition that still ends up with net positive utility increase for all its members. While extensive
part of this work is focused on the non-TU case (for reasons outlined in Chapter 3), we shall
nevertheless have the transferrable utility condition as an important add-on, and explore its impact on
the coalition dynamics in later Chapters.
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4.3.4 Effect of Weights

In the previous sections, we have analyzed the duo-agent scenario in uniform weight case with some
variations. The analysis led to some interesting results regarding the interaction between position and
normalized power. Now, we explore the effect of (non-uniform) weights on position-power interaction
by returning to the study of the duo-agent scenario in a 2-dimensional objective space.

Let the objective dimension be é, - resepctively. We denote the weight vectors for agent 1 and 2 as
ño = [È§, , È§, ] , ñ÷ = [È¨, , È¨, ] . Recall the earlier definition and constraint (that the sum of
weights across all dimensions must always be 1), we may simply write the two weight vectors as:

ño = [_, (1 − _)], ñ÷ = [[, (1 − [)],

Equation 4.26

where _ = È§, , [ = È¨, .

Let us denote the distances between agent 1 and 2 along objective dimensions é, - be d , d
respectively. We may write the negotiated group position’s distance from agent 1 and 2 as:

d§,„, =

[S¨
(1 − [)S¨
d , d§,„, =
d
_S§ + [S¨
(1 − _)S§ + (1 − [)S¨

d¨,„, =

(1 − _)S§
_S§
d , d§,„, =
d
_S§ + [S¨
(1 − _)S§ + (1 − [)S¨

We may then denote S¨ = a ⋅ S§ (a ∈ (0, +∞), and rewrite Eq. 4.27 and Eq. 4.28 as:
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Equation 4.27

Equation 4.28

d§,„, =

(1 − [)a
[a
d , d§,„, =
d
_ + [a
(1 − _) + (1 − [)a

Equation 4.29

d¨,„, =

(1 − _)
_
d , d§,„, =
d
(1
_ + [a
− _) + (1 − [)a

Equation 4.30

Correspondingly, the expected utility perceptions are:
_§,„ = _§,„, + _§,„,
¨
(1 − [)a
[a
= _ ⋅ ü1 − ¯
d ± ý + (1 − _) ⋅ 1 −
d
_ + [a
(1 − _) + (1 − [)a

¨

⋅ (1 + a)

Equation 4.31

_¨,„ = _¨,„, + _¨,„,
= [ ⋅ ü1 − ¯

¨
(1 − _)
_
d ± ý + (1 − [) ⋅ 1 −
d
(1 − _) + (1 − [)a
_ + [a

¨

⋅ (1 + a)

Equation 4.32

Based the non-cooperative nature of the coalition formation process, in order for the coalition € to
form, the following two inequalities must hold: _§,¢ ≥ _§ and _¨,¢ ≥ _¨ . We then have:

_ ⋅ ü1 − ¯

¨
(1 − [)a
[a
d ± ý + (1 − _) ⋅ 1 −
d
(1 − _) + (1 − [)a
_ + [a

¨

¨
(1 − _)
_
d ± ý + (1 − [) ⋅ 1 −
d
(1 − _) + (1 − [)a
_ + [a

¨

[ ⋅ ü1 − ¯

(1 + a) ≥ 1

(1 + a) ≥ a

Equation 4.33

Equation 4.34

§

For the above set of inequalities, it is obvious that when _ = [ = , the unweighted version of position¨

power interaction will re-emerge as we explored in section 4.3.1. Yet, we shall examine a special (and
extreme) case in non-uniform weights scenario by setting _ = 1, [ = 0, and the above inequality
requirements become:
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(1 + a) ≥ 1

Equation 4.35

(1 + a) ≥ a

Equation 4.36

Which always holds, under the earlier proposed condition a ≥ 0. This suggests that in this extreme
case, the duo would always view coalition € as a preferred state (than to be on their own), regardless
of the power ratio or distance between the two.

Proposition 4.3
4.3 Relaxation of Position-Power Constraints with Introduction of Weights. As we
introduce non-uniform weights into the objective space, the position-power constraints for which a
duo-agent system may form a coalition is relaxed. This relaxation would allow for possible duo-agent
coalition to form at previously unfeasible distances or power ratios. In proven extreme cases, such a
duo-agent coalition is always feasible regardless of position or power factors.

Remark.
Remark. This interesting, if not unexpected, discovery can also be understood in the real-world setting
of coalition formation. For two groups seemingly far apart in the objective space, if they have different
concerns for varying objective dimensions, great compromise (measured by distance) in some
dimensions might generate only minimal impact on their overall utility perceptions.

Thus far, we have conducted extensive investigation into the duo-agent scenario. By examining the
feasibility of coalitions under various settings, we have gained a fair amount of insights on how
different constraints and conditions for coalition affects the dynamics. Now, we extend the problem of
coalition formation to the multi-agent setting and explore some more interesting characteristics.
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4.3.5 Coalition vs. Member Perception on Utility Change

Aware of the significant impact that the non-uniform weights scenario may bring (which would distort
a “normal” position-power interaction), we return to the original unweighted version of our model to
avoid the perils of unnecessarily over-complicating our analysis. In this setting, another interesting
question emerges: should we regard an existing coalition as a singular entity, such that when it deems
an external agent as “coalition-forming” positive, would remaining coalition members share the same
utility perception? We begin by examining the negotiated position first. Let € be the coalition of
interest, Ä being the external agent. Therefore, we have:

The negotiated position of the coalition,
o
Ë Æï î ï
îì

Equation 4.37

o
(Æì ⋅ îì + Æ ⋅ î )
îì + î

Equation 4.38

Æì =

ï∈ì

The new negotiated position between € and Ä,

Æìx =

Expanding Eq. 4.38 with the expression in Eq. 4.37 and we get:

Æìx =

o

îì ®î

¯îì ⋅

o

îì

∑ï∈ì Æï îï + Æ ⋅ î ±,

Equation 4.39

which can be simplified to

Æìx =

o

îì ®î

(∑ï∈ìx Æï îï )
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Equation 4.40

This is a (somewhat) trivial finding that the negotiated position between an existing coalition and an
external agent is the same as the negotiated position if the external is treated as a member of a new
coalition and the negotiated position for the entire coalition that includes the external agent. This
finding can also be easily extended to the case when the external agent is also a coalition.

Observation 4.3
4.3 Consistency of Inclusion in Negotiated Position. In the unweighted scenario, the
negotiation position between two sets of agents, when treated as two singular entities with their
respective in-coalition negotiated position and collective power, is the same as the negotiated position
when considering the negotiated position of all individual agents in the coalition.

It might be tempting to assume that should the position-power condition between the two sets lead to
a utility increase for both, a coalition that is feasible for the two sets (treated as two singular entities)
should also be feasible for all member agents in them. However, recalling the non-cooperative nature
of coalition formation in our model, we must also ensure that such a new coalition would increase the
utility for all member agents for the feasibility to hold.

Let us consider a 3-agent system in one-dimensional space., as shown in Fig. 4.7.

Figure 4.7: A 3-Agent System

Let d§,¨ = f, d¨,µ = Q, r§ = 0; S§ = a ⋅ S¨ = a ⋅ Sµ . Recalling our earlier findings for the simplified
scenario of the duo-agent system in section 4.3.1, we thus have:
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•

Coalition forming constraint for equal-power duo system: Q ≤ √2

•

Negotiated position of the 2, 3 coalition: –¢ = f +

•

Negotiated position of the 1, 2, 3 coalition: –¢x =

¨
¨

¨®É

⋅ (f + )
¨

Correspondingly, we write utility perception for € and €′ by agent 2, 3 as:

_¨,„ = _µ,„ = 1 −

_¨,„x = 1 − f + Q −

_µ,„x = 1 −

Q¨
⋅ 2S¨
4
¨

2
Q
⋅ f+
2+a
2
¨

2
Q
⋅ f+
−f
2+a
2

Equation 4.41

⋅ (2 + a) ⋅ S¨

⋅ (2 + a) ⋅ S¨

Equation 4.42

Equation 4.43

Utility perception by €, when treated as a singular entity:
_„,„ = (1 − 0¨ ) ⋅ 2S¨ = 2S¨

_„,„x

a
Q
= 1−
⋅ f+
2+a
2

¨

⋅ (2 + a)S¨

Equation 4.44

Equation 4.45

Foreseeably, the new negotiated position for the coalition for the three agents will shift towards the
left. Thus the decrease in realizable utility (calculated based on distance only) for agent 2 would be
greatest. To show inconsistency between coalition-as-one utility perception and individual utility
perception of member agents, we need to find values of a, f, Q such that:
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_„,„ > _„,„

a
Q
⟹ 1−
⋅ f+
2+a
2

_¨,„x < _¨,„ ⟹ 1 − f + Q −

2
Q
⋅ f+
2+a
2

¨

¨

⋅ (2 + a) > 2

Equation 4.46

⋅ (2 + a) < 1 −

Q¨
⋅2
4

Equation 4.47

With some basic manipulation we get:

a − (2 + a) ⋅

a+

¨

¨

É

¨®É

− (2 + a) ⋅

⋅ ¯f + ±
¨

¨

+

É

¨®É

¨

>0⟹

⋅ ¯f + ±

¨

¨

É

¨®É

>

É

¨®É

⋅ ¯f + ±

¨

¨

⟹ ¯f + ± < 1
¨

<0

¨

Equation 4.48

Equation 4.49

In order to find a feasible solution set that satisfies both inequalities in Eq. 4.48 and 4.49, we choose
f = 0.7, Q = 0.4. Obviously Eq. 4.48 holds, and Eq. 4.49 becomes:

0.4¨
0.4
a
a+
− (2 + a) ⋅
+
⋅ (0.9)
2
2
2+a

¨

<0

Equation 4.50

As shown in Fig. 4.8, we find that all values of a ≥ a´ would satisfy inequality in Eq. 4.49, where a´ ≈
5.714 for f = 0.7, Q = 0.4. Thus we have found a feasible solution set that satisfies both _„,„ > _„,„

and _¨,„x < _¨,„ , so that we observe inconsistency between coalition-as-one utility perception and
individual utility perception of member agents.

115

Figure 4.8: The LHS of Inequality in Eq. 4.50, where f = 0.7, Q = 0.4.

Proposition 4.4
4.4 Inconsistency of Utility Perceptions. The utility change associated with the merging
between two sets of agents, when computed as two singular entities with their respective in-coalition
negotiated position and collective power, does not necessarily indicate the utility preference of all
member agents. Essentially, the utility perception for the coalition-as-one (agent) cannot properly
reflect the utility perceptions at the agent level.
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4.3.6 Expansion of the Objective Position: “Objective Range”

Thus far, we have explored the spatial-utility properties under the premise that each agent or group
bears an (negotiated) objective position – a singular point in the objective space which represents the

most ideal stance across multiple objective dimensions. The agent’s objective position point is most
ideal in the sense that any deviation from its objective position would lead to a decrease in realizable
utility as specified in Equation 4.1, where we first derive the utility as a function of distance d in the Rdimensional space:

g(d) = R − d ¨

Equation 4.51

For R = 2, the realizable utility value at point (h, i) for an agent with objective position at (0, 0) is:

g(h, i) = 2 − h ¨ − i ¨

Equation 4.52

We present its 3D surface plot and 2D contour plot in Figure 4.9. A plausible expansion from the idea
of a singular objective position would be to allow the agent to have a (ideal) range of objective
positions in which there are no decrease in realizable utility. This idea can be integrated into
preexisting equation of realizable utility as:

g′(d) =

Ë

w³§æ ž

1 − max˜0, (dw − Sw )

¨

Equation 4.53

Where Sw is the range represented by a distance value in objective dimension W, such that we have
max˜0, (dw − Sw )

¨

= 0 for dw ≤ Sw . The realizable utility value is retained at its maximum value for all

points in the objective space that fall within the agent’s range. Let us consider a special case: for R = 2,
the realizable utility at (h, i) for an agent with objective range ([−0.3, 0.3], [−0.3,0.3]) is:
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g(h, i) = 2 − max˜0, (|h| − 0.3)

¨

− max˜0, (|i| − 0.3)

¨

Equation 4.54

We present its 3D surface plot and 2D contour plot in Figure 4.10. As we can observe from the plots,
for Equation 4.54, the agent’s objective range is effectively a multi-headed entity (a rectangle for the
R = 2 case) inside which there are no decrease in realizable utility for the agent. Given the basic
spatial-utility properties in this setting, we can easily deduce that the objective range in an objective
space with higher dimensionality is essentially a hyperrectangle, or an n-orthotope – the geometrical
generalization of the rectangle in higher dimensions. All points inside such a hyperrectangle (i.e.

objective range) is perceived by the agent to bear identical (maximum) values of realizable utility.

While limited literature exists on the subject of bargaining and negotiation in the context of an
“objective range”, we find two plausible extensions of the preexisting setup that allow for an easy
integration of the concept:

-

The simple treatment: regard the geometrical center of the objective range as agent’s objective
position and compute the negotiated positions with the faux objective position; with this
approach, the existing set of spatial-utility properties can all be preserved;

-

The complex treatment: between two agents, first find the shortest line segment that connects
the duo’s objective range (i.e. the ends of the line segment is a point on the hyperrectangle’s
surface) and find a point on the line segment that reflects the power ratio between the duo to
serve as the negotiated position. However, this approach would lead to inconsistencies in
spatial-utility properties. For the scope of this work and lack of relevant empirical findings,
we recommend this exploration to be tabled for future investigations.
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Figure 4.9: 3D Surface and 2D Contour Plots for g(h, i) = 2 − h ¨ − i ¨
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Figure 4.10: 3D Surface and 2D Contour Plots for g(h, i) = 2 − max˜0, (|h| − 0.3)
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¨

− max˜0, (|i| − 0.3)

¨

4.4 Dynamical Properties

In contrast to our prior focus on the spatial interaction’s influence over utility perception, we now
investigate the utility perception’s impact on agents’ decision-making process and the evolution of
coalition structure at large. This section is organized as follows: we begin by reviewing some basic
elements for the agent’s decision-making process, then we examine some scenarios of interest. At
conclusion, we explore the existence of possible equilibrium states for the game.

4.4.1 Agent’s DecisionDecision-making & Equilibrium

Based on the strategy profile chosen, we formally describe the agents’ decision-making process as
following. Given a set • of R agents, let «´ be the current state of the game. The state «´ = {€§ , €¨ , … €Õ }

also represents the unordered set of nonempty subsets of • , which is the collection of all existing
coalitions (including singletons, i.e. coalition of one agent). Therefore, for any agent W ∈ €² , it has three
options (if it were “called” to act in this state):

1.

2.

3.

To remain in €² :

∀€œ ∈ «´ , O¡_w,„" ¤ > O¡_w,„# ¤ and O¡_w,„" ¤ > O[_w ], or

∃€œ ∈ «´ , O¡_w,„" ¤ < O¡_w,„# ¤ yet O¡_•,„# x ¤ < O¡_•,„# ¤ for some agent ” ∈ €œ for all such €œ .
To leave €² and become independent:

for ∀€œ ∈ «´ , O[_w ] > O¡_w,„# ¤
To leave €² and join €œ :

O¡_w,„" ¤ < O¡_w,„# ¤ and O¡_•,„#x ¤ ≥ O¡_•,„# ¤ for all agent ” ∈ €œ .
Essentially, every agent would always seek to join a coalition that provides it with the highest expected
utility available from the current state (and the move is finalized should all existing members of that
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coalition sees no decrease in expected utility with it entrance); or, it may also leave the current
coalition and be on its own.

Recalling our Nash Equilibrium solution concept setting, we therefore may define the stable state for
our model as following:

Definition. Stable State. Given a set • of R agents, let ¬ denote the set of all possible coalition structures,

or states of the game. We claim that «¢ = {€§ , €¨ , … €Õ } is a stable state in Π if and only if for ∀W ∈
€² , ° = 1, 2, … , Y:

•
•

∀€œ ∈ «¢ \{€² }, O¡óï,ì" ¤ > O¡óï,„# ¤ and O¡óï,ì" ¤ > O[óï ], or

∃€œ ∈ «¢ \{€² }, O¡óï,ì" ¤ < O¡óï,„# ¤ yet O¡ó•,ì# x ¤ < O¡ó•,ì# ¤ for some agent ” ∈ €œ for all such €œ .

In brief, «¢ is stable if and only if no agent may be able to unilaterally increase its expected utility by
changing its coalition membership. A closer look at the equilibrium condition leads to Observation 4.4,
which establishes the association between the agent’s own decision-making and overall coalition
structure (the state of the game).

Observation 4.4
4.4 Dependency on Global Coalition Topology. Given the strategy profile, the model
stipulates that agents always seek to maximize their expected utility by evaluating all possible coalition
alternatives at every state. Therefore, it is self-evident that with every single state change, every agent
will need to re-evaluate the new set of available coalitions and seek to improve its expected utility
again. In turn, there exists no coalition that can remain consistently stable regardless of the external

(global) dynamics.
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4.4.2 Cycles and Equilibrium

Having reviewed the formal expression in the utility sense for agent’s decision-making process and the
conditions for equilibrium, we now turn to the most important piece of the puzzle: does equilibrium
exist in our model? And if not, what may happen? To answer this question, we must first establish the

proper setting in which the existence (or non-existence) of equilibrium may be examined. Most of the
existing work [Bogomolnaia & Jackson 2002, Staatz 1983, Ray & Vohra 1999] focus on utility
preferences without reference to any specific or consistent utility characterization. To avoid the
potential trap of over-simplification, we first look at a classical 3-agent scenario as a source of
inspiration.

4.4.2.1 A (somewhat) Futile Attempt

Let us first consider a simple 3-agent scenario in part inspired by the discussions in Stability of Hedonic

Coalition Structures by Bogomolnaia & Jackson [Bogomolnaia & Jackson 2002] When we look at agents’
utility preferences in isolation, we can quickly establish the non-existence of the equilibrium in the
game of coalition formation with following example.

Let • = {1,2,3} and each agent with following utility (which in our model, is represented by
expected utility) preferences:

•

{1,2} >§ {1,3} >§ {1} >§ {1,2,3}

•

{2,3} >¨ {1,2} >¨ {2} >¨ {1,2,3}

•

{1,3} >µ {2,3} >µ {3} >µ {1,2,3}
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With the proposed set of utility preferences in the example, we may express the state graph for the
game as in Fig 4.9 below. Each directed link corresponds to a one-player reachable relation (where the
blue number next to the link indicates the agent involved in the state transition), and each block
indicates a state / coalition structure. We clearly see that regardless of the initial state, the game would

always end up in a cycle Â{1,2}, {3}Ã → Â{1}, {2,3}Ã → Â{2}, {1,3}Ã → Â{1,2}, {3}Ã … such that no stable
coalition structure exists with a non-TU, non-binding strategy profile.

Figure 4.11: The State Graph for the 3-Agent Scenario

While this result proves non-existence of equilibrium in certain conditions, we find it necessary to also
investigate the conditions in the spatial-utility domain of our model. We look at a 3-agent scenario in
the spatial sense, as shown in Fig. 4.10.

Figure 4.12: The Spatial Arrangement for the 3-Agent Scenario
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Adding the definition of expected utility to the set of inequalities, we get:
O¡ó§,{§,¨} ¤ > O¡ó§,{§,µ} ¤ > O[ó§ ]

Equation 4.55

O¡ó¨,{¨,µ} ¤ > O¡ó¨,{§,¨} ¤ > O[ó¨ ]

Equation 4.56

O¡óµ,{§,µ} ¤ > O¡óµ,{¨,µ} ¤ > O[óµ ]

Equation 4.57

Let us denote the distances between the agents in the R-dimensional objective space as d§¨ = f, d¨µ =
Q, dµ§ = ]. Due to the relative nature of the normalized power concept, we may assume without loss of

generality that S§ = 1, S¨ = a, Sµ = (. We expand the inequalities (R ∈

®

O¡ó§,{§,¨} ¤ > O¡ó§,{§,µ} ¤ ⟹
¨
a
(
(1 + a) ⋅ R − ¯
⋅ f± > (1 + () ⋅ R −
⋅]
1+a
1+(

O¡ó¨,{¨,µ} ¤ > O¡ó¨,{§,¨} ¤ ⟹
¨
(
1
(a + () ⋅ R −
⋅Q
> (1 + a) ⋅ R −
⋅f
a+(
1+a
O¡óµ,{§,µ} ¤ > O¡óµ,{¨,µ} ¤ ⟹
¨
1
a
(1 + () ⋅ R −
⋅]
> (a + () ⋅ R −
⋅Q
1+(
a+(
(1 + () ⋅ R −

(
⋅]
1+(

(1 + a) ⋅ R −

1
⋅f
1+a

¨

a
⋅Q
a+(

¨

(a + () ⋅ R −

¨

¨

Equation 4.58

¨

Equation 4.59

¨

Equation 4.60

>1⋅R

Equation 4.61

>a⋅R

Equation 4.62

> (⋅R

Equation 4.63

f + Q > ], f + ] > Q, Q + ] > f (triangle inequality)
f, Q, ], a, ( ∈ ℝ® , R ∈ ®
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) and get:

Equation 4.64

We then use non-linear programming (NLP) techniques to find a feasible solution set for f, Q, ], a, (, at
R = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively. Since our primary interest is in determining feasibility, we will simply create

a dummy objective function max g(a, () = a + ( for the NLP. Based on the output from General

Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) attached in Appendix B.1, we find that there exists no feasible

solution set for the above set of inequalities. Thus, the utility preference conditions proposed in the
example of the 3-agent case actually cannot hold in the unweighted version of our model.

This finding (or rather, not being able to find feasible solution) is significant for two reasons: first, it
has shown that additional constraints over utility preference conditions are introduced by the
construction of our position-power model. Second, and most importantly, it shows that any attempt to

understand coalition dynamics (in our position-power model) with sole consideration of (arbitrary)
utility preferences would be futile. We must beware the dangers of omission.

In Chapter 5, we shall take a more in-depth look at the existence of cycles in non-weighted case. But
here, out of curiosity on the effect of weights, we conclude this section with an extension of the 3-agent
scenario where a cycle exists in the state graph.

Let the position of three agents be r§ = (0, 1,0.5), r¨ = (0.5, 0 , 1), rµ = (1, 0.5, 0), fRd S§ =
S¨ = Sµ . Name the three objective dimensions as é, -, V resepctively, we then write that
d§,¨, < d§,µ, , d¨,µ, < d§,¨, , d§,µ,) < d¨,µ,) .

Based on our observations in section 4.3, we may let the weights of agent 1, 2, 3 to be È§, →

1, È¨, → 1, Èµ,) → 1 such that their utility preferences are predominantly determined by the

distances in the respective objective dimensions of greatest weight. This would make the
inequality

conditions

possible

such

that

we

have:

O¡ó§,{§,¨} ¤ > O¡ó§,{§,µ} ¤ >

O[ó§ ]; O¡ó¨,{¨,µ} ¤ > O¡ó¨,{§,¨} ¤ > O[ó¨ ]; O¡óµ,{§,µ} ¤ > O¡óµ,{¨,µ} ¤ > O[óµ ].
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We will not repeat lengthy mathematical calculations here, but the simple example above shows that
the introduction of weights relaxes certain power-position restrictions, thus making cycles possible in
the trio-agent scenario.

127

4.4.2.2 Cycles and Equilibrium

In the previous section, we examined possible existence of cycles in the state graph. The motivation
for our interest in cycles is simple: first, the existence of cycles can easily help us establish the nonexistence of equilibrium; and more importantly, the non-existence of cycles in a particular state graph
can help us establish the existence of equilibrium. The first one is simple to prove without much
elaboration: when there exists a cycle in a state graph, the game may keep its state transitions in the
cycle and thus a stable state may never be reached. The latter, however, would demand a slightly more
sophisticated proof.

Proposition 4.5
4.5. Non-existence of Cycles and Equilibrium. For any given coalition formation game, if its

complete state graph does not contain any cycles, it must have at least one stable state.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
4.5. Let Π = {«§ , «¨ , … , «Õ } be the set of possible states of the game, which

corresponds to the set of all possible coalition structures. From earlier discussion on the cardinality of
the set with regard to Bell numbers and the number of agents, we know Π is always a finite set., Let
fR](«w ) denote the set of states that may reach «w via finite number of one-player reachable transitions

(ancestors); also, let dÄ`(«w ) denote the set of states that «w may reach via finite number of one-player
reachable transitions (descendants). We quickly uncover the property of inheritance:
∀«• ∈ fR](«w ), fR]˜«• ⊆ fR](«w )

Equation 4.65

∀«² ∈ dÄ`(«w ), dÄ`(«² ) ⊆ dÄ`(«w )

Equation 4.66

By definition, a state «¢ is a stable state if and only if it is a terminal node in the state graph, i.e.

dÄ`(«¢ ) = ∅ . We note that if there exist no stable states for the given state graph, then ∀«w ∈
Π, dÄ`(«¢ ) ≠ ∅ (all nodes must have a non-empty successor set). In addition, since there is no cycle in
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the complete state graph, we also have ∀«w ∈ Π, dÄ`(«w ) ∩ fR](«w ) = ∅ (none of its successors may be

in its predecessor set). Jointly with the property of inheritance, we find that the transition from «w to

next state would lead to a strictly decreasing number of possible states to be included in the successor
set. Since the size of possible successor set is strictly decreasing, and we have only a finite number of

states, it is not difficult to see that for some Å, «æ ∈ dÄ` («¢ ) yet fR](«¢ ) = Π\{«æ } such that there are
no remaining unvisited states, and dÄ`(«æ ) = ∅, i.e. «æ is a stable state. Q.E.D.

Remark. A simple and more intuitive illustration of this proof would be as following: the non-existence
of cycles requires every state transition to visit only non-predecessor nodes; yet with every transition
the number of non-predecessor nodes decrease by at least one (the immediate state). Since the total
number of states is finite, after a sufficiently large number of state transitions, there must be at least
one state «æ for which there are no remaining non-predecessor nodes left, as its predecessor set

fR](«æ ) = Π\{«æ } and therefore «æ has to be a stable state. This is a sufficient, but not a necessary
condition.
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4.5 Conclusion

Thus far, we have established the basic assumptions and specifications for the baseline model. In the
process, we proposed specifications for characterizing functions on utility perception and likelihood
factor; in addition, we narrowed down from the multiple variations of the stability concept to one that
is most appropriate and relevant in the context of intrastate conflicts.

We began the analysis of spatial interactions with a duo-agent scenario and characterized the
coalition-forming distance boundary in relation to power-position in both weighted and unweighted
cases. With the extension to the multi-agent scenario, we then deduced series of observations on utility
perception and coalition formation in the static setting.

In the second half of the chapter, we examined the agent’s decision-making process and the definition
of equilibrium. Using the analysis of a trio-agent dynamical case, we demonstrated the futileness of
understanding coalition dynamics in absence of a proper characterizing function for utility perceptions.
Furthermore, we have uncovered relationship between cycles and equilibrium in our model, proving
that the non-existence of cycles would inevitably indicate the existence of at least one stable state.

From the baseline model, we derived some interesting spatial and dynamical characteristics that
would both help guide us in experimental design for later chapters and answer some earlier hypothesis
on parameter interdependencies. These findings, while largely discussed in relatively isolated or
limited scenarios, provide generally applicable rules to aid our understanding of the system dynamics
even as the model increases in complexity and becomes analytically intractable – so that we may begin
our computational investigations of the coalition dynamics in more complex settings with good
guidance in later chapters.
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Chapter 5 Computational Modeling of Coalition Dynamics
5.1 Introduction
Introduction

In Chapter 4, we demonstrated that in our proposed setting for coalition dynamics, formal analysis
may eventually become intractable, even for moderately complex scenarios with only a few agents and
objective dimensions. This observation has motivated us to specify a computational agent-based
model for coalition dynamics.

In this Chapter, we begin with a discussion on high-level input and output variables of interest and
how they relate to our themes of study. For the given themes, we propose a list of input parameters for
sensitivity analysis. In Section 5.3, we look into the concepts on randomization control and important
considerations for the computational experiments. In particular, we suggest a minor yet necessary
adjustment to the baseline model first proposed in Chapter 4, to account for the impact of
dimensionality on spatial-utility relationships.

In the second half of the Chapter, we introduce the simulation platform’s user interface in Section 5.4.
We discuss the full list of input variables in the context of the platform’s input and configuration view,
along with the respective list of output variables for the Monte Carlo and Single Run experiments in
the runtime and results view. In Section 5.5, we briefly discuss the runtime environment, before
moving on to examine the output format from Monte Carlo simulation settings in greater detail. We
further present a baseline configuration which is to be used throughout our run configurations to serve
as a reference for default values and establish baseline system dynamics. We conclude the section with
the list of experiment setups for the sensitivity analysis.
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5.2 Themes of Study and Sensitivity Analysis (SA) Investigations

This section addresses the question of what we want to investigate in the computational agent-based
model. To do so, we first review relevant input and outcome variables in our model and explain the
rationale for such choices. Afterwards, we propose some input parameters for experimentation, and
discuss their empirical relevance.

5.2.1 Input Variables

We now dedicate our efforts to investigating the more complex system dynamics in the computational
model. Through various themes, we intend to understand the impacts of different factors and develop
metrics that adequately illustrate the system dynamics.

Specifically, we start with the experimental parameters. For the agent-based coalition dynamics model,
it is clear to see that we have a set of general and agent-specific parameters as explanatory variables;
on the other hand, since the actual output of the model is a directed state tree (where each node
corresponds to a particular coalition structure, and each directed edge indicates one-player
reachability) – the choice of output variables can be a bit more elusive. The list of input variables is
shown in the table 5.1 below.

SystemSystem-level
•
•
•
•
•

AgentAgent-level

Number of agents
Number of objective dimensions
Weighted/unweighted scenario
Decision rules
Initial State

•
•
•

Normalized power
Objective position
Weights

Table 5.1: List of input variables, a high-level overview

Since most of the variables above have been defined earlier, we elaborate only on three of them:
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•

Decision rules
The decision rules consist of two aspects of coalition formation. The first is the utility function,
which determines how agents assigns utility value to membership in a particular coalition; the
second is the voting process, which determines how the agents of an existing coalition decide
to accept or reject an outsider’s proposal to join. In the computational model, we intend to
keep consistent with the baseline model’s choice of the utility characterization function, while
allowing for some variations in the voting process. Specifically, the group approval can be
obtained either by unanimous consent (no existing member would experience utility decrease
by accepting), or simple majority (no more than half of the existing members would
experience utility decrease by accepting).

•

Weighted/u
Weighted/unweighted scenario
As we have explored in Section 4.3.4, the introduction of (nonuniform) weights alters the
spatial relationship so drastically such that the set of dynamical properties discovered in the
unweighted scenario no longer hold. We investigate the impact of weights in an isolated
setting.

•

Initial State
Recalling the path-dependent nature of coalition dynamics, we recognize the significance of
initial coalition topology on its ensuing dynamics. For simplicity and empirical relevance, we
are primarily interested in comparing the “all-alone” and “all-together” initial states. The
former scenario corresponds to situations when different factions emerge and seek possible
coalitions from such chaos (“the big bang” [Blattman & Miguel 2010, Wood 2003, Christia
2012]); the latter corresponds to situations when a preexisting institutional enforcement of
the “grand coalition” fails, and the former members are free to make their choices (“the failed
state” [Fearson & Laitin 2003, Rotberg 2002]).
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5.2.2 Output Variables

The main purpose of the simulation experiments is to explore the impact of both system- and agentlevel input variables on coalition dynamics. Accordingly, we also need to define output variables that
properly captures system dynamics. Revisiting the algorithm design for our agent-based model
(section 3.4), we see that the simulation output in our computational model delivers comprehensive
information on system dynamics as shown in Figure 5.1, leaving us some freedom to construct metrics
of interest.

Figure 5.1: The “State Tree” Procedure, revisited

Our key focus is on the metrics that are closely related to the equilibrium concept. Accordingly, we find
the following outcome variables extracted from the state tree to be of primary interest: (1) number of
stable states, (2) number of cycles, (3) time to reach each stable state, (4) coalition structure in stable
states and (5) path to stable states. Since the first two variables are rather self-evidently necessary, we
elaborate on the later three:
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•

Time (number of iterations) to reach each stable state
The number of iterations from initial state to a stable state corresponds to the minimum
number of individual coalition shifts to reach the particular equilibrium. Empirically, this
value helps us estimate the time necessary for the group of agents to reach a stable coalition
structure, given a reasonable estimate on how frequently individual coalition shifts occur in
the real world. In addition, given the usual iteration limits21 we impose on the computational
model, the estimated time also reflect the feasibility of the equilibrium (excessively long time
to reach one particular stable state undermines its feasibility).

•

Coalition structure in stable states
The coalition structure in any stable state lends us insight on following aspects: number and
respective size of coalitions (how fragmented the structure is); utility levels of each agent; and
when we examine the two previous factors jointly, we also learn about its stability (resistance
to perturbation).

•

Path to stable states
Due to the non-deterministic nature of the coalition dynamics, the existence of stable states in
the final state graph does not necessarily guarantee that the system will “converge” towards
equilibrium. Therefore, the path to any stable state is particularly crucial as it entails
information pertaining to the likelihood of its occurrence22.

21 Tracing back to the original motivation of this work, we note that even for most chaotic and unstable intrastate conflict scenarios in the real
world, coalition changes occur at a reasonable interval (often by weeks, if not months). Thus a reasonable number of iterations, should we decide
that such changes occur as frequently as on a bi-weekly basis, can be chosen as 25-30 per annum for the period of interest.
22 We do not impose any probability distribution on the system’s evolution dynamics (moving from one state to another) despite its similarity to
a discrete-time Markov chain. That is, we simply deem one state to be “reachable” from a preceding state given the one-player reachability
condition is satisfied, as outlined in our earlier definition of the baseline model in Chapter 3. Therefore, we estimate the “likelihood” of a stable
state by assuming a discrete uniform probability distribution over the “reachable” next states from the preceding state.
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The list of outcome variables gives us a fairly comprehensive representation of the coalition dynamics
output from the computational model, with varying level of granularity. Therefore, at a later time, it is
necessary and reasonable that we conduct our comparative analysis based on these set of outcome
variables.
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5.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis for the Computational Model

Our sensitivity analysis investigations in the computational model broadly fall into two categories: at
the macro-level, we examine the influence of some tweaks to the model’s basic setups (weights,
decision rules, etc.). Therefore, we are primarily concerned with the more fundamental aspects of
system dynamics – the existence of stable state or cycles in respective scenarios. At the micro-level, we
introduce variations in agent characteristics (spatial distribution, power allocation, etc.) and
investigate their influences over more granular aspects of the dynamics: the structural features of
stable coalitions, and how stability might change when perturbed.

Accordingly, we propose the following set of input parameters for investigation in the context of our

computational model, outlined in table 5.2 (a) through (i).
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Table 5.2: a-i: List of Input Parameters for Investigation

(Table 5.2 a) S1: More relaxed proposal-acceptance voting rules lead to greater level of dynamics.
Explanatory variable

Control variables

Outcome Variables

Voting Procedure: unanimous
approval vs. simple majority

Agent power distribution
Existence of stable states / cycles
(randomization / statistical /
Number of stable states
manipulated control), weights
Time needed to reach stable states
(equal across all dimensions),
objective position (randomization
control), number of agents
(constant), no in-simulation
change, number of objectives at
initialization
Expected observation: when the proposal
proposaloposal-acceptance voting is relaxed, we would expect greater level of
dynamics as it makes coalition forming easier, while at the same time also making the coalition less stable as
some unhappy ones might leave.
(Table 5.2 b) S2: Weighted scenarios will introduce (more) cyclic behaviors.
Explanatory variable

Control variables

Outcome Variables

Randomization of weights vs.
equal weights (non-weighted)

Agent power distribution
Existence of stable states / cycles
(randomization / statistical /
Number of stable states
manipulated control), weights
(equal across all dimensions),
objective position (randomization
control), number of agents
(constant), no in-simulation
change, number of objectives at
initialization, voting procedure
(unanimous approval)
Expected observation: in the weighted scenario, constraints imposed by the Euclidean spatial properties are
lifted, and we would expect very different dynamical patterns in general.
(Table 5.2 c) S3: A higher objective dimensions prolongs the process to stability.

Explanatory variable

Control variables

Number of objectives at
initialization

Outcome Variables

Agent power distribution
Existence of stable states
(randomization / statistical /
Number of stable states
manipulated control), weights
Time needed to reach stable states
(equal across all dimensions),
objective position (randomization
control), number of agents
(constant), no in-simulation
change, voting procedure
(unanimous approval)
Expected observation: when the scenario involves more
more objective dimensions, stable states are less likely to
exist;
exist; also, it will take more time (as in number of iterations) to reach a stable state.
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(Table 5.2 d) S4: A more uniform power distribution leads to a more chaotic process.
Explanatory variable

Control variables

Outcome Variables

Normalized power distribution
among agents at initialization

Weights (equal across all
Existence of stable states
dimensions), objective position
Number of stable states
(randomization control), number
Time needed to reach stable
of agents/dimensions (constant),
states
no in-simulation change, voting
Coalition structure
procedure (unanimous approval)
Expected observation: when there is a more uniform distribution of normalized power among agents, the stable
states
states are less likely to exist, but when they do, there might be multiple such states; it takes longer to reach stable
states; more, smaller coalitions should emerge.

(Table 5.2 e) S5: A higher number of agents introduces more possible stable states and dynamics.
Explanatory variable

Control variables

Outcome Variables

Number of agents at initialization

Agent power distribution
Existence of stable states
(randomization / statistical /
Number of stable states
manipulated control), weights
Time needed to reach stable
(equal across all dimensions),
states
objective position (randomization Coalition structure
control), number of agents
(constant), no in-simulation
change, voting procedure
(unanimous approval)
Expected observation: when the scenario entails more agents, there are more stable states possible, and we
should observe more dynamics in the process as well.

(Table 5.2 f) S6: As the power changes for a leading agent in a coalition, the coalition dissembles or grows.
Explanatory variable

Control variables

Normalized power of a leading
agent in a coalition in-simulation

Outcome Variables

Weights (equal across all
Evolution dynamics from the
dimensions), objective position
stable states
(randomization control), number
Existence of new stable states
of agents/dimensions (constant),
no other in-simulation change,
voting procedure (unanimous
approval)
Expected observation: when a leading agent becomes more powerful, its coalition grows; when a leading agent
becomes less powerful, its coalition may fall
fall apart.
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(Table 5.2 g) S7: Position shift of agents in boundary zone is more likely to cause coalition structure changes.
Explanatory variable

Control variables

Outcome Variables

Agent position shifts in-simulation

Weights (equal across all
Evolution dynamics from the
dimensions), normalized power
stable states
(constant), number of
Existence of new stable states
agents/dimensions (constant), no
other in-simulation change, voting
procedure (unanimous approval)
Expected observation: a position shift of agent in the boundary zone of an existing coalition is more likely to
cause the agent to leave the coalition, thus leading to evolution dynamics from current stable states; vice versa,
a position shift of an agent closer to the core of an existing coalition is less likely to cause change.

(Table 5.2 h) S8: Elimination of weak, isolated agents is unlikely to cause coalition structure change (from a
stable state).
Explanatory variable
Control variables
Outcome Variables
Elimination of an agent insimulation

Normalized power (constant),
Evolution dynamics from the
weights (equal across all
stable states
dimensions), number of
Existence of new stable states
agents/dimensions (constant), no
other in-simulation change, voting
procedure (unanimous approval)
Expected observation: as often happens in the realreal-world, an agent with no coalition affiliation and weak power
is likely to be eliminated and has less influence existing coalition dynamics of other agents; we should observe
no significant changes from stable states.

(Table 5.2 i) S9: Different initial coalition structure leads to very different dynamics.
Explanatory variable

Control variables

All-alone agents vs. Singular
grand-coalition (regardless of
utility preference)

Outcome Variables

Normalized power (constant),
Existence of stable states
weights (equal across all
Number of stable states
dimensions), number of
Time needed to reach stable states
agents/dimensions (constant), no Coalition structure
other in-simulation change, voting
procedure (unanimous approval)
Expected observation: with a singular grandgrand-coalition to start with, the model might take much shorter time to
reach any stable state should majority of the agents find the grand coalition somewhat preferable.
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5.3 Experimental
Experimental Design

We begin by defining a few terms that are used throughout this section. A computational simulation is
a computer program that is built to reproduce behavior of a particular system, according to an abstract
model [Roy 2005, Epstein 1999, Macal & North 2009]. An experiment, not necessarily limited to the
computational simulation context, is one during which the experimenter tests a hypothesis by
observing changes to the outcome by making alternations to inputs of various kind. A simulation run
is an execution of the computational model based on a fixed set of input variables, and often serves as
the most fundamental unit of output analysis.

Given the extensive-form game nature of our computational model, an iteration of a simulation run is
defined as a singular execution of the main procedure of the model after initialization. And accordingly,
the length, or duration, of a simulation run is defined as the number of iterations. A repetition of a
simulation run is an execution of the run with a specific random seed. In the context, the random seed
is often produced by a pseudo-random number generator to implement the experiment. Often, we
conduct multiple repetitions of a given run using exact same input variables but a different random

seed. Accordingly, the behavior characteristics of the computational model can be analyzed by
reviewing repetitions of the run.

In the remainder of this section, we discuss the proper design of the experiment, followed by some
necessary considerations given the deterministic nature of our model and its output format.
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5.3.1 Randomization Control

The main purpose of employing such a computational model is simple: to investigate complex system
dynamics at a large scale, when analytical tractability becomes often elusive through formal theoretical
analysis. Therefore, we must carefully design the set of experiments where we can establish
relationships between input variables of interests and the output of the model.

Two classical approaches are in place to conduct controlled experiments setup that allows systematic
characterization of input-output analysis: parametric sweeping and Monte Carlo method23 [Lee 1993,
Mooney 1997, Macal & North 2009, Laver & Sergenti 2011, Schoonvelde 2018] However, given the
high dimensionality of the parameter space embedded in our model, we do not use the parametric
sweeping method due to its lack of scalability. Considering the few discrete system-level settings
(number of agents, objective space dimensionality, weights, voting procedure, initialization) alone, we
easily could get to over 100 parameter settings; we would further see an exponential growth in number
of parameter settings for “sweeping” by adding the agent-level individual settings into the scheme, not
to mention that many of the agent-level settings are continuous (real numbers).

Consequently, we turn to the Monte Carlo method that can handle both continuous and discrete
parameters while also allowing scalability through proper random sampling. The idea behind this
method is simple: instead of exploring the entire parameter (sub)space, we assign to every feasible
point an equal probability of being selected as input for simulation. At the same time, by holding certain
input parameters constant, we investigate the input-output relationships for the particular input
parameter of interest.

23 A related implementation of the Monte Carlo method was also used in the work of Laver & Sergenti (2011), where they described this
experimental design as using suites of model runs with “Monte Carlo parameterizations”.
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The motivation and implementation of the Monte Carlo method in this setting are both fairly
straightforward: as we have very limited information on the appropriate probability distributions of
respective input parameters, it is most sensible to assume a (continuous or discrete) uniform
distribution over the complete set of possible values for each input parameters under randomization
control so we have a uniform sampling of the parameter (sub)space. For example, if some agent’s
power is under randomization control, then its value is initialized by draw from a continuous uniform
distribution over (0, 1] at the onset of each simulation run. We use the default random number
generation module from the programming language (Python) for this task throughout our
computational simulation experiments.

143

5.3.2 A Few Considerations for the Computational Experiments

Now that we have settled on the choice of the experimental design method, let us briefly discuss a few
important considerations: the deterministic nature of the baseline model, random variable generation,
time constraint and output analysis.

The Deterministic Model
Model

The foundation of Monte Carlo simulations rests upon the baseline model, which is deterministic in
nature. In the real-world scenario, due to the sequential nature of coalition moves, multiple forms or
paths of coalition dynamics might all be feasible, yet only one particular final state or path may be
taken. To remove the probabilistic component in the process, we adopt the “State Tree” approach for
exhaustive iteration such that the output includes all feasible paths within the set depth limit. This
implementation ensures a comprehensive and fair evaluation of dynamics from any given initial state.

Remark. The Implications from our Deterministic Model. The setup of our computational model
removes the “uncertainty” from an intrinsically Markov process, thus voids the necessity to run Monte
Carlo simulation within the domain of a given set of initial inputs – as we are able to explore the entire
state space of possible coalition dynamics in each run for a finite number of iterations.

Random Variable Generation

While our input parameters include both discrete and continuous values, the principle for choosing
the underlying distribution is consistent. We adopt uniform distribution for both the discrete and
continuous variables, over their respective permissible range of values. Such choice is conceived for
two reasons: first, we are constrained by the limited number of real-world scenarios and accurate data
to identify the underlying distributions for a magnitude of input parameters; second, the uniform
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distribution would essentially allow us to give every single possible combination of initial states an
equal chance, which seems most logical in absence of an empirically validated distribution in many of
them.

Time Constraint and Output Analysis

As we have discussed in earlier chapters, the coalition dynamics process does not necessarily converge
towards any stable state after certain number of iterations. In addition, given the enormity of the state
space even for only a handful of agents, to explore the entire state space can become a daunting, if not
an infeasible task. Faced with these two challenges, we naturally need to think of a way to limit the size
of the state space for exploration. And the simple approach we adopt is to limit the depth of iterations
(see earlier elaboration on this idea in section 3.4). Taking both the frequency of coalition moves and
the typical time span of study, we limit most of our simulation runs to an iteration depth of 50. This
value corresponds to the depth of the state tree, rather than the actual number of iterations
(considering branching at each iteration depth, the actual number of iterations necessary to reach
every end node will be far greater).
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5.3.3 A Minor Adjustment to the Baseline Model

In early stages of model testing, we discovered a complication to the original specification for the
concept of Realizable Utility, as stated in section 4.2.2:

For our model (in its unweighted setting), we would specify the function in the onedimensional case as g(S) = 1 − S ¨ … we further derive the utility as a function of distance d in
the R-dimensional space therefore as:
g(d) = R − d ¨

Equation 5.1

While the specification in Eq. 5.1 in itself has no theoretical or mathematical fallacies, it brings a
prominent problem in simulation outcomes. Essentially, the proposed specification is excessively

forgiving in appraising objective distances such that coalitions are too easy to form amongst the group
of agents. Consequently, we observed an almost “clustering” type of behavior among the agents in
earlier rounds of test simulations, where the one and only terminal state discovered is one with a grand
coalition with all agents. Naturally we question the observation of such a pattern, as it contradicts our
knowledge of coalition dynamics in the real world [Christia 2012, Posen 2017].

To better understand this odd behavior, we revisit the spatial properties of the baseline model.
Recalling our discussion on unidimensional duo-agent interaction scenario in section 4.3.1, we find
maximum distance within which two agents may mutually agree to form a coalition is 1, under original
specifications for the equation. For d ∈ [0, 2] and two randomly distributed agents along the singular
objective dimension, the implication of this “coalition-forming distance” is rather significant – such
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that the duo are to form a coalition in 75% of the cases24, if the both are uniformly randomly distributed
on the singular objective dimension.

Now, we extend the spatial-utility analysis to the multi-dimensional case. To best understand the
impact of dimensionality on coalition formation, we study the case for two randomly initialized agents
in the R-dimensional space. Let the positions of two agents A and B be f*, Q+* respectively, with their

decomposed position in each dimensional drawn from a continuous uniform distribution over [−1, 1].
Let the normalized power values for of the two A and B be r, , respectively, drawn from a continuous
uniform distribution over (0, 1].

The expected Euclidean distance between the two agents can be expressed as:
O¡-f* − Q+* -¤ = . Ë (fw − Qw )¨

Equation 5.2

w³§,¨,…ž

where fw , Qw are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables drawn from a
continuous uniform distribution over [−1, 1] . The expected distance between the two randomly
initialized agents then becomes:
O¡-f* − Q+* -¤ = .

1
1
1
⋅
/
…
/
˜h − i1
2ž −1 −1 1

2
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dh1 dh2 … dhR di

R

Equation 5.3

Since the analytical solution to Eq. 5.4 is not straightforward [Robbins 1978], we instead use an
approximated solution that works well for 2 ≤ R ≤ 10, and write:

24 With some basic knowledge in joint probability distribution, let the position of agent A and B be f, Q respectively, uniformly distributed over
[−1, 1]. We may thus write the probability of the distance between the duo to be no greater than 1 as:
§1
1 ´1
1 3 3
3
–[|f − Q| ≤ 1] = 0/
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O¡-f* − Q+* -¤ ≅ 0.79√R

Equation 5.4

To compute the expected power ratio between the two agents, we must add a lower bound to the
randomly generated normalized power value so that the integral actually converges:
1
1
r
i
O ü ý = / / 1 di1 di2 ≅ 2.30
,
i
10−2 10−2 2

Equation 5.5

In addition to this mathematical practicality, introducing a lower bound for the uniform distribution
from which we draw values of normalized power parameters also imposes a sensible constraint on the
possible upper bound on ratio of power between agents: scenarios involving agents with more than
10¨ times difference in power are not only unlikely, but also of low empirical value.

Now, let us add a tuning coefficient, a ∈ ℝ® to the original formulation, and re-write the equation for

Realizable Utility as:

g(d) = R − a ⋅ d ¨

Equation 5.6

Accordingly, we write the set of expected utility relationships as following (aided by our prior work in

Section 4.3.1). Let the coalition of the duo € ≔ [1,2], r = 0.23 and , = 0.1. We write the distance
between the negotiated position for the coalition and agent A as:

d¢, =

0.1
⋅ 0.79√R ≅ 0.24 ⋅ √R
0.1 + 0.23

Equation 5.7

Similarly, we get the distance between the negotiated position for the coalition and agent B:
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d¢, =

0.23
2
⋅ √R ≅ 0.55 ⋅ √R
0.1 + 0.23 3

Equation 5.8

Based on the power-utility-related concepts and functions defined in this section, we have:

•

Expected Utility for agent A to be by itself _ = 0.23 ⋅ g(d) = 0.23R

•

Expected Utility for agent B to be by itself _ = 0.1 ⋅ g(d) = 0.1R

•

Expected Utility for agent A to be in coalition €, _

,¢

= [R − a ⋅ R(0.24)¨ ] ⋅ (0.33R)

•

Expected Utility for agent B to be in coalition €, _

,¢

= [R − a ⋅ R(0.55)¨ ] ⋅ (0.33R)

Based on the self-interested and utility maximization nature of the coalition formation process, in
order for the coalition € to form, the following two inequalities must hold: _

,¢

≥ _ and _

,¢

≥_ .

Expand the two inequalities and we get:

[R − a ⋅ R(0.24)¨ ] × 1.43 ≥ 1 ⟹ 1.43R − 0.082 × aR − 1 ≥ 0
[R − a ⋅ R(0.55)¨ ] × 3.3 ≥ 1 ⟹ 3.3R − 1.0 × aR − 1 ≥ 0

Since R ∈

®

Equation 5.9

Equation 5.10

and a ∈ ℝ® , we reduce the inequalities above to:
(1.43 − 0.082a)R − 1 ≥ 0

Equation 5.11

(3.3 − a)R − 1 ≥ 0

Equation 5.12

For a fixed value of R, the choice of a has significant impact on the validity of the inequalities Eq. 5.11

– 5.12. When a → 0, the agents would always form coalitions since there is little punishment for

agreeing to a negotiation position away from one’s own; when a becomes very large, the agents would
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never form coalition due to the prohibitively high punishment for agreeing to a negotiation position
away from one’s own.

So by tuning the value of a, we may arbitrarily shrink or extend the “coalition-forming distance” based
on the specific need and characteristics of the scenario. And for our set of Monte Carlo experiments,
we attempt to set a to be a value such that in the unweighted scenario, two equal-power agents
randomly positioned in the objective space would have a possibility of forming coalition close to 50%.
Such a setting provides a relatively neutral baseline for simulation, in the sense that we would not

always see the convergence towards a grand coalition, nor find it extremely difficult for any two agents
to form a coalition at all. Accordingly, we should decide on a sufficiently large a such that the inequality
requirements in Eq. 5.11-5.12 are just met, for R = 1, 2, 3. Following some analysis, we elect to use a =
2.7 for scenarios with no more than 3 objective dimensions.

It is important to note here, that the empirical counterpart to the a value is best described as the
system-wide coefficient on spatial-utility computations in the unweighted setting. A higher a value
corresponds to a system-wide faster (realizable) utility decrease for a unit distance in the objective
space. While we have chosen an a value in order to retain a desirable level of coalition dynamics in
computational simulations, the a value can always be tuned to fit the specific context of analysis.
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5.4 Simulation Platform:
Platform: User Interface and Internal Mechanism

A prototype version of the coalition dynamics model was initially developed as an integrated module
to the StateSim platform25 [Silverman et al. 2004] in early 2016, to support the agents’ decision-making
process in alliance formation in various scenarios. The integrated module takes certain input variables
from both the subject matter expert (SME) inputs and the broader simulation environment to compute
utility preferences based on a particular set of configurations to the baseline model outlined above.

While this module did serve the purpose well in its role within StateSim, it lacked two necessary
components for its application to satisfy our simulation needs. First, there is no proper graphical user
interface (GUI) for configuration of basic model setups. Second, it does not have the full state-tree
exploration (and thus in its output) or Monte Carlo simulation capabilities.

Therefore, we have created a fully standalone agent-based model exclusively for the purpose of this
dissertation. The platform is developed in the Python environment, with a simple yet comprehensive
user interface for initialization and output analysis for Monte Carlo and single-case use. The user may
choose to either run a set of full-scale Monte Carlo simulations or focus on a single run. Relevant
documentation and code can be found in Appendix B.2.

At last, we provide a more detailed look into the internal mechanism of the simulation process.
Specifically, we intend to reveal the algorithmic design and sequence of events during computational
modeling, which would further aid the reader’s understanding of the simulation platform.

25

A detailed description of the StateSim platform can be found in Appendix A.1.
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5.4.1 Input and Configuration View

Let us begin with the configuration page in Fig. 5.2. Starting with the upper left corner, the “Files” tab
comes with four options: load configuration, save configuration, import from StateSim and Save

Results. The first two options allow us to load a pre-configured initialization file and save current set
of initial parameters as an external initialization file for later use. “Import from StateSim” allows us to
import initialization file in a different format from a larger simulation environment, StateSim. “Save

Results” saves the latest output of a run into a table in the CSV format. Below the “Files” tab, there are
three tabs that corresponds to the three main modules of the simulation platform – the
configuration/initialization page, simulation viewer/runner, and results viewer. We shall continue
with our walkthrough with the configuration page in Table 5.3 here.

Figure 5.2: The Configuration Page of our Standalone Coalition Simulation Platform
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Row/Parameter Name

Overview

Simulation Mode

Choice between the Single Run and Monte Carlo (multi-run) setup.

Number of Objectives
Use Weight

The dimension of the objective space, i.e. the number issues the agents
agrees/disagrees upon.
Choice between the weighted vs unweighted scenario

Number of Agents

Number of agents in the scenario, pre-configured to be name as “A B C ...” in
the alphabetical order. Given the empirical necessity (total number of sizable
parties in conflict in any given scenario) we have set the maximum to be 26,
and of course, the minimum is 1. The input must be an integer.

Initial Coalitions

The coalition structure set as the initial condition. The default is a “all alone”
scenario, in which every agent is by itself. However, this can be altered
arbitrarily. Syntax-wise, the space is used as a separator for joint letters.
Example: “AB C” stands for an initial condition in which A, B is in the same
coalition, and C is alone.

Number of Runs

In the single run scenario, this function is disabled (as it automatically
defaults to 1. In the Monte Carlo setup, this dictates total number of runs that
will be completed.

Alpha Constant

The tuning parameter for the Expected Utility Function, as mentioned in
Section 5.3.3, “A Minor Adjustment to the Baseline Model”. The recommended
value is 2.7 for scenarios with no more than 3 objective dimensions. User may
tune it arbitrarily based on empirical findings or specific needs. The smaller
the alpha value, the more likely it is for any two agents to form coalitions.

Voting Style

Choice of three variations in the voting process: single, unanimous, and
majority. The first allows any agent to unilaterally join a coalition without the
consent of any of its existing members; the second requires consent (and
therefore, non-decreasing utility change) for all of the existing members of
the coalition; the majority requires no less than half of the existing members
to consent. Looser voting requirement makes it easier for an external agent to
join a coalition, however, due to the consenting nature of such a change, some
existing members may experience negative utility change and thus start
seeking alternative coalition choices.

Max. Depth

The maximum depth of the State Tree that will be explored. See Section 5.3.1,
“Time Constraint and Output Analysis” for more details.

Config. Problem

The line indicates any mistake in input configuration.
Table 5.3: Configuration Page Parameters

The lower half of the configuration page (below “Config. Problem” prompt line) is used for detailed
configuration of each agent’s power (which may either be a specific value, or a random number
uniformly distributed over its range of permissible values, (0, 1]), and similarly for its position and
weights. These configurations settings are rather self-explanatory.
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5.4.2 Runtime View
Now we turn to the second module, simulation runtime view. We show the runtime view for the Single
Run mode in Fig. 5.3, and Monte Carlo mode in Fig. 5.4. With initialization process complete, user may
click on the “Run Simulation” tab to start the simulation and monitor its process. If the simulation is
taking too long to complete, the user may terminate anytime by clicking “Cancel”.

Figure 5.3: The Runtime View in Single Run Mode

In the Single Run mode, the runtime view first displays the full list of agent characteristics (power,
weights, position), then proceeds to display specific steps of the simulation. In the end, it indicates the
completion of the run, and provides a summary value on the count of “loop nodes”. A loop node is
defined as the coalition topology (i.e. a state) that leads to a cycle in the state graph.
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Figure 5.4: The Runtime View26 in Monte Carlo Batch Run Mode

In comparison, the runtime view is much simpler in the Monte Carlo batch run mode. It only displays
the current run number, which starts from zero, and the current depth of the simulation. The depth,
just as the term depth seen in the Single Run mode runtime view, is defined as the shortest path length
from the initial state to the current state being explored. If a node «w at depth R is later found to be a
child node to «• at depth Y, where Y > R, we do not consider «w as a new node at depth Y + 1, but
simply record the directed path between «• and «w . This deliberation is made to save computational
resources, as all possible child nodes to «w have already been explored (at depth R) and there is no
need to re-compute them.

26

The view’s appearance differs as it is rendered in MacOS, instead of Windows OS.
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We shall provide a more detailed look into the mechanism of the computational model as we conclude
the user interface walkthrough.

5.4.3 Results View

When the simulation is complete, the summary of results may be viewed in the “View Results” tab.
Depending on the simulation mode choice between Single Run and Monte Carlo, the results view also
differs.

The results view for Monte Carlo runs offers a summary of the simulation results, including only the
most basic information as shown in Fig 5.5; we explain the details of these parameters in Table 5.4.
This design leaves the details of each individual run in an output file (which can be exported and
reviewed in detail by choosing “Files -> Save Results”). The details of the output file from Monte Carlo
run results are discussed later in Table 5.6.

Figure 5.5: The Monte Carlo Mode Results View
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Row/Parameter Name

Overview

Runs

Number of single runs in the batch

Completed Runs

Number of runs for which, in the preset “Maximum Depth” limit, have
been fully explored. Incomplete runs correspond to ones for which states
beyond the maximum depth limit exist, but were not explored.

Runs with 1 Terminal State

Number of runs with (exactly) 1 terminal state.

Runs with 1 Terminal State

Number of runs with (exactly) 2 terminal states.

Agents with Constant Power and Position

Agents whose power and position parameters were fully specified.

Agents with Parameterized Power

Agents whose power value was randomly generated at each run (based
on Monte Carlo parameterization).

Agents with Parameterized Position

Agents whose position value was randomly generated at each run (based
on Monte Carlo parameterization).

Table 5.4: Explanation of Fields from the Monte Carlo Mode Results View

The platform also offers a much comprehensive and detailed results view for the Single Run mode. We
highlight the three display areas in Figure 5.6 and describe its Summary Section in Table 5.5.

Row/Parameter Name

Overview

Nodes27 Visited

Total number of reachable unique states given the initial condition and depth limits.

Nodes Created

Total number of possible states visited given the initial condition and depth limit,
including those that are unreachable or duplicates.

Depth Reached

The maximum depth reached in the State Tree, such that all States at this depth either
becomes terminal, or only leads to an earlier state(s) in lower depth.

Initial Coalitions

Initial coalition structure.

Terminal States

The number of terminal states, where no unilateral move by any agent may lead to
positive utility change given preset decision rules.

Looped Nodes Detected

Number of nodes that becomes to a part of a cycle in the State Graph.

Table 5.5: Explanation of Fields from the Summary Section of the Single Run Mode Results View

The term “nodes” and “states” are used interchangeably throughout this section, as each node in the State Graph or State Tree bears a bijectional
relation to a (feasible) state of coalition dynamics.
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27

Immediately below the Summary section, we find the State Selector section organized in tabs. These
tabs of states are organized by depth (i.e. the shortest path length from the initial state to the selected
state). Each tab is given a depth number, with the initial tab of depth 0, followed by the number of
states in this tab (at this depth) in parentheses.

For example, in Figure 5.6, where the selected tab reads “Depth 3 (38)”, we know there are a total of
38 unique states at depth 3 in the simulation output. Each state corresponds to a reachable state from
the initial state, and a particular coalition topology. The agents’ coalition memberships are indicated
by the spaces between the characters. For a state that reads “A BDEF C”, the agent A is alone, the agent
C is alone, and agents B, D, E, F are in one coalition group. If a state is displayed with a suffix “Terminal”,
the state is a terminal state with no further possible child states, and static equilibrium is reached.

We may find more details about a state in the State Details section when the state is selected (indicated
by the highlighted blue bar in the State Selector section). The Parents field displays possible preceding
state(s) to the selected state; the Utilities field displays expected utility values for each agent; the

Children field displays all possible child states from the current selected state. If a child state is
displayed with a suffix “Loop”, the particular child state belongs to a cycle in the state graph.

Recalling some network science fundamentals, we find that for the fairly simple simulation run shown
in Figure 5.6, with 6 agents and 109 reachable states, there are a total of 11,772 directed link values28
along with 654 utility values in memory.
Such observation naturally leads to our choice for the Monte Carlo mode’s output format: since we do
not necessarily need all of the values for sensitivity analysis through our Monte Carlo simulations, we
elect for summary characteristics of each run for memory optimization purposes in the Monte Carlo

28 For a directed graph with 109 nodes and no self-links (a link that goes from one state to itself), a maximum total of 109 × (109 − 1) = 11,772
directed links exist.
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mode of our simulation. This ensures the computational performance while preserving all necessary
output variables of interest.
Now we have concluded the walkthrough of our simulation platform, let us discuss some technical
details related to the simulation specifications.

Summary

State
Selector

State
Details

Figure 5.6: The Single Run Mode Results View, with Highlighted Annotation
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5.4.4 Internal Mechanism of the Simulation Platform

In Section 3.4, “A Discussion on Computational Complexity”, we first mentioned the “State Tree”
approach as a means to efficiently explore the state space of coalition dynamics. Our actual
implementation follows the general principles of this approach, with some minor adjustments and
additions to serve specific functional needs.

While the output from the Monte Carlo mode does not contain the same level of details as the Single
Run mode, it differs only in output format and recorded output characteristics – the internal
mechanism of the simulation platform is shared across both run modes. The platform in Monte Carlo
mode merely repeats what happens during a single run for a predefined number of times, then records
the aggregated output characteristics for memory optimization.

Before we describe the dynamics at the coalition topology level, we find it necessary to revisit the
decision-making process at the agent level initially discussed in Section 3.2.1, where for each agent at
every turn:

-

Step 1: the agent W reviews all possible coalition moves, which may be to (1) remain where it
is, (2) join some new coalition, or (3) simply leave its current coalition and become a coalition
of its own;

-

Step 2: the agent W then rank all such possible coalition moves by spatial-utility changes29;

-

Step 3: in utility-change-descending order (going from the most positive utility change to
least), the agent makes proposal-to-join to the members of the coalition of interest. If the

29 The negotiated positions for various coalition structures are computed with Equation 3.1; the realizable utility values for different possible
coalition moves are computed with Equation 5.6 (with the introduced tuning parameter a); and the expected utility values are computed with
Equation 3.6 and Equation 4.2.
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coalition move does not involve any new coalitions, specifically, to just become or remain a
coalition of its own, no proposal needs to be made;
-

Step 4: the proposal is then reviewed by members of the affected coalition for the implied
spatial-utility changes, and a determination to accept or reject is made based on the
predefined voting procedures30;

-

Step 5: the first accepted coalition move then becomes the best-available move for agent W,
which the model takes as the only possible move from agent W under the rationality
assumption.

The process is then repeated for all agents in the scenario to discover possible move for each agent,
and accordingly, possible changes in coalition topology. Now, let us examine what happens during a
single run simulation aided by the illustrations in Figure 5.7:

-

Step 1: for each simulation run, the input parameters (listed in Table 5.3) are taken in and the
simulation is initialized from the initial coalition structure at the onset of the simulation run.
If randomization is used, then the random values are generated before initialization;

-

Step 2: with the initial state as the parent state, the platform exhaustively lists all 1-player
different states. This list includes all topologically possible states (if any one player moved)
without considering utility or voting procedures. In the illustration, the list is represented by
the light grey circles at Depth 1;

-

Step 3: from the list of 1-player different states, the platform computes new expected utility
values for each agent based on the coalition topology in the state, then applies the voting
procedures and compares the utility value changes to determine reachability 31 . In the

30 Two alternative voting procedures are allowed in our model: Simple Majority and Unanimous Approval. Details can be found in Section 3.3,
Subsection on “Voting Procedures”.
31 The agent who changes coalition membership in this state change should perceive an increase in expected utility, and the coalition group it is
joining must approve according to the predefined voting procedures. The reader may revisit Section 3.2.1 for a more rigorous definition.
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illustration, only state €(1,1) remains a reachable state at Depth 1 from the initial state. The
reachability is indicated by the arrow;
-

Step 4: after the unreachable states are eliminated from consideration, the platform then
repeats Step 2 (exhaustive listing of all 1-player different states) for each new reachable state
at Depth 1. In the illustration, the new list is now represented by the light grey circles at Depth
2;

-

Step 5: the platform again determines the reachability for the new list of 1-player different
states following the utility value changes and voting procedures. New reachable states from
the immediately preceding states are identified. In the illustration, the new reachable states
are represented by the white circles at Depth 2.

The illustrated process is then repeated for each newly identified reachable state, until (1) no new
reachable states can be found, or (2) the preset depth limit is reached.

A few details should be noted:

-

Reaching a Previously Identified State: during the simulation run, if a reachable state has
already been identified earlier, the platform simply records the reachability relationship and
moves on without repeating the computation for reachable states for this known state. In Fig.
5.8, state €(1,1,1), a blue circle at Depth 2, is found to be reachable by some descendent of
€(1,1,2) ; this does not change the reachable states from €(1,1,1) and hence no repeated
computations are necessary.

-

Reaching a Terminal State (Equilibrium): during the simulation run, if a reachable state has no
reachable child states, it is recorded as a terminal state. We are only able to identify terminal
states that can be reached before the preset depth limit. A sample terminal state is represented
by the green circle in Fig. 5.8.
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-

Reaching the Preset Depth Limit: if a state has reachable child states beyond the maximum
depth limit, we mark the state “incomplete” at the end of the simulation, indicating its
potential to evolve beyond the depth limit.

At the simulation end, the full details of the state graph, including reachable states with their
interconnections and expected utility values for individual agents in each state are recorded. For the
simulation runs in Monte Carlo mode, the aggregated output metrics are computed and stored.
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Figure 5.7: The Flow of Steps during a Single Run Simulation
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Figure 5.8: An Abridged Sketch of the State Graph at Simulation-end
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5.5 Simulation Specifications

In this Section, we focus on the technical specifications and methodology involved in the Monte Carlo
simulation experiments. We first elaborate on the simulation environment, some runtime estimates
and necessary operational matters. Then we discuss the simulation output file format for Monte Carlo
experiments based on a sample output. At closing, we list all initialization configurations for the
proposed hypotheses validations.

5.5.1 Runtime
Runtime Environment

Due to the limited computational capacity of most standalone computer systems, we recommend using
direct Shell command to run Monte Carlo simulations on a remote server (“on the cloud”) to enable
faster simulation and scalable parallel computing. Essentially, we create an individual initialization
configuration file (using the simulation platform’s “save configuration” function) for each set of runs
and execute them remotely through Shell commands. Our server specification is as following: Dell
PowerEdge 2950, Dual-Core Intel Xeon 5100 sequence processors at up to 3.0GHz, 32GB RAM, running
CentoOS 6.8 with Python 2.6.6. for the simulation platform.

In early stage testing, a set of 1,000 runs is estimated to take 10-20 hours to complete, depending on
the executed random seed, complexity of the scenario, and maximum depth for exploration.
Additionally, due to surging computational power needs, some of the late-stage runs have been
completed on a local machine with following specification: Mac Pro (late 2013 release), 3.0GHz 8-Core
Intel Xeon E5 with 25MB L3 cache and Turbo Boost up to 3.9GHz, 32GB RAM, running macOS High
Sierra with Python 2.7.14 for the simulation platform.
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5.5.2 Monte Carlo Simulation:
Simulation: Output Format

The nature of Monte Carlo simulations enable us to analyze run characteristics at a macro-level. While
it is possible to examine each individual run in exact detail, the feasibility and value of such a thorough
examination diminishes with increasing scale of the simulation. Furthermore, we are more interested
in the emergent behaviors that are verifiable through large number of statistical runs. Accordingly, the
primary outcome variables of interest for Monte Carlo experiments are:

•

Existence & number of stable/terminal states

•

Existence & number of cycles

•

Likelihood & time (number of iterations) to reach each stable state

The clear focus comes with another benefit computationally. Since we are exclusively interested in
these macro-level characteristics, the program may compute all these values in an ad hoc fashion, thus
voiding the necessity to store all details of the completed run afterwards. This seemingly small change
brings significant improvement to our computing process as the necessary computing memory (RAM)
to store all the details of each run often exceeds the RAM capacity of our server (32GB), causing
memory overflow problems and leaving us with unfinished runs. This problem becomes particularly
conspicuous for runs with enormous state space (high number of agents or dimensions, great depth,
or a combination of all these).32

Now, let us take a look at a sample output in Fig. 5.9 with a total of 10 simulation runs.

32

For more details, the reader may revisit section 3.4, “A Discussion on Computational Complexity”,
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Figure 5.9: A Sample Output in CSV format from Monte Carlo Experiments

For clarity of demonstration, we explain the meaning of each column header in Table 5.6.

Column/Parameter Name

Meaning

Run

The number for each simulation run, starting with “run 0”.

Time

Actual run time of the particular simulation run.

Completed

If the run has completed within the depth limit.

Visited

Total number of (feasible) nodes visited during the run.

Terminal

Number of terminal states.

Loops

Number of nodes that belong to any loop. (If 0, then no loop).

B.F. (Branching Factor)

Average number of children per node for the entire state tree.

B.F. @n

Average number of children per node for nodes at depth n.

Terminal Node

The coalition structure associated with the terminal state. If more than one terminal
state exists, each terminal node will be listed separately.

Depth

The depth of the preceding terminal node in the state tree.

Step

The number of iterations inside the run (using a Breadth-First-Search algorithm)
needed to reach the preceding terminal node.

Estimated Path Length

Estimated path length to reach the preceding terminal from initial state. This is
estimated value differs from (and may be greater than) depth due to existence of
multiple possible paths (with length greater than the depth of the terminal node from
origin) to the identical terminal node.

Estimated Path Nodes

A listing of all nodes along the shortest path from initial state to the terminal state.

Table 5.6: Values in a Sample Output in CSV format from Monte Carlo Experiments, Explained
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5.5.3 Baseline Configuration for the Computational Simulations

Let us now examine investigation tasks 1 through 9 in the context of our simulation platform and
specify the relevant configurations for each set of experiments. We first list some specifications
regarding the baseline configuration in Table 5.7 – 5.8. The lists include both the static values and
parameter configurations for randomization control.

Parameter Default Value

Overview

Number of Agents = 10

The number generates moderate level of complexity for each scenario, and properly
reflects the typical number of parties in a coalition-forming situation based on
empirical observations [Posen 2017, Christia 2012].

Objective Dimension /
Number of Objectives = 3

The number generates moderate level of complexity for each scenario, and properly
reflects the typical number of different objectives in a coalition-forming situation
based on empirical observations.

Voting Procedure / Decision
Rule: Simple Majority

The choice reflects the most widely applied decision rules in coalition-forming
situations, and offers moderate amount of dynamics (in contrast, a unanimous voting
is bit restrictive, while single-move allows excessive freedom in coalition-forming
dynamics).

Initial Coalition Structure: all
agents are by itself

Although most real-world coalition-forming situation starts with some fragmented
coalitions, the all-by-oneself state is conceptually the most justifiable initial state. As
every coalition had to be formed in the first place, then its earlier state must somehow
trace back to the initial state where none was formed yet and all agents are by
themselves.

Maximum Depth = 50

The choice allows for ample exploration of the state space, and also properly reflects
the needs from empirical studies and ensuring acceptable amount of computing time
even in worst case scenarios. For more detailed reasoning, reader may revisit section
3.4 and 5.3.1 of this work.

Weights = Unweighted
(uniform weights)

The exclusion of non-uniform weights by adopting unweighted scenario helps
significantly reduce the size of parameter space for Monte Carlo experiments.

Alpha value = 2.7

The recommended value for sensitivity coefficient in distance-utility function. Under
this setting, the model does not necessarily always converge towards a grand coalition.
For more detailed reasoning, reader may revisit Section 5.3.3, “A Minor Adjustment to
the Baseline Model”.

Table 5.7: Baseline Configuration
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Parameter

Default Value for Randomization Control
~v[10Áµ , 1]

Agent Normalized Power
Weight (in weighted scenario) along each Objective Dimension

~v(0,1]

~v[−1,1]

Objective Position along each Objective Dimension

Table 5.8: Parameter Configurations for Monte Carlo Simulations (Randomization Control)

While the exact rationale behind the choice for each particular setting may vary, we have tested
different alternatives and their combinations based on empirical relevance and output rationality. The
first criterion dictates that each choice must be based on reasonable supporting evidence from the
coalition forming process in the world real world, and also allows enough level of sophistication that
allows richer modeling of complex scenarios. The second requires us to carefully examine the
sensitivity of output in relation to the setting, and to ensure that we observe reasonable output
behavior in the coalition dynamics across multiple runs.

170

5.5.4 Individual Configurations for the Sensitivity Analysis (SA)

Now, we look into the experiment setup for individual sensitivity analysis investigations. For each
investigation, we briefly discuss different control and experimental groups, and relevant intendent
variables for manipulation. For simplicity of presentation, we leave the detailed configurations for each
experiment setup in Appendix B.3. It should be noted that, when we discuss the possible values for
independent variables, the values for the (unmentioned) control variables default to the values or
randomization distribution outline in the baseline configuration in Table 5.6 a-b.

S1:
S1: More relaxed proposalproposal-acceptance voting rules lead to more dynamics.
We set the “voting style” (in run configuration) to Unanimous vs. Majority. The first requires the
request to join any coalition to cause strictly non-decreasing expected utility change for all existing
members of the coalition, or the proposal will be rejected. The second only requires no less than half
of the existing coalition to perceive non-decreasing expected utility change for the proposal to join
(and the “unhappy members” may choose to leave later, should they find a more pleasing alternative).

S2:
S2: Weighted scenarios will introduce (more?) cyclic behaviors.
We set the “use weights” option to ON and OFF. Awaiting further validation, we have discovered earlier
that even under strictly unanimous voting procedure and unweighted scenario, it seems that the loops
do still occur. Accordingly, our query concerns now more a matter of frequency, rather than existence
of loops.
S3:
S3: A higher objective dimension prolongs the process to stability.
stability.
We set the number of objectives to 1, 3 (baseline) and 6 respectively. Awaiting further validation, we
believe that despite the added complexity, a higher dimensionality does not necessarily impact the
coalition dynamics to any significant extent (while increased dimensionality may cause agents to feel
“closer” and more likely to form coalitions, given a fixed alpha value).
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S4:
S4: A more uniform power distribution leads to a more chaotic process.
We compare the variances of each run’s power distribution and outcome variables to find the
correlation.

S5:
S5: A higher number of agents introduces more possible stable states and dynamics.
We set the number of agents to 3, 6, 10 (baseline) and 15 respectively. Awaiting further validation, we
believe that as higher number of agents introduces more alternative states, we should expect to see
more possible stable states and coalition dynamics.

S6:
S6: As the power changes for a leading agent in a coalition, the coalition dissembles or grows.
We take discovered stable states from large set of randomized runs, then change the normalized power
of the leading agent in the coalition for a re-run with the earlier stable state as the new initial state.
Due to the complex procedure involved in this validation, number of runs in the experiment will be
relatively lower. We further validate the findings with formal analysis of power-position dynamics as
presented in Chapter 4.

S7:
S7: Position shift of agents in boundary zones is more likely to cause coalition structure changes.
We take discovered stable states from large set of randomized runs, then change the position of the
agents on the edge of the coalition for a re-run with the earlier state stable as the new initial state. Due
to the complex procedure involved in this validation, number of runs in the experiment will be
relatively lower. We further validate the findings with formal analysis of power-position dynamics as
presented in Chapter 4.

S8:
S8: Elimination of weak, isolated agents is unlikely to cause coalition structure change.

172

We take discovered stable states from large set of randomized runs, then eliminate the agents without
a coalition for a re-run with the earlier state stable as the new initial state. Awaiting further validation,
we believe that this would actually have no impact of any level on the coalition structure.

S9:
S9: Different initial coalition structure leads to very different dynamics.
We set the initial coalition structure to all-alone agents vs. singular grand coalition.

Further, we list all initial configuration filenames and their specifications in the Table 5.9. The exact
configuration files in their original format can be found in Appendix B.3.

Investigation No.

Filenames (Spec33)

S1

S1_a.ini (unanimous), S1_b.ini (baseline
baseline configuration,
configuration simple majority)

S2

S2_a.ini (use weights), S2_b.ini (unweighted = S1b.ini)

S3

S3_a.ini (1 issue), S3_b.ini (3 issues, baseline), S3_c.ini (6 issues)

S4

S4.ini (baseline, additional 1000 runs)

S5

S5_a.ini (3 agents), S5_b.ini (6 agents), S5_c.ini (baseline), S5_d.ini (15 agents)

S6

S6_x.ini (x = 1, 2, 3…n for various terminal states, analyzed in Single Run expansion)

S7

S7_x.ini (x = 1, 2, 3…n for various terminal states, analyzed in Single Run expansion)

S8

S8_x.ini (x = 1, 2, 3…n for various terminal states, analyzed in Single Run expansion)

S9

S9_a.ini (all-alone, baseline), S9_b.ini (grand coalition)

Table 5.9: Configuration Filenames and Specifications

33

Each simulation contains 1000 runs, unless specified otherwise.
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5.6 Conclusion

Thus far, we have decided on the set of input and output parameters of the computational model
motivated by themes of study. We then propose a list of input parameters for sensitivity analysis under
the said themes. Knowing the specific subjects of investigation, we are able to design the output format
of the simulation platform in Monte Carlo mode so that our theoretical and empirical considerations
are properly captured.

A large part of this Chapter is devoted to the preparation work for computational experiments: we
begin with key concepts in experimental design, describe the list of input and output variables with
the user interface walkthrough, and discuss the simulation platform’s “State Tree” inspired internal
mechanism at length. Such discussions establish critical foundations for an accurate understanding of
the simulation platform.

At closing, we present a brief introduction to the list of sensitivity analysis investigations. For each
investigation task, we explain the input/output variables of interest, state the expected observations
and reveal the real-world implications of such observations.

In the next Chapter, we discuss the results and findings from our computational simulations.
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Chapter 6 Computational Modeling: Results and Analysis
6.1 Introduction

Over the course of our experiment, more than 8,000 independent runs were completed over
approximately 7,300 computational hours. Due to different initialization configurations, the
simulation time per run also varied drastically with the complexity of coalition dynamics in the
scenario. The number of State Tree nodes explored during each independent simulation run range
from one to 3,007,769 (that is, over three million possible states). Accordingly, the shortest simulation
run lasted less than 3 milliseconds, while the longest run continued on for over 30 hours. The complete
set of raw output files can be found in Appendix B.4.

At the configuration set level, we can tell from the chart in Figure 6.1, the average runtime per set
ranged from 4.4 milliseconds (S5_a configuration) to 5.5 hours (S3_c configuration). The average
nodes visited (i.e., the number of feasible states up to depth of 50 in the State Tree) ranges from 1.5 to
347,834. In particular, configuration S3_c has an exceptionally high runtime per node visited as
compared to its peers, which we find to be somewhat expected due to the fact that this configuration
entails highest objective space dimensionality of 6 amongst its peers. As discussed in preceding
Chapters, higher dimensionality leads to greater computational complexity for evaluating the
feasibility of each state based on utility rules. Due to the exceptionally long computational time in
certain configurations, not all simulation sets contain full 1,000 runs as designed. Nevertheless, this
does not prevent us from applying proper statistical analysis to the output.

The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2, we review the format of the raw
experiment output, and introduce key derived metrics that are later used for analysis. We discuss some
preliminaries to the proposed investigations, including minimum sample size and relevant sensitivity
analysis methods in Section 6.3. We split the investigation tasks into two groups: we present the
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statistical analysis for the first group in Section 6.4, and the analytical solution for the second group in
Section 6.5. In Section 6.4, we also introduce a slightly unusually approach to interpret highly scattered
data and conclude the section with a design validation of the Monte Carlo parametrization module. At
closing, we suggest some potential improvements to the simulation experiments and summarize our
findings.

Figure 6.1: Average Time and Number of Nodes Explored per Simulation Run, Sorted by Configuration
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6.2 Experiment Output

Ideally, the full details of any simulation run can be stored in a graph structure that includes all feasible
states and their interconnections, which is effectively the entire State Tree. However, due to the sheer
scale and complexity of the coalition dynamics for certain configurations (with millions of possible
states and billions of interconnections), attempts to store the full details of a State Tree for every single
run would bring significant memory overhead34.

Before describing the exact data structure (simulation output file format) for storing the simulation
runs, we briefly revisit the outcome variables of interest proposed in section 5.2, which can be broadly
organized into two categories:

•

Terminal Dynamics:
Dynamics: existence of stable states and/or cycles

•

Stable State: time (depth) and path (likelihood) to reach, coalition structure

Consequently, simulation output should at least contain the following self-explanatory parameters:

•

Number of stable states and/or cycles up to the depth limit (50 by default)

•

Depth of stable states from the initial state

•

Average branching factor at each depth level (average number of child nodes)

•

Exact coalition topology for the stable states

Additionally, we record three high-level parameters for the overall performance:

During the course of a single simulation run, all of its explored possible states and their interconnections are stored in RAM (random-access
memory) for ongoing computing processes. However, as the run progresses to greater depths, the number of possible states to explore grows
exponentially, thus requiring us to clear out previously explored states and preserve only the most crucial information due to limited RAM size in
most computing units.
34
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•

Time to completion:
completion: the actual computing time to complete the run. Due to expected

fluctuation in computational performance over different time periods and mixture of
computational units used, this value offers limited degree of accuracy when used to compare
run statistics across different configurations. Nevertheless, we can safely use it to analyze the
runs in the same configuration set with high confidence.
•

Completion check:
check: whether all possible nodes in the State Tree are explored by depth limit.
We originally impose depth limit out of empirical sufficiency and computational efficiency.
However, it is not difficult to foresee in certain scenarios the coalition dynamics will evolve
beyond such a preset depth limit (think about some endless civil wars, for example).
Therefore, we find it necessary to record whether the entire dynamics is contained within the

depth limit, so that we may estimate the complexity beyond the “horizon”.
•

Nodes visited: total number of feasible states explored. This includes any possible state that

the initial state may evolve into, regardless of the state’s stability.

The reader may revisit Section 5.5.2 for a more detailed technical review of a sample output file.

We also find it necessary to elaborate on two dependent variables which are not readily available in
the output file: time to reach stable state, and likelihood to reach stable state.

•

Time to reach stable state: we use a proxy variable, depth of the stable state, to capture this
value. The depth variable emphasizes the minimum number of coalition moves from the initial
state to reach the stable state, and serves as a lower bound for the necessary number of moves
to stability.

•

Likelihood to reach stable state: we use a set of output variables to estimate the likelihood

value. Specifically, let the branching factor at depth W be (w . The initial node is said to be at

depth 0. Then the likelihood to reach a stable state at depth R is effectively, |ž = ∏žw³§
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§

6á

. This

approximation assumes that the average children per node does not vary significantly, and
that the transition probabilities from a parent node to its child nodes are all equal.

While such proxy variables are not perfect representations of the dynamical properties, we recognize
that the two are the best possible proxies given the constraints imposed by the modeling structure and
computational efficiency. After all, we should be satisfied that these two parameters do offer
appropriate and manageable insights into the phenomenon of interest – just as the very philosophy
behind modeling upholds [Mahajan 2014].
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6.3 Preliminaries to Sensitivity Analysis

We discuss three important matters in this section: minimum sample size, relevant sensitivity analysis
(SA) methods and the SA methods in the context of our proposed investigations.

6.3.1 Minimum Sample Size

Given the stochastic nature of computational simulations, reliable analytical insights often can only be
found from the simulation output draw from a sufficiently large sample. While one may elect to ignore
this question and simply generate an excessive amount of simulation runs, doing so can become
prohibitively costly (in computational resources and time) and inflate the sensitivity of statistical
tests35 [Lee et al. 2015]. Therefore, we find it necessary to find the appropriate minimum sample size
which ensures the reliability of our statistical analysis. The process to determine minimum sample size
largely depends on some meta-level description of sample outcomes; specifically, we believe the
minimum sample size is reached when we observe stabilization of the chosen meta-level description
statistics.

One common approach [Lorscheid et al. 2012] relies on the metric which measures the uncertainty on
the sample variance. The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of a
sample to its mean:

]7 =

U
X

Equation 6.1

35 A large sample size can easily establish the statistical significance for a minute difference [Troitzsch 2014, White et al. 2013] and lead to
misleading conclusions. The journal of Basic and Applied Social Psychology has even gone as far as removing p-values from all their publications
in 2015.
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In practice, a predetermined list of sample sizes is used, such as [5, 10, 50, 100] runs respectively. The
first sample size36 beyond which the differences between consecutive values of ]7 consistently remain
below a predefined threshold value — is considered as the minimum size.

Now, we perform necessary computations to get values of ]7 for all 5 outcome variables at sample

sizes [5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000]. The full set of outcome variables and some statistical

characteristics from a batch of 1,000 simulation runs can be found in Table 6.1 – 6.2. We plot the values
of ]7 at different sample sizes for each outcome variable in Figure 6.2 a-e.
Output Variable

Definition

Notes

Nodes Visited, •

The number of nodes
visited (transiently feasible)

Total number of nodes that are transiently feasible
(not necessarily stable) by depth limit, proxy variable
for complexity & scale of the coalition dynamics

Terminal State
Count, •

The total number of stable
states

The depth is the length of the shortest path from initial
state to the known stable state.

Avg. Terminal Depth,
9
8

Average depth of terminal
(stable) states

Proxy variable for average “time” to reach stable states

Terminal Likelihood,
|

Sum of likelihood to reach
individual stable states,
∑w | w

See section 5.4.1 for details on definition of |ž . Since
arriving at different stable states are mutually
exclusive events, the overall likelihood to reach a
stable state should be the sum of them. This indicates
how likely the system will end in a terminal (stable)
state.

Cyclic Likelihood, V

Percentage of nodes in
loops

Since counting the actual number of loops in a directed
tree graph can easily become computationally
infeasible (and inefficient memory-wise), we track
only the number of nodes that are part of some loop.

Table 6.1: Outcome Variables and their Definitions

36 This approach of estimating minimum sample size is rather granular in the sense that it does not seek to find the exact minimum sample size
but simply takes the first value in the predetermined list as the solution. Such approximation is designed to reduce computational load and would
not lead to excessive overvaluation in so far we retain a reasonable value interval when creating the list of test sample sizes.
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Nodes Visited

Terminal State Count

Avg Terminal Depth

Terminal Likelihood

Cyclic Likelihood

count

1000.000

1000.000

916.000

1000.000

1000.000

mean

1658.698

1.074

4.008

0.023

0.272

std

8794.602

0.518

1.077

0.069

0.326

min

4.000

0.000

1.000

0.000

-0.000

25%

28.000

1.000

3.000

0.000

0.000

50%

76.000

1.000

4.000

0.001

0.100

75%

317.500

1.000

5.000

0.011

0.519

max

112371.000

4.000

7.000

0.583

1.000

Table 6.2: Outcome Variables and their Statistical Characteristics from a Simulation Batch

Figure 6.2 a – e: Values of ]7 at Different Sample Sizes, for five different outcome variables

Coefficient of Variation, Nodes Visited

Figure 6.2 a: Values of ]7 at Different Sample Sizes, for Nodes Visited
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Figure 6.2 b: Values of ]7 at Different Sample Sizes, for Terminal State Count

Figure 6.2 c: Values of ]7 at Different Sample Sizes, for Avg. Terminal Path

Figure 6.2 d: Values of ]7 at Different Sample Sizes, for Terminal Likelihood

Figure 6.2 e: Values of ]7 at Different Sample Sizes, for Cyclic Likelihood
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Observing the statistical trend for the chosen metric of ]7 , we can easily conclude that the sample size

of R = 1000 can be considered as a point of stability for 4 outcome variables: terminal state count, avg.

terminal path, terminal likelihood and cyclic likelihood. For the nodes visited variable, the minimum
sample size should ideally be R = 2000.

Due to extremely high computational resource requirements for certain simulation configurations, we
might not be able to fulfill the minimum sample size for all of the run configurations in our
computational simulations. Nevertheless, the minimum sample size for respective outcome variables
provides important context for the reliability of the statistical analysis during our investigations.
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6.3.2 Some Relevant Sensitivity
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) Methods

Sensitivity analysis methods can be broadly sorted in two categories, based on they explore input
parameter space: local sensitivity analysis and global sensitivity analysis. The former refers to
methods that explore a limited subspace of input values, while the latter set of methods explore a wide
range (if not entire parameter space) of input values. Specifically, we discuss two common SA methods
most relevant to our investigation needs.

OneOne-factorfactor-atat-a-time (OFAT)

OFAT sensitivity [Niida et al. 2019] analysis mainly entail three procedures: (1) select a baseline
parameter setting and one input parameter of interest, (2) vary the value of the one selected input
parameter over its range, (3) review the input-output relationship and model mechanisms.

It is necessary to note that the OFAT is not to be confused with One-at-a-time (OAT) method. OAT
shares limited similarity with OFAT in requiring a baseline parameter setting, but only measures the
partial derivatives of the model outcomes at the baseline parameter values. Accordingly, any
meaningful extension of OAT findings would require assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity –
neither of which can be easily assumed for our agent-based model. We see limited value in such a
method and generally do not explicitly compute partial derivatives throughout our investigations.

Global SA

Global sensitivity analysis [Saltelli et al. 2008] explores the interaction effects from random sampling
of the input parameter space. With a sufficiently large sample, the sensitivity to an input parameter is
then measured as the proportion of outcome variance that can be attributed to the input parameter.
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Either a regression-based method or Sobol’s decomposition [Broeke et al. 2016] can be used to
decompose the output variance.

Given the enormity of our parameter space and nonlinearity of the model, we adopt a hybrid approach
that combines OFAT and global SA to properly explore a representative subspace. We discuss the
detailed implementation in the context of the coalition dynamics model.
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6.3.3 Sensitivity
Sensitivity Analysis for the Coalition Dynamics Model

Let us first revisit the input values for initial conditions in the proposed baseline configuration
(previously shown in Table 5.6 a):

Initial Conditions

Baseline Value

Number of Agents

10

Objective Dimension / Number of Objectives

3

Voting Procedure / Decision Rule

Simple Majority

Initial Coalition Structure

all agents are by itself

Maximum Depth

50

Weights

Unweighted (uniform weights)

Alpha value

2.7
Table 6.3: Initial Conditions in the Baseline Configuration

Input Parameters

Randomization Control

~v[10Áµ , 1]

Agent Normalized Power

~v(0,1]

Weight (in weighted scenario) along each
Objective Dimension

~v[−1,1]

Objective Position along each Objective
Dimension

Table 6.4: Parameter Configurations for Monte Carlo Simulations (Randomization Control)

We treat the list of input variables in Table 6.3 as initial conditions of the model, as they collectively
set the macro-level foundations for the model. More importantly, this baseline configuration is
designed to be representative of the most common scenarios in coalition dynamics. The baseline
configuration is to be treated as the baseline setting (collection of nominal values) in the OFAT
sensitivity analysis context.
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However, we do not assign a fixed value for some remaining input parameters: agent normalized

power, weights (in weighted scenario), and objective positions. Instead, we sample uniformly from the
entire subspace spanned37 by the parameters with randomization control as specified in Table 6.4. The
randomization control for these input parameters is effectively creating a random sampling of
parameter (sub)space commonly seen in global SA methods.

The motivations for this adopting hybrid approach are fairly simple:

-

there is limited value in exploring the entire parameter subspace of the initial conditions, as
we expect the fixed baseline settings to be representative of the common scenarios;

-

given the enormity of the subspace spanned by input parameters of agent characteristics, any
findings from local sensitivity analysis will be extremely limited in scope and value, and we
simply do not know enough to construct a “representative” set of agent characteristics.

The hybrid approach allows us to properly explore the entire subspace spanned by input parameters
of agent characteristics, while enabling computationally inexpensive local sensitivity analysis for the
initial condition parameters that govern agent behaviors.

The span of a set of vectors, also called linear span, is the linear space formed by all the vectors that can be written as linear combinations of the
vectors belonging to the given set [Heymann 1970]. The subspace for 10 agents in 3-dimensional objective space with uniform weights is akin to
a 40-dimensional hypercube.

37
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6.3.4 Result Analysis and Statistical Tests
The proposed investigations fall under two broad categories. The first set of investigations (S1-5)
explores the statistical relationship between multiple dependent variables and one selected input
variable. The second category (S6-9) investigates only the existence of some fundamental change in
distribution for certain outcome variables due to changes in one input variable.

For the first set of investigations, we first determine whether the independent variable (i.e. “input

variables”, or “explanatory variables”) is numerical or categorical. For those with numerical
independent variables, we perform regression analysis to investigate the relationship38 between the
input and output variables. For those with only one categorical independent variable, we may simply
treat the pair of outputs (the baseline and the altered configuration) as two random samples drawn
from two independent distributions of unknown form, and perform t-test to validate the directional
inequality statement (“A is greater than B”).

For the second of investigations, the procedure is more straightforward. We simply treat the pair of
outputs as two samples drawn from two independent distributions of the unknown form, and then
perform the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) to determine whether the duo share the same
underlying distribution.

This relationship may either be linear or non-linear. When non-linearity is observed (from a raw scatter plot), we often use some form of
transformation to manipulate input and output data so that we might still use linear regression for curve fitting.

38
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6.4 Sensitivity Analysis Investigations: Simulation Results & Analysis (S1(S1-5 and S9)

In this section, we review the simulation results for the proposed investigation tasks S1-5 and S9.
Investigation tasks S6-8 are left out of the computational simulation experiments (and therefore not
included in the current section) as we have found more efficient methods of analysis. For each
investigation task in this section, we first conduct sensitivity analysis based on the simulation output;
subsequently, we review the observed input-output relationships in the context of our theoretical
model and available empirical evidences, for the purpose of a partial validation.

A note on the partiality of the model validation work is necessary: Our sensitivity analysis method is a
hybrid approach of OFAT and global SA which only explores the model characteristics in a limited
subspace of the parameter space. Additionally, given the nonlinear and heteroskedastic nature of the
agent-based model, we should refrain from any outright conclusions on the validation effort. This

partiality limitation extends to both the structural and output validation39.
Therefore, we are only able to verify the model’s structural validity in the immediately adjacent
parameter space surrounding the baseline setting. Similarly, the empirical evidence corroborating the
observations from our simulation experiments would be a necessary yet insufficient attempt at output
validation. We discuss their implications on a case by case basis.

Now, let us examine the simulation output for each SA investigation in detail.

39 Structural validity [Manson 2003] assesses how well the simulation model represents the prior conceptual model of the real-world system.
Sometimes it is also referred to as “theoretical validity”, “conceptual validity” and “internal validity”. Output validity assesses how faithfully the
simulation output exhibits the historical behaviors of the real-world target system. Sometimes it is also referred to as “external validity”.
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6.4.1 S1:
S1: More relaxed proposalproposal-acceptance voting rules lead to greater level of dynamics.
dynamics.

•

Expected observation: when the proposal-acceptance voting is relaxed, we expect more
dynamics as it makes coalition forming easier, while at the same time also making the coalition
less stable as some unhappy ones might leave.

•

Input Variable of Interest: “voting style” option, Unanimous vs. Simple Majority (relaxed)

•

Output Variables of Interest: Nodes Visited (Main), Terminal Likelihood, Cyclic Likelihood

•

Run Configurations: S1_a (unanimous, 1000 runs), Baseline (simple majority, 1000 runs)

Sensitivity Analysis

We list the mean values of three output variables of interest for both configurations in Table 6.5.

Configuration

Nodes Visited

Terminal Likelihood

Cyclic Likelihood

baseline

1658.698

0.023079567

0.27199313

S1_a

68.545

0.036631493

0.012476714

Table 6.5: Mean Values of S1 Output Variables

To examine the output variables in detail, we include the grouped box plots in Figure 6.3 a-c.

Remark. It is fairly obvious that the set of runs with baseline configuration (with relaxed, simple
majority voting) exhibit greater level of dynamics: on average, it is consisting of nearly 24 times more

states, approximately 36% less likely to end in some stable state, and almost 22 times more likely to
be in a cyclic state.
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Figure 6.3 b: Boxplots of S1 Output Variable Terminal Likelihood

Figure 6.3 a: Boxplots of S1 Output Variable Nodes Visited

Figure 6.3 c: Boxplots of S1 Output Variable Cyclic Likelihood

Figure 6.3 a – c: Boxplots of S1 Output Variables

Comments
From the structural validity perspective, the observation is aligned with the expectations from our
earlier analysis of strategies and equilibria (Section 3.3). Conceptually, a relaxed voting procedure
leads to easier coalition formations as it only requires no less than half of the existing members of the
target coalition to anticipate a positive change in expected utility. Therefore, some members of the
newly formed coalition may actually experience decreases in expected utility, making previously less
desirable coalition moves appealing again. From the output validity perspective, we are unable to find
relevant empirical evidence on the subject for a meaningful comparison.
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6.4.2 S2:
S2: Weighted scenarios will introduce cyclic behaviors.
behaviors.

•

Expected observation: in the weighted scenario, constraints imposed by the Euclidean spatial
properties are lifted, and we expect to see more cyclic behaviors.

•

Input Variable of Interest: “Using Weights” option, Use Weights vs. Unweighted

•

Output Variables of Interest: Nodes Visited (Main), Cyclic Likelihood

•

Run Configurations: S2_a (use weights, 1000 runs), S2_b (unweighted, 1000 runs)

Sensitivity Analysis

We list the mean values of three output variables of interest for both configurations in Table 6.6.

Configuration

Nodes Visited

Cyclic Likelihood

S2_b

1857.279

0.275374693

S2_a

7101.353

0.422787123

Table 6.6: Mean Values of S2 Output Variables

The outcome variable values in grouped box plots are shown in Figure 6.4 a-b.

Figure 6.4 a: Boxplots of S2 Output Variable Nodes Visited

Figure 6.4 b: Boxplots of S2 Output Variable Cyclic Likelihood

Figure 6.4 a – b: Boxplots of S3 Output Variables
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Remark. The set of runs with use weight configuration exhibit greater level of dynamics and cyclic
behavior: on average, it is consisting of nearly 4 times more states, and approximately 50% more likely

to be in a cyclic state.

Comments
From the structural validity perspective, the observation is aligned with the expectations from our
earlier analysis on effect of weights (Proposition 4.3 in Section 4.3.4). The introduction of non-uniform
weights along different objective dimensions essentially allows the agents to have different
perceptions on utility along different objective dimensions – which can also be interpreted as having
different (and distorted) perceptions on objective distances from each other in the unweighted
scenario. Consequently, seemingly great differences (measured as distance in objective space) in
certain dimensions might have trivial impact on the aggregated utility perceptions in the weighted
scenario, allowing for easier formation of coalitions.
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6.4.3 S3:
S3: Increase in objective dimensions
dimensions prolongs the process to stability.

•

Expected observation: when the scenario involves more objective dimensions, stable states
are less likely to exist; also, the average depth to reach a stable state becomes greater (it takes
longer to reach some stable state).

•

Input Variable of Interest: Number of Objective Dimensions, R ∈

•

Output Variables of Interest: Terminal Likelihood, Avg. Terminal Depth

•

Run Configurations (100 runs each): S3_a (R = 1), S3_b (R = 3), S3_c (R = 6)

•

Additional Configurations40: S3_d (R = 2), S3_e (R = 4), S3_f (R = 5)

®

Sensitivity Analysis

We list the mean values of three output variables of interest for both configurations in Table 6.7.

Dimensionality, R

Nodes Visited

Terminal Likelihood

Avg. Terminal Depth

2 (S3_d)

9368.70

0.00106

4.963

1 (S3_a)

3 (S3_b)
4 (S3_e)
5 (S3_f)

6 (S3_c)

40845.83
2355.30

11268.76
62.01
23.22

1.142e-7
0.0243

0.00330
0.326
0.470

7.098
4.126
4.793
2.25

1.742

Table 6.7: Mean Values of S3 Output Variables

The outcome variable values in grouped box plots are shown in Figure 6.5 a-c.

40 These run configurations were not part of the original planned simulation. However, as we made progress in our review process, it became clear
to us that having a complete list of possible dimensionalities from 1 to 6 would improve the clarity and accuracy of the analysis. We conducted 100
runs for (å =2) and (å =5), and 300 runs for (å =4). The higher number of runs for (å =4) was done because of the outcome statistics being
somewhat an outlier in our analysis.
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Figure 6.5 a: Boxplots of S3 Output, Terminal Likelihood

Figure 6.5 b: Boxplots of S3 Output, Avg. Terminal Depth

Figure 6.5 c: Boxplots of S3 Output, Nodes Visited

Figure 6.5 a – c: Boxplots of S3 Output Variables

Remark. With the exception of R = 4, the set of runs with lower objective dimensionally exhibit more
dynamics: on average, the runs with lower objective dimensionality have significantly more states
(nodes visited), take more steps (avg. terminal depth) to reach stable states, and are much less likely
to reach some stable state. The prior expected observations are contradicted by our observations.

Comments
For a proper discussion on the structural validity, we must revisit our prior discussion on the impact
of dimensionality in Section 5.3.3 (A Minor Adjustment to the Baseline Model). There are two
prominent patterns from the observations: the first is the consistent (with the exception of R = 4)
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decrease of dynamics in the system (measured by lower number of Nodes Visited and Avg. Terminal

depth, and increasingly higher values for Terminal Likelihood); the second is the unusual uptick at R =
4. We believe this can be explained by two independent forces at play, namely the coalition-forming

likelihood and expected utilities from coalition memberships. The former is a discrete, global factor
that decides the coalition topology and governs macro-level system dynamics; the latter is a

continuous, local factor that influences micro-level coalition dynamics which we discuss in the
following.

CoalitionCoalition-forming Likelihood

The core concept in the coalition-formation process is the distance. As we shall find, the expected
distance between two randomly initialized agents in the R -dimensional objective space increases

superlinearly with regard to √R, while the maximum coalition-forming distance (Eq. 4.7) increases

linearly regard to √R . In short, this subtle mathematical relationship makes it less likely to form

coalitions at higher dimensions.

Now, let us estimate the maximum coalition-forming distance dÕ› . As we have learned in Section 4.3.1,
dÕ› is jointly determined by the power ratio between two agents in question, and the objective space

dimension R.

The expected power ratio between the two agents, with an earlier introduced lower bound to the
randomly initialized normalized power value:
1
1
r
i
O ü ý = / / 1 di1 di2 ≅ 2.30
,
i
10−2 10−2 2
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Equation 6.2

With the tuning coefficient a = 2.7 and the O

:
;

≅ 2.30, we write the expected coalition forming

distance as a function of the objective space dimension R:

1
1
dÕ› (R) = . ⋅ < 1 + r
a
O
,

R ≅ 0.73√R

Equation 6.3

The a in Eq. 6.2 refers to the tuning coefficient introduced in Section 5.3.3 and is not to be confused
with the power ratio constant used in the original equations Eq. 4.5 – 4.8. As we can easily tell from Eq.
6.2, the maximum coalition-forming distance increases linearly regard to √R.

Meanwhile, the expected Euclidean distance between the two agents can be expressed as:
O¡-f* − Q+* -¤ = .

1
1
1
⋅
/
…
/
˜h − i1
2ž −1 −1 1

2

+ ⋯ ˜hR − iR

2

dh1 dh2 … dhR di

R

Equation 6.4

Since the analytical solution to Eq. 6.2 is not straightforward [Robbins 1978], we have previously
created an approximated solution that works well for 2 ≤ R ≤ 10 (in Section 5.3.3), such that:
O¡-f* − Q+* -¤ ≅ 0.79√R

Equation 6.5

However, this approximation can be misleading for our analysis here. By examining the actual ratio of

O¡-f* − Q+* -¤ and √R for 1 ≤ R ≤ 6 using statistical methods (with 1 million randomly initialized points
for each value of R), we find that the distance between two randomly initialized agents in the R-

dimensional hypercube (the normalized objective space) increases superlinearly with regard to √R.
The second column in Table 6.6 illustrates the idea.
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To better encapsulate the impact of dimensionality on coalition-forming likelihood, we introduce a
more straightforward metric. We name this aggregate metric hyper ratio Sš (R), defined as:

Sš (R) =

-8™£ |8|

Equation 6.6

Where |8| is the number of distance values generated from unique pairs, from the set of randomly

selected points in the R-dimensional objective space, and 8™£ is a subset of 8, where d < dÕ› (R),
∀ d ∈ 8™£ . The proposed metric Sš (R) effectively measures the likelihood of two randomly initialized

points to be within the coalition distance of each other in the R-dimensional objective space. As we can
easily find from Table 6.8, the Sš (R) steadily decreases with increase of R, suggesting that it becomes
increasingly less likely to form coalitions at higher dimensions.

1

O¡-f* − Q+*-¤/√R
0.667

0.597

2

0.737

0.503

3

0.764

0.449

4

0.778

0.421

5

0.786

0.399

6

0.791

0.373

R

Sš (R)

+* -¤/√R and Sž (R) for 1 ≤ R ≤ 6
Table 6.8: Estimated Values of O¡-f* − Q

Now, one may wonder, what happened at R = 4? We turn to the other factor for some explanation to
the unusual uptick of system dynamics.
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Expected Utilities from Coalition Memberships

We begin by revisiting the expected utility considerations for the duo-agent case in Section 5.3.3,
where we find that following set of inequalities must hold:
(1.43 − 0.082a)R − 1 ≥ 0

Equation 6.7

(3.3 − a)R − 1 ≥ 0

Equation 6.8

The LHS’ of the inequalities in Eq. 6.7 - 6.8 corresponds to the difference between expected utilities
from coalition membership and being in a coalition of oneself. As we have set a = 2.7 throughout our
simulation experiments, we arrive at one simple inequality condition:

0.6R − 1 ≥ 0

Equation 6.9

Which essentially states that the expected utility difference for agents that are initialized to be within
the coalition-forming distance of each other becomes greater at higher values of R.

Figure 6.6: Mean of Outcome Variables, at Different values of R

To understand how the two factors working in opposite directions jointly influence coalition dynamics,
we analyze the dynamics in sequence: first, the global factor consistently governs the overall dynamics
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as it describes the likelihood of any two agents to be within maximum coalition forming distance of
each other. Yet the aggregated level of dynamics, is further determined by the interactions of the subset
of agents that are within maximum coalition forming distance of each other; this is in part influenced
by the local factor, difference in expected utilities.

A less rigorous but more accessible explanation for our observation (as illustrated in Figure 6.6) would
be as following: with the increase of objective space dimension R , the global share of randomly
initialize agents that may participate in coalition formation activities decreases drastically (larger
coalitions are less likely to be formed); meanwhile, for the share of agents who participate in coalition
formation activities, the surplus in expected utility boosts the level of local dynamics we see (more
local activities occur). While the local factor might be seen as a counteracting force to the global factor,
the influence of the global factor eventually prevails, and we end up with little level of dynamics for
higher values of R.

A plausible real-world phenomenon to this observation? We speculate this might the explanation for
why groups in a competitive setting with too many political issues of contention often find it difficult
to form or maintain large coalitions [Narine 1997].
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6.4.4 S4:
S4: A more uniform power distribution leads to a more chaotic process.

•

Expected observation: when there is a more even distribution of normalized power among
agents, the stable states are less likely to exist, but when they do, there might be multiple such
states; it takes longer to reach stable states; more, smaller coalitions should emerge.

•
•

=¨
Input
Input Variable of Interest: Normalized Variance of the Agents’ Power Distribution, U

Output Variables of Interest: Terminal State Count, Avg. Terminal Depth, Terminal Likelihood,
Cyclic Likelihood

•

Run Configurations: Baseline, S1_b, S2_b (same baseline configuration, 3000 runs total)

6.4.4.1 RegressionRegression-based Sensitivity Analysis

We begin with a brief discussion on the input variable. The concept of spread in a distribution is best
captured by its variance. Furthermore, the transition feasibility between individual states is fully
dictated by the utility function that only considers the ratio of power rather than the absolute

magnitudes. Therefore, the coalition dynamics is identical for configurations where the agent power
ratios are identical, all other parameters being the same. In light of this knowledge, we naturally come
to the conclusion that some form of normalization should be introduced to properly reflect the
effective spread of the distribution, as the variance measure itself is susceptible to the absolute values
of the data points.
Let us review the scaling property of variance: when the values are all scaled by a constant f, the
§

§

variance is scaled by f¨ . Since ‚fS(>) = ∑žw³§(hw − X)¨ , ÈℎÄSÄ X = ∑žw³§ hw , when all the values are
ž

ž

scaled by f, we get:

ž

ž

w³§

w³§

1
f¨
‚fS(f>) = Ë(fhw − fX)¨ = Ë(hw − X)¨ = f¨ ⋅ ‚fS(>)
R
R
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Equation 6.10

In our context, we consider the scaling coefficient as the mean of the data points, and define the
normalized variance of power distribution as:
=¨ =
U

ž

‚fS(>)
1
, ÈℎÄSÄ X = Ë hw
¨
X
R
w³§

Equation 6.11

The grouped Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) plots are in Figure 6.7 a-d. Kernel density estimation is
a non-parametric method of estimating the probability density function of a continuous random
variable. It does not assume any underlying distribution for the variable, while offering an intuitive
way to visualize bivariate distributions. The contour line is a 2-dimensional visualization of the
probability for a data point from the bivariate distribution to be in the kernel – which corresponds to
the proportion of data points observed to be in the kernel. Along with the KDE plots, we compute the
Pearson correlation coefficient with the corresponding p-value. We provide an overview of the
parameters in Table 6.9.

Output Variable

Pearson’s r

Average Terminal Depth
Terminal Likelihood
Cyclic Likelihood

-0.11
0.083
0.17

Terminal State Count

-0.15

Table 6.9: Pearson’s r between Normalized Variance of Power Distribution (U=¨ ) and Respective Output Variables
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Figure 6.7 b: KDE Plot for S4 Output Variable Average Terminal
Figure 6.7 a: KDE Plot for S4 Output Variable Terminal State Count

Depth

Figure 6.7c: KDE Plot for S4 Output Variable Terminal Likelihood

Figure 6.7 d: KDE Plot for S4 Output Variable Cyclic Likelihood

Figure 6.7 a-d: KDE Plots for S4 Output Variables

Remark. From Fig. 6.7 a-d, We find fairly weak negative relationship between Terminal State Count
=¨ , between Average Terminal Depth and U
=¨ . We find almost no relationship between Terminal
and U

Likelihood and U=¨ . We find fairly weak positive relationship between Cyclic Likelihood and U=¨ . We do
not find these relationship to be meaningful or significant.
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Figure 6.8 a: Scatter Plot with Regression Line for S4 Output,

Figure 6.8 b: Scatter Plot with Regression Line for S4 Output,

Variable Terminal State Count

Variable Average Terminal Depth

Figure 6.8 c: Scatter Plot with Regression Line for S4 Output,

Figure 6.8 d: Scatter Plot with Regression Line for S4 Output,

Variable Terminal Likelihood

Variable Cyclic Likelihood

Figure 6.8 a-d: Scatter Plots with Regression Line for S4 Output Variables

The scatter plots with regression lines in Fig. 6.8 a-d reveal more details on the distribution of outcome
variables. From Fig. 6.8 a-d, we easily recognize a clear absence of linear (or any meaningful)

=¨ , |). The nonlinearity suggests that we should
9 ) and (U
relationship for variable pairs (U=¨ , •), (U=¨ , 8

reconsider whether to apply (linear) regression analysis for Terminal State Count, Avg. Terminal

Depth and Terminal Likelihood.
=¨ , V) in Fig. 6.8 d is the only one of the four to exhibit some trace of linearity,
Since the scatter plot for (U

we examine it in detail and find two prominent characteristics:
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•

•

a significant fraction ( ≈ 47.0% ) of the observed data points have a V value of 0, across
=¨
different values of U

=¨ value greater than 0.7
a small fraction (≈ 3.77%) of the observed data points have a U

=¨ , (for example, U
=¨ ≥
From the regression analysis perspective, the data points for higher values of U
0.7) have high leverage due to their high predictor variable value. While high leverage alone does not

justify exclusion of these data points, the scatteredness prevents us from any meaningful assessment
of the trend – an important criterion to discern outliers. Therefore, we elect to omit those data points
and perform regression analysis on remaining data points to check its validity.
=¨ ≤ 0.7) are shown in Fig. 6.9 a-b and
The results of regression analysis for the subset of data points (U

=¨ > 0.7) has not led
Table 6.10 respectively. We can see, the omission of high leverage data points (U
to much change in the key results from regression analysis. Nevertheless, the patterns in the residual

plot remain a prominent challenge to the inherent soundness of our approach. Consequently, before
we can draw any meaningful conclusions about the hypotheses, it is almost imperative that we
investigate and answer two questions:

•
•

=¨ , V)?
Why are we observing such high level of scatteredness for (U

What other method can we use to improve the clarity and soundness of our analysis?

In the ensuing section, we address the first question in the context of our computational model setup
and introduce a unique approach to organize the data to produce more reliable and interpretable
=¨ , V).
results for data points of (U
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=÷ ≤ n. A
Figure 6.9 b: Residual Plot for (U=¨ , V), @

=÷ ≤ n. A
Figure 6.9 a: Scatter Plot for (U=¨ , V), @

Figure 6.9 a-b: Scatter Plots for (U=¨ , V) in S4

Dataset

Pearson’s r

Complete Set
=¨ ≤ 0.7
U

0.172
0.167

Table 6.10: Pearson’s r for (U=¨ , V) in Different Sets of Data Points
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6.4.4.2 A Slightly Unusual Approach to Organize Scattered Data

To understand the high level of scatteredness in our data, we first revisit the basic setup of our
computational model. In the case of baseline configuration runs, except for a few basic initial condition
categorical settings, all input variables are randomized – a procedure earlier introduced as the Monte

Carlo parameterization, which theoretically neutralizes (diminishes) the impact of irrelevant variables
through randomization – so that we can later isolate and identify the relationship between the input
variable and the output variables of interest.

Despite the validity of this experimental design method, Monte Carlo parameterization does not
guarantee the ease of analysis. In particular, the intrinsically stochastic nature of the method leads to
multiple observations for even a small range of a single input variable – because for a fixed value for
one input variable, Monte Carlo parameterization generates multiple possible combinations of
remaining input variables for simulation. In our scenario, the baseline configuration has 10 agents with
randomized power and 3 objective dimensions in which the agents are placed based on randomized
coordinates. One can easily foresee the vastness of the entire input parameter space.

Of course, one might argue repeated sampling in the vicinity of one input variable value does not
necessarily lead to such high degree of scatteredness, nor should it prevent proper regression analysis
if some linear relationship does exist after all. However, such an argument relies on either of the two
assumptions:

•

The range of the chosen input variable constitutes the entire parameter space (no other input
variables affects the outcome); or,

•

The impact of randomized input variables (which are not considered in the analysis) is

significantly smaller compared to that of the chosen input variable.
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The first assumption clearly does not hold in our case. While the second assumption might be valid for
some cases, the position parameters however do have significant impact on coalition dynamics – this
is a fact known to us from our earlier mathematical validation work in Chapter 4, where we find that
the coalition dynamics are highly sensitive to spatial distance between agents. Since the spatial
distance is fully dictated by position parameters, it is no surprise that the second assumption would
not hold either. Furthermore, this high sensitivity towards omitted input variables is precisely why we
=¨
observe such high level of scatteredness on the vertical axis, even for data points with very close U

values.

The PseudoPseudo-Compression Mean Analysis (PCMA) Method

Now, having addressed the question of scatteredness, we introduce a statistical analysis method to
make sense of the linear regression of the data points. Given its source of inspiration in Signal
Processing (a subfield of Electrical Engineering), we name the method “Pseudo-Compression Mean
Analysis” (PCMA), as it constructs a simpler representation of the original dataset. The PCMA method
works as follows:

Given a set of data points {(h§ , i§ ), (h¨ , i¨ ), … , (hž , iž )}, we first find the range of observed h

values, [hÕwž , hÕ› ]. For an arbitrarily chosen “discretization coefficient”, Y ∈ ℤ® , we would

divide [hÕwž , hÕ› ] into Y subintervals of equal length. Let us denote the subintervals as

`§ , `¨ , … `Õ , such that

•

`w = [hœ

•

hœ

Û•ÞÜ

Û•ÞÜ , hC::•ÞÜ ],

= hÕwž +

where

DEF Á DÜá

Õ

⋅ (W − 1), and hC::•ÞÜ = hÕ› +
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DEF Á DÜá

Õ

⋅W

Then, for each subinterval `w on h -axis, we compute the mean XGs of the i values for all data

points whose h value falls into the subinterval `w , such that XGs = —[Hw ], where Hw = Âi• - i• ∈

{i§ , i¨ , … , iž } ∧ h• ∈ `w }.

Thereby, we have “compressed” the original dataset into a total of J data points (W, XGs ). The

(linear) regression-based methods may then be applied, and the findings should be
interpreted as a relationship between the range of input and expected value of the output.

The PCMA method effectively reduces the resolution for input variable values through discretization
and helps to surface the collective characteristics of output variable values through sample mean
computation. While we would refrain from entering into a lengthy discussion over the statistical
advantages and concerns of the PCMA method, some justification here is necessary.

The first and foremost reasoning for the PCMA method lies in the query of interest: how does the
“expectation of some value” change with the input variable. In this case, the sample mean of the data
points’ output values is a proper representation of the “expected value” in the specific subinterval of
input values. In addition, due to the somewhat uneven distribution of input variables, the discretization
process allows us to mitigate the impact of possible outliers in the dataset.

Remark.
Remark Empirical Variograms. It is important to note that while such (moving) averages from PCMA
method are useful visual smoothers, they are not formal analytical methods. An important and related
concept in the field of spatial data analysis [Smith 2019, Schabenberger and Gotway 2005] is
“variogram” and its approximation, “empirical variograms”.

Specifically, the variogram function [Matheron 1963] was originally constructed to provide a
description of how the data are correlated with distance. It is defined as half the average squared
difference between points separated by a distance ℎ, namely:
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K(ℎ) =

1
Ë ˜`w − `•
2|•(ℎ)|
ª(š)

¨

Equation 6.12

where •(ℎ) is the set of all pairwise Euclidean distances W − ” = ℎ, |•(ℎ)| is the number of distinct
pairs in •(ℎ), and `w , `• are data values at spatial locations W and ”.

However, there is a limitation imposed on this estimator, where K(ℎ) refers to point pairs with

distance of exactly ℎ. With the exception of data points on regular grids, most finite samples are

unlikely to contain [Smith 2019] more than one pair that are exactly ℎ apart in distance. The concept
of empirical variograms is then introduced to generate intermediate data to fit specific variogram

models. With the empirical variograms, we first construct bins of same size (containing same number
of data points) and associated lag distances are determined following some basic rules. The associated

variogram estimate, KL(ℎ² ) , for a given bin, •² , is then computed by treating the mean or median value
of the point pairs in •² as ℎ² .

As the statistical methods and concepts on empirical variograms provide important guidance and
inspiration to PCMA, it is also necessary to note that variogram is primarily used to describe the spatial
continuity of the data [Bohling 2005] and may not produce an easily interpretable estimation for the
data points in our experiment outputs.
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Application of the PCMA Method
=¨ , V). We choose the number of subintervals to be 50, so that
Now, let us revisit the data points for (U
we generate a good number of new data points, while at the same time ensuring that the number of

original data points per subinterval is still sufficiently large to be representative. A quick examination
of the scatter plot with fitted regression line and the residual plot in Fig. 6.10 a-b reveals a prominent
linearity relationship (a significant improvement from the original data points). Furthermore, due to
insufficient data for high values of h, and their high leverage, we deem the points outliers and repeat
the analysis excluding values of h > 30. As we can see from Fig. 6.10 c-d, the filtered data points bear
an even stronger linear relationship, and the residual plot patterns indicate the linear regression
assumptions are met.

Figure 6.10 a: Scatter Plot with Regression Line for (W, XGs )

Figure 6.10 b: Residual Plot for (W, XGs )

Figure 6.10 c: Scatter Plot with Regression Line for (W, XGs ), W ≤ 30

Figure 6.10 d: Residual Plot for (W, XGs ), W ≤ 30

Figure 6.10 a-d: Scatter Plots and Residual Plots for the PCMA Data Points

212

Dataset

(W, XGs ), n = 50

(W, XGs ), (W, XGs ), n = 50, W ≤ 30

50*
50*slope41

Intercept

Pearson’s r

std. error

0.453

0.138

0.852

0.00105

0.500

0.115

0.580

0.00207

Table 6.11: Linear Regression Output for (W, XGs ), full dataset and partial

In conjunction with the detailed results from regression analysis in Table 6.11, we can conclude the
existence of a strong linear relationship in the data points from the PCMA method. The relationship is
largely consistent with our earlier findings on the original set of data points. Furthermore, the
regression output with outliers removed shows a fairly high S ¨ value (≈ 72.6%), indicating a good fit
of the model to the data points generated from our PCMA process.

After this initial assessment of the PCMA method’s practicality and validity, we apply it to the three
other output variables previously omitted for regression analysis for lack of linearity in original set of
data points. The preliminary results without attempts to remove outliers are shown in Table 6.12.

Output Variable

50*
50*slope

Intercept

Pearson’s r

std. error

Average Terminal Depth

-0.00742

4.025

-0.00373

0.005998

Terminal State Count
Terminal Likelihood

-0.539

0.0200

1.221

0.0239

-0.587

0.0979

0.00219

0.000599

Table 6.12: Linear Regression Output for Different Output Variables, with PCMA Method Applied and Y = 50

41 The multiplication coefficient of 50 is used here to compensate for the scaling effect on input variable, since unit change in W corresponds to
approximately 0.02 value change in the actual input variable U=¨ .
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Comments
From these results, we may conclude that a strong association exists between the input variable and
the expected Terminal State Count per sub-interval. Also, no significant associations can be concluded
for the Average Terminal Depth or Terminal Likelihood output variables.

Quite contrary to our initial assumptions, given that chaos often implies more cyclic behavior and less
stable states, our statistical analysis reveals that a more uniform power distribution leads to a less
chaotic process.

Remark. This interesting finding is also consistent with real-world observations on intrastate conflicts:
civil wars with equally powerful factions often last longer with frequent coalition changes [Posen 2017,
Christia 2012], and the emergence of some superpower often leads to some stable coalition structure,
if not an eventual peace.

214

6.4.5 S5:
S5: A higher number of agents introduces more possible states and dynamics.

•

Expected observation: when the scenario involves more agents, there should be more states
(either transitionally feasible or terminal), along with lower terminal likelihood and higher
cyclic likelihood.

•

Input Variable of Interest: Number of Agents, é ∈

•

Output Variables of Interest: Nodes Visited, Terminal Likelihood, Cyclic Likelihood

•

Run Configurations: S5_a (é = 3, 1000 runs), S5_b (é = 6, 1000 runs), S5_c (é = 10, 1000

®

runs), S5_d (é = 15, 50 runs42)

Sensitivity Analysis
We list the mean values of three output variables of interest for all configurations in Table 6.13.
Number of Agents, N

Nodes Visited

Terminal Likelihood

Cyclic Likelihood

6 (S5_b)

7.18

0.481

0.0669

3 (S5_a)

10 (S5_c)

15 (S5_d)

1.53

0.962

1658.70

0.0231

347834.70

1.61e-3

0.00475
0.272
0.205

Table 6.13: Mean Values of S5 Output Variables

We include the grouped box plots in Figure 6.11 a-c.

Recalling our earlier discussion on Bell Numbers in Section 3.4.1, the number of possible coalition structures grows almost super-exponentially
with increased number of agents. Accordingly, assuming a relatively stable ratio between transitionally feasible states and total possible states,
the number of transitionally feasible states (which makes most of the “Nodes Visited”) would also increase super-exponentially with increased
number of agents. Therefore, the average runtime for S5_d configuration with 15 agents were significantly higher, and we were only able to
complete 50 runs within the allocated computing time.

42
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Figure 6.11 a: Boxplots of S5 Output Variable Terminal Likelihood

Figure 6.11 b: Boxplots of S5 Output Variable Avg. Terminal Depth

Figure 6.11 c: Boxplots of S5 Output Variable Cyclic Likelihood

Figure 6.11 a-c: Boxplots of S5 Output Variables

Remark. It is fairly obvious that the set of runs with higher number of agents exhibit more dynamics:
on average, the runs with higher number of agents have significantly more states (nodes visited), are
much less likely to reach stable states, and are more likely to be in a cyclic state.

Comments

From the structural validity perspective, this finding is consistent with our earlier discussion on the
impact of agent count in Section 3.4.1 (A Simple Algorithm, and Bell Numbers). Evidently, higher
number of agents corresponds to a greater number of possible coalition structures (barring
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considerations of spatial-utility factors) that grows almost super-exponentially as the Bell Numbers.
Assuming a sub-exponential, if not almost constant ratio of transitionally feasible states to the total
possible coalition structure count, the number of transitionally feasible states (“nodes visited”) would
naturally increase with the higher number of agents in the scenario.
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6.4.6 S9:
S9: Different initial coalition structure leads to very different dynamics.

•

Expected observation: with the initial coalition topology being a grand coalition containing all
agents, the simulation reaches stable states much faster.

•

Input Variable of Interest: coalition structure at initialization, All-Alone vs. Grand-Coalition

•

Output Variables of Interest: Nodes Visited, Terminal Likelihood, Cyclic Likelihood

•

Run Configurations: S9_a/S3_b (all-alone/baseline 43 , 100 runs), S9_b (grand-coalition, 100
runs)

Sensitivity Analysis

We list the mean values of three output variables of interest for both configurations in Table 6.14.

Coalition Structure at Initialization

Nodes Visited

Terminal Likelihood

Cyclic Likelihood

Grand-Coalition (S9_b)

66605.65

8.82e-5

0.137

All-Alone (S9_a)

2355.30

0.0243

Table 6.14: Mean Values of S9 Output Variables

We include the grouped box plots in Figure 6.12 a-c.

43

We use the same simulation output for dataset S9_a and S3_b since their configurations are identical.
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0.267

Comments

From these results, we find sufficient evidence that the simulation runs with different initialized

coalition structure (all-alone vs. grand coalition) exhibit very different coalition dynamics measured
by number of transitionally feasible states, terminal likelihood and cyclic likelihood.

Figure 6.12 a: Boxplots of S9 Output Variable Terminal Likelihood

Figure 6.12 b: Boxplots of S9 Output Variable Nodes Visited

Figure 6.12 c: Boxplots of S9 Output Variable Cyclic Likelihood

Figure 6.12 a-c: Boxplots of S9 Output Variables
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6.4.7 KolmogorovKolmogorov-Smirnov test: Validating the Monte Carlo Parameterization Design

Thus far, we have concluded our sensitivity analysis work for part of the simulation results. While we
have already discussed the theoretical foundations of the Monte Carlo-base parameterization and how
the method should provide sufficient and meaningful sampling of the entire parameter space, a more
thoughtful examination should be in order since the method serves as a critical component to our
experimental design. The veracity and validity of the method in turn dictate the validity of our analysis
to date.

Therefore, we devote the closing of Section 6.4 to reviewing two aspects of the Monte Carlo
parameterization method: verification and validation. The verification review addresses the question
of whether the experiment is carried out as designed, and the validation review answers the question
of whether the particular design leads to system behavior as expected. To better illustrate the
relationship between the two concepts, consider the review of some engine improvements on a racing
automobile designed to make it run faster around Nürburgring, a renowned race track in Southern
Germany: the verification review examines if the proposed improvements have been completed
according to the design specifications, while the validation review looks if the engine improvements
do indeed reduces its lap time44 at Nürburgring.

In our case, the verification review examines whether the input parameters generated are from the
specified random variable. And the validation review examines whether the Monte Carlo
parameterization method does indeed lead to proper sampling of the entire parameter space with
limited number of observations.

44

Lap time is defined as the time it takes for an automobile to complete a full lap of some given racetrack.
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Verification Review

The verification procedure is necessary not only because we want to verify if our source code has been
written and interpreted correctly, but also for the fact that we have limited confidence in the Python’s
random number generation process. Similar to many other programming languages, Python’s
<random> module implements only Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNG) for various
distributions. Since implementing a True Random Number Generator (TPNG) requires some physical
process to take place and can often be rather costly (QUANTIS45), it is not widely adopted. As a result,
most systems only implement PRNGs that achieve reasonably good approximation.

Python’s <random> module uses Mersenne Twister as its core generator. By far the most widely used
PRNG, Mersenne Twister provides efficient generation of large sequences of random numbers based
on fluctuating internal (physical) states of the underlying computing unit just as most other PRNG
implementations [Matsumoto & Nishimura 1998]. While it is not cryptographically secure [Tzeng &
Wei 2008], the flaw is not quite a concern for our computational simulation purposes. Nevertheless,
Mersenne Twister can occasionally get into “bad states” and generate poorly distributed “random
numbers”, when problems arise with the underlying computing unit’s internal states. As a
precautionary measure, some form of verification concerning the proper distribution of randomized
parameters should be in place.

The verification process itself is rather straightforward: for any given input parameter that is
generated based on a specified random variable, we examine its values from the simulation result to
confirm that they do follow the expected distribution.

45 The least expensive TPNG module from a Swiss National Library-certified provider (Quantis) starts at €990, - (approx. 1170 USD). [QUANTIS
WEBSITE https://www.idquantique.com/shop/online-shop/]
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For example, we have specified that the position of an agent where its position is Monte Carlo
parameterized is generated based on a uniform distribution over [−1, 1] for each objective dimension.
Accordingly, we should expect to see that the sample values from simulation results to conform to this
distribution. Careful examination of the distribution plot for Agent A’s X-dimension position values

from baseline configuration runs (denoted as é − > rQ`WÅWQR in Figure 6.13 a) does properly verify

this setup.

Furthermore, the power parameters for individual agents are generated based on a uniform
distribution over [0, 1], but then re-scaled to ensure that the sum of all agents’ power values equal to
1 (for normalization purposes). Due to re-scaling, the actual distribution of an agent’s power values
§

from simulation results should approximate a uniform distribution over [0, ], but with a decrease in
·

§

probability as the value increases towards (and past) as a result of normalization. Examination of the
·

distribution plot for Agent D’s power values from baseline configuration runs (denoted as D Power in
figure 6.13 b) does verify this setup.

Figure 6.13 a: Distribution Plot of é − > rQ`WÅWQR Values from 1000

Figure 6.13 b: Distribution Plot of D Power Values from 1000 runs

runs with Baseline Configuration

with Baseline Configuration

Figure 6.13 a-b: Distribution Plots of Randomly Initialized Input Parameters in the Monte Carlo mode
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Since the power and position parameters are the only two sets of input parameters randomized for the
Monte Carlo parameterization method, we simply repeat the procedures above to verify if all input
parameters have been properly generated, for all output results from various configurations. We spare
the reader the examination of a few hundred more such distribution plots here. Comprehensive
verification procedures may be found in the Python Notebook file, with link in Appendix B.5.

Based on our analysis, the Monte Carlo parameterization method passes verification review.
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Validation Review

Now that we have verified the implementation of the Monte Carlo parameterization method, we must
answer the second question concerning its validity: does it provide a proper representation of the
entire parameter space, for sample size as few as 100 simulation runs46?

Due to theoretical challenges and complications to prove the method’s validity from the input
parameter space perspective, we propose a procedure centered around analysis of the output
variables to validate the effectiveness of Monte Carlo parameterization method.

The core argument of the method’s validity rest upon the claim that Monte Carlo parameterization
helps to create de facto controlled experiments. Statistically speaking, should we examine two samples’
output variables from two independent set of simulation runs with all of its input parameters being
either equal or properly randomized, they should appear to be from the same underlying distribution.

Accordingly, we propose following procedure for its validation:

Let è§ , è¨ be two independent sets of simulation runs with all of their input parameters being
either identical, or randomly generated identical probability distributions (according to the
Monte Carlo parameterization method). In the context of our experimental design, è§ , è¨ are
considered to be of “identical configuration”.

46 The choice of value, 100 as the minimum sample size, is determine by the fact that the minimum number of runs we have per configuration is
one hundred (a compromise we made when the computational time for each run is prohibitively long).
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Draw a random sample of size 100 (minimum sample size used in our analysis) from é, resepctively, and denote them €§ , €¨ . For any output variable associated with the simulation,
– , denote the observations of – for the two samples as Âr§,§ , r§,¨, … , r§,§´´ Ã, {r¨,§ , r¨,¨, … , r¨,§´´ }.

Let
•

•

Âr§,§ , r§,¨, … , r§,§´´ Ã be observations on independent and identically distributed

random variables (i.i.d. r.vs) with a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) R§ ,
{r¨,§ , r¨,¨, … , r¨,§´´ } be observations on i.i.d. r.vs with a c.d.f R¨ .

We are interested in testing the null hypothesis of the form
T

S´ : R§ → R¨

Let us elaborate this idea using a specific example. Earlier in Section 6.4.6 (S9 Review), we analyze two
independently generated runs from different configurations to explore the impact of initial coalition
structure. Other than different initial coalition structure input, all input parameters are either identical,
or properly randomized with an identical underlying distribution. The sample size is 100 for both cases.

For three output variables of interest (Nodes Visited, Terminal Likelihood and Cyclic Likelihood), we
may elect to compute the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic on the two samples. At some chosen
significance level, we’d be able to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the output variables are
different in their distributions with different initial coalition structure input.

In this case, the inductive step that attributes the validated change in distribution of output variables
to the altered input variable rests upon an important assumption: that Monte Carlo parameterization
procedure does produce a proper representation of the entire parameter space such that samples
drawn from the simulation runs of the same configuration should appear to be generated from the
identical underlying distribution, even for sample size as small as 100 in our case.
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To carry out the procedure described above, we simply compare two samples of size 100, from the
same configuration, and perform K-S test on the pair. In the actual implementation, we compute K-S
statistic and p-values for output variables from over 100 pairs of randomly drawn samples from the
same configuration.

A sample source code for this implementation is shown in Fig. 6.14 below. In code block [231], we
define a function that computes k-s statistic and p-values over 100 pairs of randomly drawn sample
data points from a given result table and output variable. In code block [232], a table is generated for
baseline configuration runs, output variable “Nodes Visited”.

Figure 6.14: Sample Code Block for K-S tests for validation using SciPy in Python Notebook

Since our primary interest is to predict how often the null hypothesis gets rejected, we examine the pvalues in greater detail. Examining the histogram and boxplot of the distribution for p-values in Fig.
6.15 a-b, it is not difficult to conclude that the p-values are almost always far greater than the typical
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values of significance. Specifically, for a = 0.01, we are able to retain the null hypothesis for all 100
pairs; for a = 0.05, we are able to retain the null hypothesis for 99 out of 100 pairs.

We repeat the procedure for other two output variables (Terminal Likelihood, Cyclic Likelihood) and
include the histogram and boxplots for corresponding p-values in Figure 6.15 c-f, along with the pvalues lower than the two commonly chosen significance level values in Table 6.15.

Output Variable

a = 0.05

a = 0.01

Terminal Likelihood

3

0

Nodes Visited

1

Cyclic Likelihood

1

0
0

Table 6.15: Number of p-values lower than the significance level chosen (“rejected null hypothesis” out of 100 cases),
for Baseline Configuration runs
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Figure 6.15 a: Histogram for p-values from 100 K-S tests of “Nodes

Figure 6.15 b: Box plot for p-values from 100 K-S tests of “Nodes

Visited” Variable from Baseline Configuration runs

Visited” Variable from Baseline Configuration runs

Figure 6.15 c: Histogram for p-values from 100 K-S tests of “Terminal

Figure 6.15 d: Box plot for p-values from 100 K-S tests of

Likelihood” Variable from Baseline Configuration runs

“Terminal Likelihood” Variable from Baseline Configuration runs

Figure 6.15 e: Histogram for p-values from 100 K-S tests of “Cyclic

Figure 6.15 f: Box plot for p-values from 100 K-S tests of “Cyclic

Likelihood” Variable from Baseline Configuration runs

Likelihood” Variable from Baseline Configuration runs

Figure 6.15 a-f: Histogram and Boxplots for Corresponding p-values
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Given that we are able to retain the null hypothesis for all of the 100 K-S tests performed over all three
output variables at the chosen significance level of a = 0.01, it is fair to confirm the validity of the
Monte Carlo parameterization method.

We simply repeat the procedure to establish validity of the Monte Carlo parameterization method for
different configurations throughout our experiment. Comprehensive validation procedures and
results may be found in the Python Notebook file, with link in Appendix B.5.

Based on our analysis, the Monte Carlo parameterization method passes validation review.
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6.5 A Discussion on Investigation Task S6-8

During experimental design, we realized that we do not necessarily need to utilize computational
simulation for all of the investigation tasks. In our original design, investigations S6 through S8 require
re-runs with new initialization parameters adapted from some known stable states of previous
simulation results. While conceptually valid, we find computational experiments for the said
investigations somewhat flawed due to their lack of value.

Closer examinations of the hypotheses 6 through 8 reveal a delightful truth: we may very well conduct

formal mathematical analysis for validation work. Specifically, since all statements made in S6-8 are
only concerned with the immediate coalition dynamics after altering some stable state, the full details
of the state transitions thereafter are not of primary concern. And one investigation task (S8) can even
be quickly validated with some back-of-envelope calculations.

In light of the simplicity and soundness with the formal analysis approach from Chapter 4, the original
design seems to be of dubious value while requiring extensive work. Therefore, we have decided to
use the former approach to validate S6-8. A revisit to Section 4.2 (Definitions and Specifications of the

Abstract Model) is recommended to facilitate the understanding for the remainder of this section.
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6.5.1 S6:
S6: As the power changes for a leading agent in a coalition, the coalition dissembles or grows.
Let € be an existing coalition of ° agents, with their position the objective space as {Æo , Æ÷ , … , ÆU }, and
their normalized powers as {S§ , S¨ , … , S² }. Recalling the basic setup of the abstract model, we write the
total power of the coalition as:

îì = Ë

w∈„

Sw

Equation 6.13

And the negotiated position of the coalition as:

Æì =

o
Ë Æï Sw
îì
ï∈ì

Equation 6.14

Let agent ° be the “leading agent” with highest normalized power, i.e. S² ≥ Sw , ∀Sw ∈ {S§ , S¨ , … , S² } .

Expand Eq. 6.13 and we get:

Æì =

o
o
Ë Æï Sw + ⋅ ÆU S²
îì
îì
ï∈ì\{U}

Equation 6.15

The total power of the coalition with updated power of the member agent becomes:

îì ′ = Ë

w∈„

Sw + kS²

Equation 6.16

The negotiated position of the coalition with update power:

Æì ′ =

o
o
Ë Æï Sw +
⋅Æ S ′
îì ′
îì ′ U ²
ï∈ì\{U}
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Equation 6.17

As we may easily find from Equation 6.16, a change in the power of a single agent leads to changes in
both the coalition’s total power and its negotiated position, with the exception when the coalition’s
negotiated position coincides with that of the agent °, i.e. ÆU = Æì . In the rare case of ÆU = Æì , the

coalition’s negotiated position is not impacted by changes in value of ÆU .

Recalling our earlier findings from Section 4.3.5 (Coalition vs. Member Perception on Utility Change),
we conclude that changes in utility perceptions for an agent in the coalition are possible, as
exhaustively listed in Table 6.16. Since any position shift will lead to both increase and decrease in
distance dw,„ for different agent W, their expected utility perceptions may either increase or decrease.

ÐV
Increases
Decreases

Distance between
ÆÓ and Æð
Increases

Expected Utility Perception of Agent ð
on coalition Ó,, O¡Wð,Ó ¤ = Wð,Ó

Possible actions for agent ð

Might either increase or decrease

-

Increases

Decreases

Decreases

Might either increase or decrease

Should a better alternative exist,
leave the coalition

Decreases

Increases

Remain in the coalition
-

Table 6.16: Listing of Scenarios for Changes in Expected Utility

Of course, it is important to add on the rare case when ÆU = Æì , such that we expect increases in

expected utility perceptions for all agents with kS² > 0, and vice versa. We may therefore conclude,
that as the power changes for a leading agent (or as a matter of fact, any agent) in a coalition, the
individual member agents’ expected utility perceptions will change. The direction of change varies for

individual agents. The impact on coalition dynamics is also contextual. When and only when an
alternative coalition structure exists with higher expected utility for some member agents, the agents
will leave the current coalition. Furthermore, since the coalition’s power and position might both
change with the power change of its member agent, the external (who are not a member of the coalition)
agent’s expected utility perception of the coalition will also change, leading to further coalition
dynamics.
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6.5.2 S7:
S7: Position shifts of agents in boundary zones is more likely to cause coalition structure changes.
Let € be an existing coalition of ° agents, with their position the objective space as {Æo , Æ÷ , … , ÆU }, and
their normalized powers as {S§ , S¨ , … , S² }. Recalling the basic setup of the abstract model, we write the
total power of the coalition:

îì = Ë

w∈„

Sw

Equation 6.18

And the negotiated position of the coalition as:

Æì =

o
Ë Æï Sw
îì
ï∈ì

Equation 6.19

Now, consider following scenario with two agents ”, ° of equal power, S• = S² but different distance
from the coalition’s negotiated position. Specifically, agent W is further away from the negotiated

position of the coalition, i.e. ‖Æì − Æï ‖ > ‖Æì − ÆU ‖. Expand Eq. 6.18, to isolate the contribution of
agent ”, °’s impact on the negotiated position on Æì , and we get:

Æì =

o
îì

Æì =

o
îì

Ë Æï Sw + ÆX S•

Equation 6.20

Ë Æï Sw + ÆU S²

Equation 6.21

ï∈ì\{X}

ï∈ì\{U}

Now let us introduce a small position change, kr, for both agents. We therefore write the updated
position of the agent ”, ° as:
ÆxX = ÆX + YZ
ÆxU = ÆU + YZ
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Equation 6.22
Equation 6.23

We quickly realize that due to linearity, we may write the updated negotiated position of the coalition
as:
Æì ′ =

o
îì

Æì ′′ =

o
îì

Ë Æï Sw + ˜ÆX + YZ ⋅ S•

Equation 6.24

Ë Æï Sw + (ÆU + YZ) ⋅ S²

Equation 6.25

ï∈ì\{X}

ï∈ì\{U}

Accordingly, the position shift for Æì in both cases can be expressed as:

YÆxì = Æxì − Æì =

o
îì

xx
YÆxx
ì = Æì − Æì =

o
îì

Ë Æï Sw + ˜ÆX + YZ ⋅ S• −

ï∈ì\{X}

o
îì

Ë Æï Sw + (ÆU + YZ) ⋅ S• −

ï∈ì\{X}

Ë Æï Sw + ÆX S•

=

S•
⋅ YZ
îì

Ë Æï Sw + ÆU S²

=

S²
⋅ YZ
îì

ï∈ì\{X}

ï∈ì\{U}

Equation 6.26

Equation 6.27

In case of S• = S² , we have YÆxì = YÆxx
ì . We therefore conclude from the expanded forms above, that the
coalition’s negotiated position change caused by a member agent’s position shift is independent of the

agent’s position, and only has to do with the member agent’s normalized power, S.

Therefore, with no external coalitions available47, position shifts of agents in boundary zone is no more
or less likely to cause coalition structure changes than the position shifts of those located closer to the
coalition’s negotiated position. It only has to do with the agent’s power.

47 When external coalitions are available, it is trivial to see that the position shifts of agents in the boundary zone is far more likely to cause it to
defect and join external coalitions than the position shifts of agents located closer to the coalition’s negotiated position.
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6.5.3 S8:
S8: Elimination of weak, isolated agents is unlikely to cause coalition structure change (from a
stable state).

For a stable state, by definition, there exists no one-player reachable state (revisit Section 3.2.1 for
details) from it. Essentially, no agent can unilaterally improve its expected utility.

In addition, based on the utility specifications of our model, an agent’s expected utility in the current
state is fully and exclusively determined by the power and position parameters of the fellow member
agents in the same coalition (and of course, those of its own).

Now, consider the case when we eliminate some isolated agents: their state of isolation ensures their
elimination does not impact the expected utilities of any remaining agents in the scenario.
Furthermore, since elimination of isolated agents only reduce the number of one-player different
states from the current stable state, their elimination does not provide any additional alternatives (it
only reduces the number of alternatives). Consequently, elimination of isolated agents (regardless of
their power) leads to:

•

No impact on the expected utilities of remaining agents, and

•

Reduction in number of one-player different states

Recall that in the stable state, none of the one-player different states are reachable, then the remaining
one-player different states are not reachable remains unreachable. Essentially, none of remaining
agents will experience any change in its expected utility, and no new alternatives with potential oneplayer reachability are created with the elimination of isolated agents. Therefore, we may conclude
that the elimination of isolated agents (regardless of power) will not cause coalition structure change

in a stable state.
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6.6 Notes
Notes on Experiment Improvements

For future reference, here are a few closing thoughts on a list of potential improvements to the
technical aspects of the simulation platform.

SoftwareSoftware-related

•

Customized Randomization:
Randomization for simplicity we used uniform distribution to generate
randomized input parameters throughout the model, but the reader may freely choose
appropriate random variables that best reflects the actual distribution of these parameters in
their scenario of study.

•

Optimized Parallelization (Multi(Multi-threading): in our experiments, we decide appropriate multithreading in Python based on the estimated runtime for certain. However, a module can be
added to the platform so that parallelization can be optimized and automated.

HardwareHardware-related

•

Use of TRNG: while we find it sufficient and economical to use Pseudo-Random Number
Generators from Mersenne Twister’s implementation, one is free to consider using TrueRandom Number Generator for Monte Carlo parameterization if a higher level of rigorousness
is desired.

•

Memory Limit: due to memory limit on our computing units (and limited practical value), our
platform only records partial results from each run for large-scale Monte Carlo simulations.
One should consider a more powerful computing unit so that full details of each run can be
recorded and accessed for more thorough analysis. Minimum changes to the source code will
be required.
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6.7 Conclusion

We have hitherto explored the full list of proposed investigations through our experiments conducted
via the computational simulation model. As expected, the computational modeling method is a
powerful tool that helps us to uncover various characteristics of coalition dynamics that are previously
not feasible to solve with formal analysis for their mathematically intractability. To our delightful
surprise, some investigation tasks have turned out to be more suitable for formal analysis for
simplicity and elegance.

We began this chapter with discussion on sensitivity analysis methods and themes of investigation,
which lays the important theoretical foundation. We then examined the simulation results with various
methods of sensitivity analysis.

We further discussed investigations 6 through 8, which were left out earlier in the computational
simulation experiments. We provided specific reasoning for the motivation to employ formal analysis
method instead of computational modeling and establish clear conclusions for all three cases. We also
shared practical learnings from the experiments with extensive notes on potential improvements for
future experiences.

The newly gained insights from the computational simulation experiments have given us deeper
understanding of the model’s characteristics and greater confidence in its capability in analyzing
complex scenarios. In the following Chapters, we continue to explore the coalition dynamics for a few
real-world cases.
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Chapter 7 Empirical Exploration: Three Case Studies
7.1 Introduction:
Introduction: Goals and Challenges

Through quantitative analysis and simulation experiments, we have concluded our investigation into
the dynamical behavior of the model. Now, we are to look into a few real-world cases of coalition
dynamics. Since the primary motivation of this work is to study coalition dynamics in multiparty
competitive settings akin to that of intrastate conflicts, we find it necessary to apply the proposed
model and simulation capabilities to such settings.

Through the empirical applications, we intend to achieve three goals. First, we would like to review
the model’s output validity through back-testing on specific historical events. Second, we shall reintroduce some alternative theories of coalition formation to conduct an informal comparative

analysis on their respective validity and effectiveness alongside our own. Lastly, we attempt to alter
some of the model’s premises and evaluate the model’s extensibility to different use cases.

However, before we delve into any extensive analysis, it is important to clarify a few challenges and
limitations that in the process.

The first set of challenges has to do with the input data. Because of the complexity and lack of
transparency in most intrastate conflicts, it is fairly difficult to collect quantitatively accurate data on
some key parameters for the model – actual objective positions and aggregated power of agents. Even
the most knowledgeable sociologists or intelligence analyst would refrain from declaring such

absolute accuracy [Collier & Hoeffler 2007, Posen 2017]. Unlike in natural sciences, the quantitative
values in many social phenomena are often elusive to exact measurement. In addition, the subjective

nature of some parameters only further hinders the goal of a precise measurement, for that often even
the agent itself (in our case, the leader of a faction in some intrastate conflict) would fail to consistently
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assign an accurate numerical value to its stance on certain issues. With the help of subjective matter
experts, we are able to obtain some reliable data points on these metrics, yet it is important to beware
that even the best experts in any field can only give an educated estimate of a qualitative value. Our
expectation, just as that of many other computational sociologists or economists of our times, is that
the model would still yield reasonable output from the input data within an acceptance margin of error.

The second set of limitations originates with some basic assumptions of our model. Similar to many
classical economic and game theoretical models, the proposed model constructs its agents under the
framework of rational choice theory [Oppenheimer 2008, Scott 2000]. The assumption of rationality
mandates all agents to have clear preferences, account for uncertainty as expected payoffs, and
consistently act to maximize their utility. A rational agent always makes the optimal choice in the given
context. While such construction properly describes the actions from most of the agents for most of

the time, sizable number of real-world contradictions do exist – either out of stupidity or
misinformation, people do not always make the optimal choice [Thaler & Ganser 2015].

Nevertheless, we make peace with the fact that while such infrequent acts of irrationality do occur,
their influence over the dynamical process in the long run remains limited. Furthermore, due to the
very competitive nature of intrastate conflicts, we argue that the persistently irrational agents would
be quickly eliminated due to its series of suboptimal choices in such an environment – and the
rationality will eventually reign again. Similar thoughts and arguments maybe found among the
believers of the renowned efficient market hypothesis [Malkiel 2003].

A less significant source of limitation is our transparency of information assumption. The model
assumes that the objective positions (stances on certain issues of concern) and power are both known
to all participating agents, whereas in some chaotic intrastate conflict situations agents might conceal
their information or misinform others despite the advancement of modern-day information and
intelligence technologies. But the likelihood of such spread of misinformation, either caused by the
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inability to perceive accurate information, or the individual’s deliberate intention to misrepresent its
own power or objective positions, can vary significantly in different scenarios. We believe it is most
relevant to revisit the specific likelihood and impact of these limitations as we investigate individual
cases in the later chapters.

For the challenges and limitations stated above, we foresee reasonable deviations from expected
outcomes when applying our coalition model to the real-world cases. Accordingly, we refrain from the
temptations to ascertain unrealistically absolute confidence in the validity of our model even if the
simulations lead to the anticipated behaviors through these empirical studies.

Accordingly, we devote the rest of this Chapter to a brief discussion on the scope and methods of
intended validation work, along with an introduction to the selected cases, some technical details of
the simulation platform, and intended structure of the individual case studies.
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7.2 A Brief Discussion on Validation of Computational Models

Regardless of their purpose or type, the formal models should be evaluated for their merit in terms of
clarity, parsimony, generality and validity [Mayhew 1984, Carley & Wallace 2001]. We focus on
validation herein, since we have already treated the remaining subjects through formal methods and
computational modeling in previous chapters.

7.2.1 Forms of Validation

Existing work on validation evaluation for computational models often involves several forms of
validation: theoretical, internal, external, cross-model, and data [Carley 1996], which differ primarily
in their definitions of acceptability and interest of assessment.

•

Theoretical or conceptual validity requires that a model conform to the characteristics of
the actual process in the real world. We have extensively discussed our rationale for the
particular choice of model setup in the first 3 Chapters.

•

Internal or structural validity requires that the computational setup and procedures of a
model adequately reflects the underlying theoretical setup. We have evaluated this aspect
of the model through limited formal analysis and extensive computational modeling in
Chapters 4 through 6.

•

Cross-model validity is assessed when we intend to compare the behavior of the model
against an established model, by observing how close their input-output relationship
match for the same process of interest. Due to lack (if not absence) of established similar
models, we would only be able to conduct such an assessment in a limited scope. In
addition to some theoretical discussion on their differences in Chapter 2, we intend to
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evaluate their validity by applying them to specific use cases during this empirical
exploration.

•

Data validity demands accuracy for input parameters alongside their appropriateness and
relevancy to the problem of interest. This validity is specific to the context of real-world
problems where there is presumed to be a “ground truth” value for such input parameters.
We describe our data collection processes and methodologies for individual case studies
and evaluate the validity of our input data case-by-case.

•

Lastly, the external validity examines the relationship between the simulated and real
outcome – so that we may tell how closely the proposed model emulates the behavior of
the phenomenon in the real world. This is the primary focus herein.

With the focus of our case studies on external validity, we discuss some common external validation
methodologies for agent-based models.
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7.2.2 External Validation Methodologies for AgentAgent-based Models

The external validation methods of agent-based social and economic models generally fall into two
broad categories [Kennedy et al. 2005, Balci 1998], subjective and quantitative.

From the subjective list [Kennedy et al. 2005, Law 2008, Turing 1948], we find two most relevant
methods:

•

Turing test. Originally proposed as a test named “The Imitation Game”, the Turing test
was first developed by Dr. Alan Turing in the 1950s to assess a machine’s ability to exhibit
intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human. Comparably,
we may ask a group of domain experts to examine the model’s input-output behaviors and
those of an actual scenario, and to discriminate the simulated results from the real-world
ones.

•

Entity behavior tracing. This technique involves tracking the sequences of behavior for
certain entities throughout the duration of simulation, to determine if the logic is correct,
and if observed behavior patterns conforms to the presumptions of the model.

From the quantitative list [Qian et al. 2006, Sargent 2005, Hukkelhoven et al. 2003], we find three
practical quantitative methods:

•

Historical data validation. As its name suggests, historical data validation involves using
established historical data to determine if the model behavior mimics that of the actual
system.

•

Predictive validation. The method examines how well the model predicts some future
events given all relevant historical and present data. Due to the timescale of most
scenarios, validation of predictive outcomes might not be feasible in our cases of study.
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•

Sensitivity analysis. This technique requires one to observe the variations in outcome
after tuning some of the input parameters. The corresponding changes in system behavior
is then examined to determine if such changes reflect real-world dynamics. We have
essentially conducted this analysis during our review of the outcomes from thousands of
Monte Carlo experiments (with random seed) in Chapter 5.

In the following section, we discuss the main validation methods that we intend to use in this Chapter,
along with the choice of three real-world cases for analysis.
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7.3 Some Considerations on Case Selection and Validation Work

Thus far, we have discussed two major challenges to successful empirical exploration work on coalition
dynamics: data imprecision and real-world deviations from the model’s key assumptions. With the
challenges in mind, we carefully select our case studies with a focus on quality of data and applicability
of the premises. In addition, we should be able to perform one or more methods of validation on the
selected case.

We conceive the selection criteria motivated by data quality and model premises:

•

The input data for the case should be accessible and uncontentious, ideally from a credible
source in the subject domain;

•

The context of the case should not deviate excessively from the model’s basic premises so
that its agents are able to make rational choices, and the information is transparent to all
participating agents.

In addition, we establish the following criteria inspired by possible validation methods:

•

Turing test. If the results from the simulation are presented in an identical form alongside
real-world developments, we can perform the Turing test by asking if the two are
distinguishable in the sense that the developments are both believable and realistic.
Furthermore, by the mandate of the Turing test, the results should ideally be reviewed by
some subject matter expert (in the domain of coalition dynamics).

•

Entity behavior tracing. The case scenario should be sufficiently complex and generate
enough iterations (moves) so that sufficient dynamics can be observed and traced.

•

Historical data validation. The case scenario should have happened in the past, with
accurate, verifiable data and details.
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However, the Turing test’s output format requirement confines the comparison to some predictive
analysis (as our model outputs a tree-like list of all possible future paths and states of coalition
structure, whereas the real-world only follows a singular path). A likely meaningful test would present
the expert with some predictions of the future states, and he may analyze and say if the model’s
prediction of all possible future states is reasonable. However, no real-world results of

indistinguishably same format may be available, thus failing a major premise of the Turing test.
Furthermore, even as the expert rejects some prediction made by the model, there is no way to deny
it of any legitimacy with absolute confidence – for the future is yet to come.

Based on the criteria set forth, we have selected three real-world cases for in-depth analysis in the
ensuing Chapters. Respectively, we look into an ongoing civil war in a regional of conflict, test the
validity of the model’s spatial-utility component on a past U.S. Presidential Election, and review
competing theories for the governing coalition structures in Israel’s Knesset over many decades.

Next, we introduce the three selected case studies and briefly discuss the focus of our empirical
exploration for each case.

246

7.4 Introduction to the Selected Case Studies

The three selected case studies are: (1) the ongoing Syria Civil War48; (2) the governing coalitions in
the 19th and 20th Knesset; and (3) the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election.

Syrian Civil War

The focus of the first case is on the overall coalition dynamics in relation to each group’s fluctuation in
power and change of weights over different objectives (shifting power and evolving priorities).
Specifically, we are interested in answering following questions:

•

Why the rebels (Free Syrian Army, etc.) were initially closely linked to extremist groups
(Al-Nursa, ISIS) in their attempts to topple the Assad regime, and were then recently able
to agree to some degree of ceasefire with the government?

•

Given the chaotic situation, what are possible stable coalitions structure in the scenario,
and how reliable are they (in response to fluctuations in power)?

•

What was the impact of external support or intervention in the scenario?

•

How can we properly account for the external support in the existing model?

Through the investigation, we demonstrate modest applications of our agent-based model and analyze
the effects of parameter changes in relation to the observed real-world events in Syria. Given the scope
of the investigation, the agents in the model are limited to the main belligerents in this conflict;
furthermore, the sovereign states (Iran, Russia, Turkey, the United States, etc.) with pledged support
to one or another factions involved in this conflict are not considered as independent agents in the

48

At the time of this revision in April 2020, the conflict has been ongoing for nearly 9 years.
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modeling work. Instead, their presence and pledged support forces are considered as an addition to
power of those receiving agents.

Governing Coalitions in the Nineteenth
Nineteenth and Twentieth Knesset

In the Knesset governing coalitions scenario, we use the model to find feasible governing coalition
structures in the Israeli legislature. We borrow from contemporary studies of the political spectrum in
Israel to plot different political parties onto the objective dimensions along key issues of debate.
Meanwhile, we use the number of seats each political party held in the Knesset as a proxy to their
power. Given the fragmented and polarized nature of its political landscape [Krouwel et al. 2013], the
Knesset is an ideal context for us to explore the validity of competing theories of coalition formation.
In particular, we address the following questions through our analysis:

•

How well can the competing theories of coalition formation explain observations?

•

What possible extensions to the model might make it more relevant in the given context?

Through our study of the Knesset case, we provide a comparative analysis of different theories based
on their predictive power for the governing coalition outcome and introduce possible extensions to
our model and demonstrate its extensibility.

Having laid out the basics of all three case studies, we hope the reader find it unsurprising that the
experimental setup and flow of presentation differs from scenario to scenario, due to the distinct
interests in exploration and emphasis on approach. We therefore must treat each case study with
consideration to its characteristics, while at the same time organize them in a way that would best
support our assessment of the model’s empirical value collectively.
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For the remainder of this chapter, we review some key technical details and concepts in the context of
the said case studies, present and explain the planned structure of analysis, and provide a preliminary
summary on learnings and recommendations from our empirical exploration.

The 2008 United States Presidential Election

In the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election case, we are primarily interested in validating the model’s
spatial-utility component by examining the relationship between the voting behavior and perceived
utility (for the candidates) of different demographic groups. While there is strictly speaking not any
“coalition formation” event in the scenario, we treat the act of voting for a particular candidate as
accepting the candidate’s position as the negotiated position of the “new coalition”. Accordingly, we
compute the voting group’s perceived utility values based on its own position and that of the candidate.
We foresee a reasonably good prediction of its outcome given highly reliable survey data for the model
input. With the help of a subject matter expert49, we also provide a brief review of the data retrieval
and structuring process – an important procedure for any reader interested in possible ways of
obtaining necessary input parameters for the model. Accordingly, the key questions we intend to
address in this section are:

•

How can we obtain accurate data points on people’s positions in an objective space?

•

Can the utility values derived from the model’s spatial-utility component be a strong
predictor of the voting behavior?

49 We thank Prof. Eunji Kim of Vanderbilt University, then a fellow doctoral student at Annenberg School for Communication and Department of
Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania.
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Through this investigation, we provide an in-depth look at the data aspect of the modeling process and
validate the spatial-utility component of the model itself. It is important to note that some level of
simplification on the election process is necessary to facilitate the application of this model without
overcomplicating the data input process.
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7.5 A Technical Review for Modeling RealReal-World Coalition Dynamics

While we have introduced various aspects of the coalition dynamics model in the context of formal
analysis and computational simulations, we feel obliged to provide some further clarifications on
certain technicalities in the empirical exploration work. In particular, we discuss concepts in three
areas of interest: (1) the internal mechanism that drives the flow of simulation, (2) the real-world
counterparts of power and position concepts in the model, and (3) the details of configuring the
simulation platform for individual case studies.

7.5.1 Inputs to the model

There are two groups of inputs to the model: the system-level settings and agent-level parameters. The
former mainly dictate the rules of interaction for the agent-based simulation, while the latter describe
micro-level agent characteristics. They collectively determine the simulation outcome.

The full list of inputs for the Single Run mode of the simulation can be found in Table 7.1. The systemlevel settings are to be kept constant for simulations of the same scenario under the assumption that
the rules of interaction remain unchanged. Additionally, we recommend the following default values
for two system-level settings:

-

Alpha Constant: the tuning parameter for spatial-utility calibration is recommended to be set
to 2.7 for scenarios with an objective space dimension no great than 4;

-

Max. Depth:
Depth: while we have previously suggested a max. depth value of 50 for Monte Carlo
simulation runs in earlier Chapters, we recommend the value to be set with consideration to
the time frame of analysis.
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Systemlevel
Settings

Parameter
Name

Overview

Alpha
Constant

The tuning parameter for the Expected Utility Function, as mentioned in Section 5.3.3, “A
Minor Adjustment to the Baseline Model”. The recommended value is 2.7 for scenarios
with no more than 3 objective dimensions. User may tune it arbitrarily based on empirical
findings or specific needs. The smaller the alpha value, the more likely it is for any two
agents to form coalitions.

Use Weight

Choice between the weighted vs unweighted scenario.

Voting
Style

Choice of three variations in the voting process: single, unanimous, and majority. The first
allows any agent to unilaterally join a coalition without the consent of any of its existing
members; the second requires consent (and therefore, non-decreasing utility change) for
all of the existing members of the coalition; the majority requires no less than half of the
existing members to consent. Looser voting requirement makes it easier for an external
agent to join a coalition, however, due to the consenting nature of such a change, some
existing members may experience negative utility change and thus start seeking
alternative coalition choices.

Max. Depth

The maximum depth of the State Tree that will be explored. See Section 5.3.1, “Time
Constraint and Output Analysis” for more details.

Number of
Agents

Agent-level
Parameters

Number of agents in the scenario, pre-configured to be named as “A B C ...” in the
alphabetical order. Given the empirical necessity (total number of sizable parties in

conflict in any given scenario) we have set the maximum to be 26, and of course, the
minimum is 1. The input must be an integer.

Initial
Coalitions

The coalition structure set as the initial condition. The default is a “all alone” scenario, in
which every agent is by itself. However, this can be altered arbitrarily. Syntax-wise, the
space is used as a separator for joint letters. Example: “AB C” stands for an initial condition
in which A, B is in the same coalition, and C is alone.

Number of
Objectives

The dimension of the objective space, i.e. the number of issues the agents find contentious
over.
Agent Characteristics

Power

The normalized power is a proxy of the agent’s collective resources that can be used to
influence the outcome in the competitive setting.

Position

The position of the agent in the proposed objective space, representing its overall stance
on the issues of contention.

Weights

The weights are used in the weighted scenario to represent agents’ varying levels of
commitment to different issues.

Table 7.1: Inputs to the Model: System-level Settings and Agent-level Parameters, in the Single Run mode
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7.5.2 Flow of Simulation

As we have introduced the key components and internal mechanism of the simulation platform in
Section 5.4, we focus on the application of the platform to our case studies herein.

The Single Run Mode

A typical case study for coalition dynamics is to be carried out in the Single Run mode of our simulation
platform, since the entire set of input parameter values are known at the beginning of the simulation
and there is no need for randomization control from the Monte Carlo mode.

For simulation in the Single Run mode, there is no stochastic component in the simulation output: for
a fixed set of inputs where all necessary input parameter values are defined, the simulation platform

always returns an identical output in the state tree format (conceptual diagram can be found in Figure
5.1, and a sample results view from the simulation platform is shown in Figure 5.5). The deterministic
input-output relationship does not mean that there is only one possible outcome for a fixed set of
inputs, but rather that the simulation platform is able to return the entire set of plausible future states
in a path-dependent format as a state tree.

In Section 5.4.4, we described the decision-making process for individual agents at every turn, and
changes in coalition topology over the course of a simulation run. In addition to the illustrations in
Figure 5.6 and 5.7, we review some terminology 50 and offer a juxtaposed view for the agent-level
decision-making process and system-level tracing of state changes.

50

For more detailed definitions, we recommend a revisit to Section 3.2.1.
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-

A state corresponds to a unique coalition structure for the agents. Let • = {1, 2, 3 … , R} be the
set of R total players in the game. A coalition structure is a partition of •.

-

A (one-player) reachable state from the current state is a new coalition structure made
possible by the best nonnegative utility-changing move of one agent in the current state.

-

A terminal state is a coalition structure with no future reachable state(s) from itself.

-

A turn of the simulation is defined as expansion of all states at current depth and grow the
state tree to the next depth level. We describe what happens during a turn below with
reference to Figure 7.2.

Now, let us examine how agent-level interactions lead to system-level updates. We illustrate the
process with a few lines of pseudocode in Table 7.1 and complement it with a more concrete
description of the events in Figure 7.1 and 7.2.

In the pseudocode notation, we denote system-level events with lines in UPPER CASE, and agent-level
events in lower case; all conditional statements or control flow statements (for / if / else if) are marked
bold,
bold and so are system-level start/end statements; the verbs at the agent-level are underlined. Dotted
vertical lines are added to aid visual understanding of the flow hierarchy.
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Figure 7.1: Pseudocode for the Single Run Mode of the Coalition Dynamics Simulation Platform
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Next, let us examine the sequence of events in smaller unit of interactions with an example scenario
containing three agents [é, -, V]. The simulation begins with the initial state shown in Figure 7.1, with
no coalition in place (we denote a coalition relationship with edges connecting the agents). The initial
depth level is zero, and only one state (the initial state) exists at current depth. The following sequence
of events take place as the first turn of the simulation begins:

-

The system begins exploring possible evolution of coalition structure from the first (and only)
state at current depth;

-

The system selects the first agent é and enables it to explore possible coalition moves;
o

Agent é evaluates utility changes51 for all three possible moves (to form a coalition
with -, to form a coalition with V, or to remain in current state);

o

Agent é then makes a list of moves with nonnegative utility changes, which in this
case happens to include all three aforementioned moves;

o

Agent é ranks them in descending preference: to form a coalition with - is preferred

over to form a coalition with V, which is preferred over to remain in current state;
o

Since the first two choices involves another agent, coalition proposals are made and
reviewed52:
Agent - rejects the proposal;
Agent é then proceeds to make proposal to Agent V, who then accepts;

o

Agent é has found its best possible move from current state;

-

At system-level, the state tree is updated with a new reachable state from the current state;

-

The system then selects the next agent in current state and repeats the process.

51 The negotiated positions for various coalition structures are computed with Equation 3.1; the realizable utility values for different possible
coalition moves are computed with Equation 5.6 (with the introduced tuning parameter a); and the expected utility values are computed with
Equation 3.6 and Equation 4.2.
52 The proposal review process takes place according to the voting procedures described in Section 3.3.
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Figure 7.2 illustrates a possible complete state tree for the three-agent scenario, with vertical line
segments indicate the depth levels. The agent causing the state change are noted on the directed edges.
If multiple agents’ moves cause the same state change, they are all noted on the same edge. Additionally,
we add a shorten sequence of actions that illustrates how different spatial-utility characterizing
functions are called upon during the process.
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Figure 7.2: Agent Interactions and Updates to the its State Tree
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The Stopping Condition(s)
Condition(s)

We have previously stated the stopping condition of the simulation flow as such: The simulation stops
when (1) the preset maximum depth limit is reached, or (2) there are no reachable states from the
latest depth level. Further, we call a state tree complete if it includes all reachable states from the initial
state, or equivalently, the simulation that generated this state tree stopped because of condition (2) –
there are no further reachable states at the next depth level.

For the state tree shown in Figure 7.3, the simulation would have stopped at depth 1 if the preset
maximum depth limit was set to 1, and the state tree output from the simulation would have omitted
the state at depth 2 so €(é-V) is excluded. Alternatively, if the maximum depth limit is set to 2 or more,
then the simulation would only stop after having exhaustively explored all reachable states from the
initial state in this case. In the given state tree output, €(é-V) and €(-V, é) are both terminal states,
also known as static stable states, of the simulation.

An intuitive way to understand the State Tree is to think of it as a Markov chain without known

transition probabilities. That is, the State Tree describes a sequence of possible states (coalition
structures) and their reachability relationships without explicitly asserting the probabilities of
transition between the states. Nevertheless, one may freely introduce transitional probabilities on a
State Tree and analyze the coalition dynamics under such conditions.
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Figure 7.3: A Complete State Tree of Three Agents, an Example

Next, let us expand on two important concepts and discuss their role in the modeling task: time
frame of analysis and the spatial-utility component.
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7.5.3 Time Frame of Analysis

The proposed agent-based coalition dynamics model is a discrete-event simulation as it models the
operation of a system as a discrete sequence of events in time. In such discrete-event simulation
setting [Moshref-Javadi & Lehto 2016], each agent’s move occurs at a particular instant in time and
marks a change of state (coalition structure) in the system. Between consecutive events, no change in
the system is assumed to occur. Conceptually, simulation transitions from one state to another
without lapse of time, or without any consideration for the concept of time.

While the simulation event sequence does not entail the time concept, we can always map the event
sequence to a real-world timeline with ease. Doing so requires knowing the time it usually takes for
such state changes in the given scenario. We can even take it further by analyzing the State Tree output
and estimate the time required for individual state transitions in the real world. What are the
implications for the time frame of analysis in our case studies then?

-

For the Syrian Civil War case, state change corresponds to change of coalition memberships,
a lengthy process that might take weeks or months to materialize. Our time frame of analysis
spans from 2011 to late 2017;

-

In the Knesset governing coalitions scenario, state change corresponds to some h in vacuum,
as the formateur agent simply proposes a governing coalition. The one and only coalition
structure change is the forming of the governing coalition from all agents being on its own;

-

For the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election case, we mainly focus on studying the spatial-utility
component of the model and the time is not a consideration for the analysis.

If the desired time frame of analysis is known, how should one decide on the maximum depth of the
simulation? We have learned from our computational experiments, approximately 96.2% of the 3,000
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Monte Carlo simulation runs with the baseline configuration53 completed before reaching the preset
maximum depth of 50. This observation suggests that we will likely be able to exhaustively explore all
reachable states from the initial state with reasonable computational time and resources.

Since computational time and resources for the simulation is even less a concern for the Single Run
mode, one may extend the maximum depth to a higher value so that the simulation outputs a complete
state tree. One can then assign a general or transition-specific time estimate and decide which subset
of the state tree is relevant for the desired time frame of analysis.

Alternatively, if the particular simulation run continues beyond a reasonable depth such that
computational time and resources do become a challenge (to produce the complete State Tree), one
may decide on a preset depth limit by examining the desired time frame of analysis and estimated
transition time54 in the scenario.

53 As presented in Section 5.5.3, baseline configuration entails 10 agents, 3 objective dimensions, voting by simple majority, all agents by itself at
simulation start, uniform weights, alpha value of 2.7, and randomly initialized power and position parameters. The maximum depth of the
simulation is set to 50.

For example, if we estimate that each state transition takes one week, and our desired time frame of analysis is one calendar year, then a
reasonable depth limit can be set to a value slightly higher than 52 (as there are 52 weeks in a year).

54
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7.5.4 The SpatialSpatial-Utility Component

Since the process of coalition formation is largely dictated by the rules of interaction and agents’ utility
preferences, it is no exaggeration to say that the spatial-utility component of the model is an
indispensable part of the simulation. During the discussion of the simulation flow, we have offered
some meta-level descriptions on agents’ utility considerations while leaving out the its details. Here,
we revisit some key concepts for the spatial-utility component and discuss relevant experiments in the
context of the selected case studies.

The spatial-utility component is a system-level module that helps agents assign utility values to
different coalition memberships based on a wide range of input parameters including power, position
in the objective space, coalition structure, and weights (in weighted scenarios). Since the exact
definitions and clarifications can be found in Section 3.2.2, we focus on the role and application of the
spatial-utility component throughout our case studies here.

-

For the Syrian Civil War case, the spatial-utility component simply serves as an integral part
of the coalition dynamics model and help agents assign proper expected utility values on
different coalition moves or proposals;

-

For the Knesset governing coalitions case, we extend the coalition dynamics model by
introducing some adjustments to the spatial-utility component to account for the presence of

formateur advantage in forming governing coalitions;
-

In the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election scenario, we examine the empirical validity of the
spatial-utility component by applying it as a stand-alone module and analyze the predictor
power of the derived realizable utility values for different groups’ voting behavior.

Next, let us delve deeper into two important elements of the spatial-utility component and explain how
such values can be derived for our case studies.
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7.5.5 Power and Positions in the Real World

In the proposed collation dynamics model, power is defined as the agent’s ability to influence the
outcome in the competitive setting. The spatial-utility component uses the agent’s power with some
normalization, jointly with the realizable utility, to compute the expected utility. The power serves as
a probabilistic component in the utility computations, as a proxy for the likelihood of winning in the
competitive scenario. Winning in this context essentials means to enforce the coalition’s objective
position and fulfilling the associated payoffs based on the objective positions to its members.

As the context of the competitive setting changes, the list of real-world elements that constitute the
power also changes. For an armed conflict such as a civil war, the military and political resources are
the most important elements that makes up the power parameter in our model. To model the power
of different political parties in a legislature, the most straightforward and least controversial element
that is equivalent to the power concept would be simply each party’s number of seats. To best find the
elements that constitute power for a particular scenario, one may begin by asking a simple question:
what are some of the agent’s characteristics that will have the most significant impact on the outcome
of a potential conflict in the given scenario?

The positions of an agent should faithfully represent its stances on a set of issues in the scenario. To
derive the positions for individual agents, we must first construct a relevant objective space. The
objective space consists of different objective dimensions, which each represents the spectrum of
possible stances on a particular issue. To construct the objective space for a given scenario, we identify
a list of orthogonal issues (which then become the objective dimensions) that are essential to the
competitive setting. The positions of an agent in the constructed objective space is the derived by
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aggregating its position along individual objective dimensions. We elaborate on this process in the
ensuing case studies.
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7.6 Structure of the Case Studies

To facilitate the understanding of the procedure and findings, we maintain a consistent presentation
structure for the case studies while allowing for some variations to reflect different focus of analysis.
Each case study mainly consists of five parts:

-

Background: We begin each case study by presenting its context. Against the historical
backdrop, we then introduce the competing agents and major issues of contention. Depending
on the specific case, the agents could be warring factions, voter groups or political parties;
accordingly, the issues of contention may be derived from various sources of conflict, political
issues of debate in an election, or issues of debate in the legislature;

-

Scenario Analysis: We first discuss some unique characteristics of the presented case. Such
characteristics often play an important role in shaping our experimental design. At last, we
decide on necessary adjustments to the simulation setup or extensions to the model.

-

Data Collection and Methodology:
Methodology: We present the source data from which we derive the input
parameters, such as agent power, objective space dimensions and positions. More
importantly, we describe the motivation, methods and process of extracting the input
parameters from the original data.

-

Experimental
Experimental Design:
Design: In this part, we propose a set of experiments to investigate specific
aspects of the selected case and the coalition dynamics model itself. We also present a
summary of input parameters that are used throughout the proposed experiments.

-

Output Analysis:
Analysis: After the conclusion of the aforementioned experiments, we unveil the
output from the simulation runs. From the simulation output, we share key observations and
insights for the scenario. When applicable, we also discuss the implications of such
observations and insights to the empirical validity of the model.
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7.7 A Summary at the Beginning: Learnings and Recommendations

We provide here a preview to the learnings and recommendations for the ensuing case studies. The
motivations for this work are best summarized in three words: application, validation and exploration.

Application
Application

Through the consistent structure of analysis across three case studies, we showcase a repeatable endto-end process for applying the model to real-world situations. Specifically, we demonstrate the
important steps of data collection, model configuration, experimental design, and output analysis.
Some common questions addressed through the case studies are:

-

Data Collection & Model Configuration: (1) where and how to find reliable data sources for
modeling needs; (2) how to derive agent-level parameters from diverse data sources in a
systematic and scientific manner; (3) how to map the unique characteristics of the scenario
to system-level model configurations and adjustments;

-

Experimental
Experimental Design: (1) what aspects of the coalition dynamics are selected for modeling; (2)
what functionalities and features of the simulation are most relevant to the intended
investigations; (3) how to configure the simulation platform for different experiments;

-

Output Analysis: (1) how to interpret the simulation output; (2) what are relevant statistical
methods that can be employed.

With different focus across three cases, we also emphasize on the distinct approaches of application:

-

For the Syrian Civil War case, we fully utilize every component of the simulation platform in
modeling coalition dynamics. To support the design experiments, we introduce techniques to
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interrupt an ongoing simulation, take the intermediate output as the input, and alter some
parameters for a subsequent simulation. We also rely heavily on the State Tree representation
of the output for analysis and interpretation;
-

For the Knesset governing coalitions case, we scrutinize the unique characteristics of the
scenario due to the presence of a formateur. In particular, we demonstrate how easily we can
extend the model to account for the formateur’s proposal-selection power. The model output
is a ranked list of likely coalition outcomes. We investigate the model’s predictive power by
locating the real-world governing coalitions in such ranked lists;

-

In the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election scenario, we introduce a survey-based method for
deriving agents’ objective positions and apply the spatial-utility component of the model in
isolation. At last, we employ regression analysis to determine the relationship between the
model-derived utility value and group voting behavior.

Validation

An essential part of all three case studies is devoted to evaluating the model’s eternal validity, where
we analyze the simulated and real outcomes in the scenario. However, the exact scope and methods of
validation differ from case to case.

-

For the Syrian Civil War case, we focus on (1) the path-dependent stable states and (2)
responses of the model to changes in input parameters mid-simulation. We examine the
model’s external validity through historical data validation, entity-behavior tracing, and
conduct cross-model validation to compare the predictive power of existing models on
coalition dynamics;
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-

For the Knesset governing coalitions case, we review the model’s capability to predict pathindependent outcomes. From a ranked list of likely outcomes, we examine the model’s
external validity through historical data validation;

-

In the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election scenario, we investigate exclusively the spatial-utility
component of the model. This focus is motivated by our high confidence in the data validity in
this case so we can isolate the effects of potentially noisy or biased data. We had direct
collaboration with the subject matter expert and were able to derive key spatial-utility data
points from a large and credible dataset following a proven scientific approach. We examine
the external validity of the spatial-utility component indirectly by examinig its predictive
power for the groups’ voting decisions;

Exploration

In addition to the said motivations, we are ultimately motivated by the opportunity to apply and
validate our proposed model under a wide range of intriguing scenarios. The case studies take us
through a journey from tracking coalitions in the war-torn country of Syria, understanding people’s
political beliefs across the United States, to predicting the governing coalition in the Knesset. It brings
us great pleasure and pride to witness the model in action, as it guides us through such complex
scenarios and offer valuable insights on the subject of coalition dynamics.
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At last, we suggest a few possible readings of the case studies at last:

-

A handshands-on tutorial on modeling realreal-world coalition dynamics with our simulation platform:
we recommend readers to revisit Chapter 5 for a more detailed introduction of the simulation
platform, and read the ensuing case studies with a focus on the process of data collection,
model configuration, experimental design and output analysis;

-

An investigation of the model’s usability,
usability, validity,
validity, and extensibility:
extensibility: the readers are encouraged
to carefully follow each case’s sections on model configuration and output analysis. The crossmodel validation work in the Syrian Civil War and the regression-based analysis in the U.S.
President Election cases should be especially relevant and interesting;

-

A series of studies on realreal-world coalition dynamics using a quantitative approach: the sections
on background and scenario analysis may receive greater attention, as they offer a quick
introduction to the case with an emphasis on relevant characteristics of the scenario through
our perspectives.
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Chapter 8 Case Study: Syria Civil War (2011(2011-2017)
In this chapter, we explore the coalition dynamics in the ongoing Syrian civil war, one of the deadliest
conflicts the world has witness so far in this century [Ryan 2012, Lister 2016]. We begin by examining
its inception and the larger historical backdrop to better understand the causes of disagreement
amongst the warring factions. We then discuss a few key events of interest that would impact our
choice of parameters for the simulation, followed by a review of the data collection and model setup
process. Then we present the configuration specification for the relevant simulation runs, followed by
a thorough output analysis.

8.1 Background

Amidst the waves of uprisings in the Arab states that started in early 2010s, a number of states in North
Africa and the Middle East saw massive civil demonstrations, riots, military coups that either toppled
the regimes or led to sustained periods of civil wars [Anderson 2011, Lotan et al. 2011]. As a part of
this wider wave, large-scale protests against the incumbent regime of President Bashar al-Assad broke
out in Syria in early 2011, and quickly escalated to armed conflicts when the regime responded with
military violence. With the emergence of organized rebel forces aiming to overthrow the regime,
separatist ethnic populations seeking greater degree of autonomy, and armed religious extremist
groups seizing the power vacuum to expand territory, the situation in Syria became rather chaotic,
resulting in a seemingly never-ending conflict causing thousands of civilian deaths and millions of
refugee displacements. The civil war is only then further complicated and prolonged by external
countries’ (Russia, Iran U.S. and EU countries) support to opposing factions to ensure their core
political and strategic interests in the region. As we hold the view that most conflicts have their roots
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in deeper and historical disagreements over certain set of issues, we shall hereby provide a brief
historical context to the case.

After the period of French occupation (1917-20) and Mandate (1920-1946), Modern Syria finally
gained its independence in year 1947. The early decades of the new country underwent a series of
turbulent events, and eventually culminated in the coup by the Ba’ath party in 1964 [Fildis 2011,
Narbona 2007] and then the dictatorship of General Hafez al-Assad (the father of the incumbent Syrian
president). Ever since, country has been ruled exclusively by the al-Assad family, who strongly favored
their own Alawite community. This preferential treatment (in the form of granting disproportionate
number of high-level government posts and distribution of resources) has long bred discontent among
the Sunni majority in the country. When they saw the opportunity to “reclaim their fair share” through
either reform or revolution in the backdrop of “Arab Spring”, the initial civil unrests soon became the
Syrian civil war we see today. In the years that followed, with the government losing control over
extensive regions of the country, many other ethnic and extremist groups also rose against the regime,
hoping to achieve their respective objectives through victories in this conflict. In the interest of space,
we limit the discussion to the different factions and their primary conflict of interests in the general
framework of our multi-objective model.
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The Warring Factions

For clarity of presentation, we list the prominent groups in the scenario in the Table 8.1 along with a
brief description of their characteristics. Reader should be aware that due to variations in
categorization methodology and publication dates, some reports and analysis on the subject might
offer a different perspective on partitioning of groups in the Syrian civil war. Our version is in part
based on the Syria country report from the Master Narratives Platform, a collaboration between
Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center (OSC), Monitor 360, and other partner agencies
of the U.S. Government. The exact groups (and their characteristics and relevant quantitative metrics)
are reviewed and finalized by subject matter experts55 through the ACASA Lab led by Prof. Barry G.
Silverman at the University of Pennsylvania, in a project initiated in early 2016.

Major Sources of Conflict

With the help of SMEs on the project, we list the following major sources of conflict in the Syrian civil
war as following. They shall serve as the four objective dimensions along which we position individual
groups in the scenario.

•

Stance on Incumbent Government: how the group feels about rule of the dominant Alawite
minority government led by President al-Assad.

•

SunniSunni-Shia Alignment: where the group’s religious faith lies in the Sunni-Shia split.

•

ChurchChurch-State Separation: whether the group prefers a secular or religious society.

•

Brokered Peace: how strongly the group embrace a peaceful solution through negotiations
and compromises, rather than prolonged military conflicts.

55 We thank Prof. Barry G. Silverman, Dr. Gnana Bharathy, Nathan Weyer of the ACASA Laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania; we further
thank the team at Monitor 360, the government agency strategy consulting practice of Monitor Deloitte.
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Group
Pro Regimists

IRGC Hezbollah Shiite
Militias
Civil Society
Druze
Kurds PYD YPG
Tribes in South and East
Syria

Moderate Armed
Opposition (MAO) in
Northern Syria
Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria

Southern Front

Islamic State (ISIS)
Jabhat al Nursa
Sunni Islamists Hardliners

Description
The main support base for the incumbent government, consisting of
the Syrian armed forces, members of the Alawite community, nongovernment foreign militia who came into Syria (for either religious
or political motivations), and civilians who are enthusiastic
government loyalists.
The joint force by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (a branch of
the Iran’s Armed Forces), Hezbollah Brigades (an Iraqi Shia
paramilitary group supported by Iran) and Shia militia group from
Iraq.
The civilians who do not hold strong affiliation or support for any
particular groups in this conflict.
A minority (approx. 2% of the Syrian population, estimated to be
between 300-400,000) monotheistic Abrahamic religious group.
Several factions of the Kurdish militia (an ethnic minority in the
region, approx. 10-15% of the Syrian population, 2-2.5 million), with
goals for greater autonomy or independence.
The rural tribes with historical close ties to the al-Assad regime
(approx. 10% of the Syrian population). The tribes have mixed views
on the ongoing conflict. The tribes’ objectives are rather dynamic
and pragmatic in nature, due to their primary quest for survival and
prosperity.
“Moderate Armed Opposition” group in Northern Syria.
Formerly called “Islamic Socialist Front”, it is a branch of the Sunni
Islamic Muslim Brotherhood, loosely connected to the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood. It is commonly considered to be the most
powerful and organized force within the Syrian opposition (against
the government). [Carnegie Middle East Center]
The rebel alliance group consisting of some 50+ Syrian opposition
factions established in Southern Syria in early 2014. It is considered
to be a [Carter Center] loose coalition of self-claimed moderate
armed groups without core leadership or organization structure. It
is also considered to be the emerging and functional coalition of
opposition forces since the dwindling of Free Syrian Army (“FSA”) in
2014.
The jihadist, unrecognized proto-state and military group that
currently occupies parts of Syria and Iraq.
Formerly a branch of al Qaeda, and one of the biggest jihadist groups
in Syria and a close ally of ISIS.
A part of the rebel group that hold more strong religious belief and
seeking to establish a more theocratic form of government. Slightly
more moderate than the extremists.
Table 8.1: Major groups in Syria civil war
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A Note on Time Frame of Analysis and Scope of Modeling

While time itself is not modeled in the discrete-event simulation, it plays a crucial role on how we
configure our experiments and interpret the simulation output. Since the applicability of the
simulation results depends on the validity of its input parameters, a meaningful interpretation of the
results can only be made when the expected coalition dynamics occur prior to any major deviations
(changing priorities or fluctuations in power for example) from the input parameters included initial
conditions of the model.

We address this potential concern with two measures:

-

Clarify the overall time frame of analysis: as our data sources are largely from late 2011 to late
2017, we recommend limiting any meaningful interpretation of the simulation results to the
said time period;

-

Track such deviations in agentagent-level parameters and construct new simulations for the ensuing
dynamics: as we are to demonstrate with the changing priorities and power increase
experiments, the proposed model and simulation tool is extremely agile in adapting to such
changes in agent- or system- level parameters and continues to produce meaningful results
that reflect the observed changes in the real world.

Another concern that may arise has to do with the scope of the modeling work. As explained in Section
7.4, we do not model some sovereign states (Russia, Turkey or the United States) for example because
their pledged support for certain agents is often motivated by grander geopolitical objectives beyond
the Syrian situation itself. We therefore find it most appropriate and clear to model their involvement
as added power for their supported agents in the scenario. Such modeling practice is illustrated by the
proposed external intervention and group empower experiment.
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8.2 Scenario Analysis

In the past years of Syria civil war, we have witnessed various types and levels of dynamics. The
complications in this conflict involve external interventions, rise of previously unknown players and
shifting priorities for different groups in this conflict. Foreseeably, these developments alter key
characteristics of agents (position, power and weights over objective dimensions) which are the model
inputs, along with the evolution of coalition structure in the scenario.

It would be negligent to not assume this dynamic view of the groups’ individual characteristics in this
prolonged conflict, in addition to the coalition forming process itself. We select two events of interest
from the actual developments in the real world and discuss their respective impacts on the model’s
agent characteristics. In Section 8.3, we will discuss our construction of relevant simulation re-runs.
We outline two key set of events and their impacts on input parameters in the Table 8.2.
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Event Type
Changing
Priorities

External
Intervention
and Power
Increase

Related Events [Many
[Many News Citations]
Due to the rise of extremists (ISIS) in the regions
across Syria and Iraq, U.S.U.S.-backed rebels were
directed to direct their focus to fight ISIS (mid-2014
reports). Despite Western media reports claiming
the Assad regime’s lack of active interest in
fighting ISIS, other accounts and evidences do
indicate some level of increase in willingness to
eradicate the Islamic extremist group by the Assad
Regime and its Russian backer.

Russia’s continuous support (military and
diplomatic) to the Assad regime since the onset of
the civil war: military personnel under the guise of
military advisers were manning anti-aircraft
defenses from Russia (December 2012), increase in
military support through supply of advanced
military equipment (December 2013); direct
military intervention through air strikes
(September 2015)

Impact on Input Parameters
Minor increase in weight
over the “Church“Church-State
Separation” dimension for
the Pro Regimists
Moderate increase in
weight over the “Church“ChurchState Separation”
dimension for the
Opposition forces
Increase
Increase in Power for the
Pro Regimists
Increase in Power for the
Opposition forces (mainly:
MAO Northern Syria,
Southern Front, Kurds)

U.S. and other Western countries’ support (military,
(military,
financial and diplomatic) for the rebel groups:
groups
facilitation and enactment of sanctions against the
Assad regime (March 2011); covert operations
through CIA branches to aid opposition forces
through financing and training programs (20122014); resupply to Kurds and armed Syrian
opposition (October 2015).

Table 8.2: Events of Interest and their Impacts on Input Parameters
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8.3 Data Collection and Methodology

The chaotic situation in Syrian Civil War precludes accurate, timely collection of data on many aspects.
Fortunately, two prominent characteristics of this scenario come to rescue and ensure the relative
validity of our model. First, with the severely weakened Assad regime, there is little tangible

institutional enforcement for coalitions in the scenario. Therefore, the model’s underlying utilitarian
and myopic conditions remain valid. The lack of institutional enforcement also means there is little
exit/entry costs for coalition forming – such that the decision to join or leave a coalition should be
primarily based on the power-position related utility considerations. Second, as we have
demonstrated through formal analysis in Chapter 4, the objective position’s impact on coalitions far
outweighs that of the power ratio. Therefore, the model has higher error tolerance over power
parameters (which are the most difficult to collect with accuracy) and should still yield reasonable
output despite the limitations.

While the details of the source data can be found in Appendix B.6, we would provide an outline of our
general principles here.

•

Source Credibility:
Credibility from the carefully curated range of credible sources, we rank their
credibility in descending order as following: intergovernmental organization reports,

established education institution reports and publications, government reports from
countries not involved in the Syrian conflict, top-tier international news agencies, and
government reports from countries not directly involved in the Syrian conflict. This particular
ranking is based on the idea that places higher credibility on institutions with proper
investigative power and minimal conflict of interest.
•

SME Verification:
Verification all input data were reviewed by available Subject Matter Expert associated
with the ACASA Lab on the project.
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•

Composite Power:
Power the “normalized power” parameter is a normalized value of the composite
power. For civilian or government factions, the composite power includes both military and
non-military resources, with military resource being the main factor. For strictly military
factions (Rebel forces, ISIS, etc.), the composite power includes only their military resources.

Now, let us explore the coalition dynamics through our Coalition Dynamics platform.
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8.4 Experimental
Experimental Design

The simulation experiment for the Syrian Civil War case study consists of three interdependent parts.

•

Baseline:
Baseline: initialize the simulation with basic configurations and input parameters;

•

Changing Priorities: alter the weights over different objective dimensions to reflect changes in
priorities for certain agents, re-start the simulation from a known stable state;

•

External Intervention and Power Increase:
Increase: change the normalized power for certain agents, restart the simulation from a known stable state.

In the baseline experiment, we intend to perform historical data validation, by examining the stable
state coalition structure discovered in simulation and comparing it with the real-world developments.
In the other two experiments, we analyze the evolving dynamics after introduced changes in agent
characteristics. We investigate model validity by tracing entity behavior in the simulation output and
evaluate the model’s predictive power.

In the changing priorities experiment, we increase the Pro Regimists’ objective weight over “Churchstate Separation” dimension by 10% (while decreasing its weights over remaining objective
dimensions proportionally). We also increase two rebel groups’ (MAO Northern Syria, Southern Front)
objective weight over “Church-state Separation” dimension by 30%. The simulation is then re-started
with altered agent characteristics, with the initial coalition set to a previously known stable state.

In the external intervention and power increase experiment, we increase the Pro Regimists’
normalized power by 50%, and those of two rebel groups’ (MAO Northern Syria, Southern Front) by
10%. The simulation is then re-started with altered agent characteristics, with the initial coalition set
to a previously known stable state. We list the initial configuration for the simulation in Table 8.3, along
with the rationale for the choices. The detailed list of input parameters may be found in Appendix B.7.
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Row/Parameter Name

Value

Notes

Simulation Mode

Single Run

The “Single Run” configuration explores the entire
spectrum of possible coalition dynamics when all input
parameters for the simulation are available and
deterministic.

Number of Objectives

4

Four major sources of conflict in the scenario have been
identified.

Use Weight

Yes

We consider the impact of weights in the scenario.

Number of Agents

12

A total of 12 agents exist in the scenario.

Initial Coalitions

All-alone

The different warring factions somehow emerged
spontaneously during the “Arab Spring” period, and
therefore for initial coalition structure it would be fair to
consider them to be all by oneself.

Number of Runs

N/A

In the single run scenario, this function is disabled (as it
automatically defaults to 1. In the Monte Carlo setup, this
dictates total number of runs that will be completed.

Alpha Constant

3.0

The tuning parameter for the Expected Utility Function, as
mentioned in Section 5.3.3, “A Minor Adjustment to the
Baseline Model”. The recommended value is 2.7 for
scenarios with no more than 3 objective dimensions. We
have decided to use a slightly higher alpha value of 3.0
since there are 4 objective dimensions in our scenario.

Voting Style

Simple Majority

The agents in this scenario might not be very interested in
full-consent conditions, but rather to maximize their
expected utility whenever convenient.

Max. Depth

50

At a frequency of one coalition shift per 2 weeks, this
simulation explores approximately 2 years of coalition
dynamics. Also, based on our earlier observations from
Chapter 5, it is unlikely to evolve beyond depth of 50.

Table 8.3: Configuration Page Parameters
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8.5 A Short WalkWalk-through of the Experiment Procedures

Since this is the first case study of the series, we find it important to present a walk-through of the
experimental procedures as an example. The process of running such a simulation is very intuitive and
simple, as we demonstrate by going through all three phases of the simulation with the baseline
experiment: the input and configuration, runtime, and results. More details on the simulation platform
can be found in Section 5.4.

8.5.1 The Input and Configuration

In this phase, we enter the system-level and agent-level input parameters; this can be done either by
manually entering them in the simulation platform user interface, or by importing a ready-to-use
configuration file (via the “load configuration” option under the “Files” tab). Such configuration file can
be either created with any script-editing tool, or with the input and configuration view of the platform.
To save a configuration file for the manually entered input parameters, one may simply use the “save

configuration” option.

In Figure 8.1, we can find the input parameters at a glance: the upper part of the page displays the
system-level parameters, and the lower part of the page displays the individual agent characteristics.
For the “Initial Coalitions” entry which asks for the initial coalition structure, we enter the agent IDs
separated by spaces indicating that they are all-alone at the start of the simulation.

Since we are in the Single Run mode, we select “Constant Power” under the “Power Distribution”
Column, and exact numbers for each agent. Same is done for each agent’s position parameters. The
agent’s position parameters are displayed at the bottom of this page, for the agent selected.
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Figure 8.1: Input and Configuration View for the Syrian Civil War Baseline Experiment
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8.5.2 The Runtime

After verifying the input parameters, we proceed to the “Run Simulation” tab and click “Start” to start
the simulation. The progress bar (partly blue and partly grey/empty) indicates the estimated progress
of the simulation. The text box occupying the main body of this page updates with the background
simulation computations, with each line displaying the coalition structure being investigated and
resulting reachable states.

At the end of the simulation run, a brief summary is printed out, with information on the total
number of coalitions structures explored during the run, and number of loop nodes found.

Figure 8.2: Runtime View for the Syrian Civil War Baseline Experiment
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8.5.3 The Results

Guidelines on interpreting the results view have been provided in Section 5.4.3, so we focus on a few
key findings on the baseline experiment shown in Figure 8.3:

-

Nodes Visited: a total of 4,500 coalition structures are found in the “State Tree”;

-

Nodes Created: a total of 82,121 coalition structures were evaluated as the simulation
platform explored reachable states;

-

Depth Reached: the farthest state is found at depth 23, and the max depth limit of 50 was not
reached during this simulation run;

-

Initial Coalitions: the coalition structure at the beginning of the simulation;

-

Terminal States: only 1 terminal state (stable state) is found;

-

Looped Nodes Detected: 1,754 states are found to be part of some loop.

Overall, the key metrics from the simulation output suggest a high level of coalition dynamics of the
simulated scenario under the Simple Majority voting procedure, in accordance with our expectations
based on findings from Section 6.4.1 where we investigated the impact of voting procedures on the
level of dynamics. As a reference, in the same setting but with Unanimous voting procedure, we found
only 360 nodes visited, 9,404 nodes created, depth reached at 7, 1 terminal state and 0 loop nodes

detected.

In the lower part of the page, the user interface allows us to explore the interconnections between the
states via the state selector, displaying each state’s “parents” (states from which the selected state can

be reached) and “children” (states to which the selected state can reach). The mapping between the
factions and the agent ID can be found in the Input and Configuration view in Figure 8.1 and the local
configuration file. The results can also be saved to a file in CSV format.
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Figure 8.3: Results View for the Syrian Civil War Baseline Experiment

While such details are nice in the user interface, we often would prefer a “bird’s-eye view” of the results.
Unsurprisingly, such view is best captured with the visualization based on the State Tree structure.
Due to the enormity of the output from the baseline experiment run (which contains 4,500 nodes and
40,959 edges), its State Tree visualization would perhaps defy understanding given its size. Instead,
we plot the State Tree for the same experiment configuration under the Unanimous voting procedure
to offer a glimpse of its shape: with 2,024 edges and 360 nodes, we plot the valid states and their
interconnections in Figure 8.4, with the initial state at the top, and the terminal state at the bottom.
The intermediate states are crammed and overlapping in the illustration due to the scaling limits of a
static output for the State Tree representation. We plot the State Tree visualization again during
ensuing output analysis for more manageable situations.
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Figure 8.4: State Tree Result Visualization for the Unanimous-voting Counterpart of the Baseline Experiment
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8.6 Output Analysis
The primary focus of this section is to review the validity of the simulated coalition dynamics in the
Syria scenario. Specifically, we are interested in comparing the predicted stable coalition topologies
and evolutionary path in three different experiments with the historical data from the real world.

8.6.1 Baseline Experiment Output

In the baseline experiment, the simulation reached its stable state at depth 7, with coalition structure
plotted in Figure 8.1 below. The size or position of the text boxes containing the group names do not
bear any meaning. It is important to not confuse the stability in coalition dynamics with the real-world
idea for the term. While stability in a war-torn country is often associated with peace, a stable state in
the coalition dynamics context is merely a game theoretical concept when no agents in the scenario
are able to improve its utility by making any move.

Figure 8.5: Stable Coalition Structure for Syria Scenario, Baseline Simulation
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The coalition structure does well correspond to the early reports on the Syrian situation. At a glance,
the Pro Regimists (the Assad Regime) are supported by IRGC [Tanter 2017]; the Druze and Kurds are
in solidarity with the Civil Society [Mazur 2015, Mahmoud & Rosiny 2016]. More importantly, a faction
of the rebels (the Southern Front in our scenario) is in alliance with the Islamic Extremist forces: ISIS,
al Nursa and Sunni Islamists Hardliners. Given the high priority the rebel group had to “overthrow the
incumbent regime”, it is not quite unexpected to foresee such a possible coalition. Reports from several
top news agencies in 2014 do indeed confirm the occurrence of such an alliance.56

Now that we have tested the model’s ability to faithfully replicate real-world results, let us explore the
evolving coalition dynamics when the agents’ characteristics are altered.

56 See original media report via Al Jazeera:
Jazeera http://aje.me/1gIGU73 and Washington Post:
http://wapo.st/1BsTggW?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.4af430006727
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8.6.2 Changing Priorities Experiment Output

From the baseline experiment, we have discovered a stable state that is a fairly accurate representation
of the real-world coalition structure. In the changing priorities experiment, we study the evolving
coalition dynamics from the discovered stable state, when the priorities of certain agents are altered.
Specifically, we are to increase the weight factor over the “Church-state Separation” objective
dimension for both Pro Regimists and the Southern Front, to reflect their shared concern for the rise
of Islamist Extremists (ISIS) in later stages of the Syrian civil war.

To fully explore the impact of changed priorities, we produced two independent simulation runs, with
different incremental values to the weight factor. In CP1 configuration we increase in weight parameter
by 0.1 (the weight parameter ranges from 0 to 1 in our model) over the selected objective dimension
for both Pro Regimists and the Southern Front, and in CP2 configuration we increase the weight
parameter by 0.8 for both agents.

Figure 8.6 a: Stable Coalition Structure from CP1 Simulation

Figure 8.6 b: Stable Coalition Structure from CP2 Simulation

Figure 8.6: New Stable Coalition Structures from the Changing Priorities Experiments

As we can see from Figure 8.6 a-b above, the small change in priorities leads to a quick coalition switch
for the Southern Front (left the extremists coalition and joined alliance with the Moderate Armed
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Opposition forces, in one iteration). On the contrary, the greater change in priorities leads to more
complex coalition dynamics: in addition to the same coalition switch for the Southern Front, the Pro
Regimists left the alliance with IRGC to join forces with Civil Society, Druze and Kurds.

The shifting relationship between the rebels and the extremist groups predicted by both simulations
have indeed been observed in the real-world57. However, since a drastic increase (as CP2 configuration
suggests) for the weight factor in “Church-state Separation” objective dimension is rather unlikely and
yet to happen in the actual world, the predicted dynamics cannot be properly validated by comparing
it to nonexistent historical data.

Nevertheless, some recent developments do lend us some clues on the validity of the prediction. The
Assad regime has been considering granting Kurds greater autonomy58 as of mid 2017, and the YPG
(Kurdish military forces) is said to have collaborated with the government in some circumstances. The
“frenemy” relationship between the duo does somewhat imply a chance of alliance in some distant
future59. During the revision of this work, news broke that the Syria’s Kurds have formally asked the
Assad government for protection.

In the simulation output from CP2 configuration, we also observe the decision for the Pro Regimists to
abandon their alliance with IRGC. This is a rather unexpected act, but reasonable after understanding
the implications of the altered priorities. Essentially, if the Assad regime decides to have high priority
on the issue of church-state separation, it will eventually upset its ally from the highly religious state.
While such a rift has not occurred (or been reported), there have reportedly 60 been some
disagreements regarding Syria’s future among the members of the pro-Assad alliance.

See original media reports via the Israeli National
National News:
News http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/229578, and RT:
RT
https://www.rt.com/news/401672-syria-rebel-isis-us-weapons/
58 See original media report via Reuters:
Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds/damascus-says-syrian-kurdishautonomy-negotiable-report-idUSKCN1C10TJ
59 See original media report via the New York Times:
Times https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-turkey-manbij.html
57

See original media report via the Telegraph:
Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11973660/Russia-stance-onAssad-suggests-divergence-with-Iran.html
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In conclusion, the evolving coalition dynamics with altered priorities from our simulation are largely
aligned with the real-world developments. Its predictions are also plausible based on available reports
on the Syrian situation.
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8.6.3 Power Increase Experiment Output

In the power increase experiment, we study the evolving coalition dynamics when the normalized
power values of certain agents are altered. Accordingly, we are to increase the normalized power value
for both Pro Regimists and the Southern Front, to reflect the external interventions [Stent 2016,
Blanchard et al. 2014] (Russian Federation’s military support to the Assad regime, and United States’
aid to the rebels, respectively) that have empowered both groups.

We increase both agents’ normalized power value by 100% from the CP1 configuration, then reinitialize the simulation from the known stable state. The resulting new stable coalition structure is
shown in Figure 8.8. Apparently, this change does not have much impact on coalition dynamics, as the
agents remain in the previous stable state.

The predicted coalition dynamics (or rather the lack thereof) do indeed correspond well to the realworld developments in Syria: the situation has remained in stalemate ever since, with dimming hope
of any imminent peace agreement between the rebel groups and the incumbent regime.

In addition to the simulation, we are also able to find some evidence to support the validity of some
previously discovered characteristics of our coalition dynamics. As concluded in Section 4.3.1

Interaction between the Duo, the coalition-forming distance (maximum distance in the objective space
for two groups to form a coalition) decreases as the power ratio between the duo increases. The realworld implication of this conclusion suggests that when one group of the duo becomes overwhelmingly
more powerful, all others being equal, it is less likely for the duo to form a coalition. Several reports on
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the Syrian situation have re-affirmed this idea, suggesting that the increasingly more powerful Assad
regime is now much less likely61 to return to peace talks with the rebel forces.

Figure 8.7: Stable Coalition Structure from GE Simulation

See original media report via the Washington Post:
Post http://wapo.st/2kOmmYz?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.9a6f73365748, Newsweek:
Newsweek
http://www.newsweek.com/bashar-al-assad-says-he-ready-negotiate-everything-new-peace-talks-540311,
and
Reuters:
Reuters
http://reut.rs/1Uu5C3n
61
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8.7 CrossCross-Model Validation

As the one of the most prominent ongoing intrastate conflicts in the decade, the Syrian civil war is
undoubtedly among the most well-documented wars in history. The ongoing conflict has drawn longlasting worldwide attention due to three main factors: the refugee problem arising from the
humanitarian crisis [Ostrrand 2015], the intervention from major global powers [Stent 2016], and the
widespread access to internet (social media in particular) in the war-torn country [Klausen 2015].

This last worldwide attention has produced massive amount of data over the full spectrum of details
in the Syrian civil war, through media coverage and reports by international institutions at large. The
plethora of data and the variety of dynamics in the scenario therefore allows us to conduct proper
validation of our model with sufficient robustness. This is a rather rare opportunity since very few
intrastate conflicts in the past century have comparable amount of reliable data or level of dynamical
complexity. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to consider the Syrian civil war as a fairly ideal
case to conduct cross-model validation, as it entails sufficient data for thorough review and
comparative analysis of the predictive power of existing models on coalition dynamics.

The two other prominent theoretical frameworks on coalition dynamics are the Minimum Winning
Coalition (MWC) model from the International Relations field, and the Spatial Theory model from the
Legislative Competition field62. We have therefore selected them for the cross-validation analysis in
this section. Adapting our existing coalition dynamics simulation platform to replicate the setup of the
two alternative coalition models is a reasonably easy task, thanks to their conceptual affinity to the
power and spatial-utility sub-components in our proposed framework.

62

Readers may revisit Chapter 2 of this work to review the details of the relevant models on coalition dynamics.
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The MWC PowerPower-based Model

The MWC model, as introduced in Section 2.1.1, focuses largely on the power aspect of coalition
dynamics. The original alliance formation model [Riker 1973] studies the scenario of three
independent agents, with the intention to explain the motivation behind “balancing” and “bandwagon”
behaviors against the identified “aggressor”. Limited by the complexity of analysis via logical
inductions, the original model does not consider scenarios with more than three agents. Furthermore,
there is no clear guidance on how the “aggressor” may be properly identified in an intrastate conflict.

Therefore, it is quite challenging to find an exact heuristic interpretation of the MWC model in the
multi-party context. Instead, we elect to adapt our own coalition model by eliminating the impact of
objective positions in utility computations, so that only the power values are taken into consideration
in the scenario by assigning identical objective positions for all agents. The coalition dynamics become
extremely simple and consistent in this setting as well, essentially voiding the need for computational
simulation – when no aggressor is defined, all agents eventually form a grand coalition.

Alternatively, with a loose interpretation of the minimum winning coalition concept, we may seek to
find the minimum number of agents that jointly have the absolutely dominant power in the scenario.
And in the case of Syrian civil war, we would expect to see the emergence of a “dominating” coalition
of the Pro Regimists with the Civil Society (59.3% combined normalized power) or the Pro Regimists
with the Kurds (51.2% combined normalized power).

Both results are clearly very far away from the actual coalition dynamics in the scenario. Given the
aforementioned limitations of the WMC model, the finding is not quite unexpected.
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The Spatial Theory Model

The Spatial Theory model [Laver 2011] focuses exclusively on the objective spatial-utility aspect of
coalition dynamics. We simply modify our own coalition model by eliminating the impact of power in
utility computations by assigning identical power values for all agents. Not surprisingly, in Figure 8.9’s
visualization of the ensuing coalition dynamics, we observe a slightly different coalition dynamics from
the spatial model but an identical stable state, due to the objective space’s comparatively greater
impact on utility (than power factors). This finding further confirms the validity of our proposed
framework.

However, it is important to know, that the Spatial Theory model only produces static stable states in
isolation of the evolutionary coalition dynamics (as there are no path-tendency concepts or
considerations in such models). Its results cannot be used to build a State Tree or any similar
structures that helps us to understand the evolutionary process in coalition formation.

Figure 8.8: Stable Coalition Structure from the Spatial Model (Weighted)
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8.8 Findings and Reflections from the Syrian Civil War

In this chapter, we applied the proposed coalition dynamics framework to the real-world scenario of
a civil war and conducted thorough analysis of the simulation output under different themes. Since this
is the first case study of the series, we dedicate a good part of this chapter to a detailed description of
the experiment process, presenting a step-by-step explanation for all phases of a simulation run and
various possible formats of the simulation results.

To model the Syrian Civil War scenario, we first identified 4 major sources of conflict as the objective
dimensions in the model, and curated parameter values for the baseline experiment configuration.

For the validation part of this work, we were able to establish the model’s external validity through

historical data validation process. In addition to the baseline experiment, we reviewed two other cases
with altered agent characteristics and analyze how changes in these parameters would lead to further
coalition dynamics from a known stable state. While the real-world developments only match part of
the initialization conditions in the altered cases, we were able to employ entity behavior tracing
technique to review the soundness of the underlying logic for affected agents with reference to some
in-depth reports on Syria civil war.

Additionally, we compared the simulated coalition dynamics to the real-world developments and
results from comparable models. We successfully conducted the basic level of “sanity check” on the
model’s validity. Additionally, by introducing the subsequent changes to agent characteristics, we were
able to predict possible deviations from the baseline case. We then evaluated the plausibility of such
deviations and demonstrate the model’s agility in modeling even more complex scenarios. Such
accuracy and agility lay strong foundations for our work in ensuing case studies.
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Chapter 9 Case Study: Governing Coalitions in the 19th and 20th
Knesset
In this Chapter, we apply a set of coalition formation theories (including our own proposed model) to
the Knesset’s governing coalition structures and compare their respective theoretical validity. We
begin with an introduction to the procedure of forming governing coalitions in the Knesset and discuss
their implications to our analysis. In subsequent sections, we look into multiple data sources on
different aspects of the coalition formation across multiple Knesset terms. We then explore theoretical
validity of all three models: The Minimum Winning Coalition (WMC) power-based model, the Spatial

Theory model, and the proposed Coalition Dynamics framework. At closing, we discuss potential
adaptations to the proposed framework to better model coalition dynamics in the particular context
of forming a governing coalition from an elected legislature.

9.1 Background

According to the Basic Laws of Israel (Hebrew: [ )היסוד חוקיNavot 2007], national elections to the
Knesset occur every four years unless circumstances demands an early election (such as dissolution
of the Knesset or the government). Further, the law dictates, “The Knesset shall be elected by general,

national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law.”
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs further elaborates on the characteristics of the election process
as following [Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018]:

•

General: On election day, voters cast one ballot for a political party to represent them in the
Knesset. Every Israeli citizen aged 18 or older has the right to vote.

•

National:
National The entire country constitutes a single electoral constituency.
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•

Direct:
Direct The Knesset is elected directly by the voters, not through a body of electors.

•

Equal:
Equal: All votes cast are equal in weight.

•

Secret: Elections are by secret ballot.

•

Proportional: The 120 Knesset seats are assigned in proportion to each party’s percentage of
the total national vote. However, the minimum required63 for a party to win a Knesset seat is
3.25% of the total votes cast.

While we are to primarily concern ourselves with the coalition formation process which occurs only

after the Knesset election, there are two noteworthy characteristics of the Knesset that greatly
influence its dynamics: fragmentation and ease-of-dissolution.

Fragmentation

Due to the Proportional mandate and a low qualifying threshold in the election process, it is relatively
easier for political parties in Israel to enter the Knesset than for their foreign counterparts. In
comparison, the election threshold to enter national legislature is 5% for New Zealand, Poland, Russia
and Germany [Vowles 2018, Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier 2016, Bauer & Schulte 2017]; there are rarely
any third-party (neither Republican nor Democrat) representatives [Schattschneider 2017] in the
United States House of Representatives. Naturally, the low barrier to entry definitely encouraged
political groups representing different interests to put in their bids (and win), as reflected in the
number of political parties over many terms of the Knesset. As the detailed counts in Figure 9.1 show,
there have been exceptionally many political groups in the Knesset since its inception in 1949.

63 The qualifying threshold for a political party to win sufficient votes to enter the Knesset has evolved (increased) over time: it was 1% for the
First through Twelfth Knesset (Year 1949 - 1988), 1.5% from the Thirteenth through Sixteenth Knesset (Year 1992 - 2003), then raised to 2% for
the Seventeenth through Nineteenth Knesset (Year 2006 – 2013), and finally to 3.25% from the Twentieth Knesset (2015) until now.
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The exceptional electoral volatility and fragmented political landscape in the Knesset make it an ideal
context to study coalition dynamics. The volatility leads to a high turnover rate for the political groups
in the Knesset over different terms and offers many terms of Knesset with different political group
composition. Meanwhile, the fragmentation yields an average of more than 20 political groups per
Knesset term, hence welcoming the application of coalition models to the situation. The fragmentation
originates from the fact that almost any political group that is able to find a sufficiently large electorate
base (correspondingly, a group of voters with some unifying political agenda or preference) is
encouraged to do so and given a good chance of winning representation in the Knesset [Nachmias 1974,
Renshon et al. 2016, Kook 2017, Nikolenyi 2019]. Expectedly, we are to observe a highly diverse
portfolio of political positions across a wide range of issues.

Figure 9.1: Number of Political Groups64 in the First through Twenty-First Knesset

64 Single Member of the Knesset (MK) are counted as a political group of its own. For example, the Ninth Knesset had 9 single MKs, thus leading to
its highest in history group count of 35. Furthermore, political groups may dissolve and emerge during one term of the Knesset - thus the count is
often higher than the number of political groups at the inception of a Knesset term.
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EaseEase-ofof-Dissolution

While each Knesset is elected for a four-year term, it is not unusual for the Knesset to agree upon its
premature dissolution before the term ends. As the Basic Laws provides in Section 28 (b):

An expression of no confidence in the Government shall be done by means of a resolution of
the Knesset, adopted by the majority of its Members to express confidence in another
Government that announced basic guidelines of its policy, its make-up and the distribution of
functions among Ministers, as stated in article 13 (d). The new Government shall be
established once the Knesset has expressed confidence in it, and from that time the Ministers
shall go into office.

Of the most recent five Knesset terms (Seventeenths through Twenty-First, in years 2006 - Present),
only the Eighteenth Knesset served even close to its full four-year term, and all five65 of them (including
the incumbent 21st Knesset) ended in premature dissolution. Further, any member can withdraw its
support for the governing coalition such that if the total number MKs in the governing coalition drops
below 61 seats, a new governing coalition must be formed without necessarily dissolving the Knesset.
In the first seven Knesset terms (years 1949-1970), seventeen governing coalitions were formed and
disbanded [Nachmias 1974].

The ease-of-dissolution has profound positive implications on the non-binding premise of the coalition
dynamics framework described in Section 4.2 of this work66. It affirms the relatively weak institutional
enforcement of the coalition in the Knesset, effectively skewing the environment for coalition
dynamics towards the non-binding case. More importantly, the ease-of-dissolution impels the political

The incumbent 21st Knesset, has just been dissolved at the time of this writing, and an election for the 22nd Knesset is scheduled in late 2019.
The three assumptions of the setup for our proposed coalition dynamics framework are: rational (agents), non-binding (coalitions), and
transparent (information).
65
66
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groups in the Knesset to regularly evaluate the viability of the governing coalition. It also compels the

formateur, the party selected to make proposals and form a governing coalition, to take a Markovian
approach in evaluating the feasibility and stability of the proposed coalition, such that the formed
coalition cannot be easily dissolved due to potential member defections.

Formateur and Formation
Formation of governing coalitions

After the Knesset election, the President of the State assigns the task of forming the government to a
Knesset member. The MK is usually the leader of the party with the largest Knesset representation, or
the head of the party that leads a coalition with more than 60 members [Spyer 2013]. Since the
government requires the Knesset’s confidence to function, a coalition (that includes the MK’s own
party by default) must be formed, consisting of at least than 61 MKs such that the governing coalition
always has enough votes to win a simple majority (more than half) in the 120-person Knesset.

The selected MK and their affiliated political group is therefore considered the formateur by definition.
The coalition is formed from the political groups in the Knesset, not individual MKs. The formateur
must present the proposed coalition in the given period of time, and the government is only installed
if such proposed coalition consists of at least 61 MKs from the member political groups.

Major Issues of Debate in the Knesset over time

In nearly seven decades of Israeli politics, many issues of debate in the Knesset have come and gone.
When predecessor to the Knesset, the Constituent Assembly, was born in the turmoil of war in 1948,
the nation was still in its nascence. Understandably, in its early days, the Knesset largely focused on
issues pertaining to nation building [HaKnesset 1950, Kohn 1954]: the foundations for a democratic
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state (legislation), Zionism movements (immigration), the development plan (economy) and armistice
agreements with the Arab states (security).

Over the ensuing years, the Knesset debated on a wide range of issues [Begin 1973, Rapoport & Weg
1986] such as judicial system reforms, regulatory changes for businesses, civil liberties and property
rights. More recently, the Twentieth Knesset was pondering over the balance between “a Jewish state”
and “a state of all its citizens” [The Times of Israel 2015], causing heated debates over the core values
of the state.

Nevertheless, we observe a few recurring, salient themes of debate throughout Israeli politics [Peretz
2018, Schiff 2018, Renshon et al. 2016]:

•

The nature of the state of Israel:
Israel the group’s preference between a secular democracy and a
nation-state of the Jewish people

•

National security:
security the group’s stance on Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflict

•

SocioSocio-economic:
economic the group’s position along the left-right dimension on economic and social
issues

Accordingly, we construct the coalition dynamics model for the 19th and 20th Knesset (year 2013 and
2015) with objective dimensions based on the aforementioned themes of debate.
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9.2 Scenario Analysis

To construct a faithful model for coalition dynamics in the context, we must consider a few prominent
elements of the coalition formation process in the Knesset – and configure or adjust our framework so
that we may most appropriately model the intricacies of the process and yield meaningful results.
Specifically, we are to discuss the details and empirical impact of these elements, and propose how
they can be effectively brought into our existing coalition dynamics framework.

9.2.1 The Existence of a Formateur

The coalition formation process within the Knesset is a fairly deliberate one, compared to the scenarios
with limited institutional enforcement or formal procedure. Essentially, the chosen formateur must
conceive of a coalition proposal such that (1) the coalition is sufficiently large in size, (2) the proposal
is acceptable to all member groups, and (3) if possible, the proposed coalition structure maximizes the
formateur’s own interest. The unique characteristics brought by the introduction of a formateur to the
process demand we introduce a few accommodations in our existing coalition dynamics framework:

•

Focus on the Stability of the States, not the Path:
Path since the formateur is to evaluate and propose
the composition of the governing coalition67, we are less interested in the sequence of states
(coalition topology) that preceded the stable states or the idea of path-dependency. We also
do not need to consider the associated concepts68 such as the reachability and the state trees.

67 In the Knesset’s coalition formation process, the political groups that are not included in the proposed governing coalition automatically
becomes a coalition of their own conveniently considered as the “opposition” to the governing coalition. Also, we are primarily interested only in
the governing coalition for the scope of this study.
68

The concept of reachability may be revisited in Section 3.2.1 of this work, and state trees in Section 3.4.2.
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•

ConstantConstant-Sum Payoff to the Qualifying Coalition States:
States in addition to the utility computations
set forth in the existing framework, we introduce a constant-sum payoff that can be
distributed to the members of a proposed coalition with more than 61 MKs. This payoff
properly captures the utility value associated with the formation of a governing coalition. We
discuss its magnitude and distribution to different member groups in ensuing sections.

•

Preference Ranking based on Robustness and Formateur’s Utility: previously, we have withheld
from an extensive discussion the likelihood of the system reaching a particular equilibrium
(out of many possible equilibria) from the utility perspective. This deliberate choice was
largely influenced by the premise that no single dominant group may be able to exert
overwhelmingly powerful influence in the coalition formation process. However, this premise
would not hold well in the context Knesset, given the extraordinary powers vested in the
formateur. Therefore, we find it interesting, if not necessary, to construct a ranking of all stable
states (i.e. viable coalition proposals) based on the formateur’s perception of utility and
robustness. We discuss the methods for computing utility and robustness at length in
subsequent sections.
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9.2.2 Utility Computations
Computations

Since the utility consideration has always been critical to our prediction of coalition dynamics, we must
take into account a few details on utility payoffs associated with governing coalitions in the Knesset.
Specifically, we discuss the types of payoffs and bargaining in a non-homogeneous setting.

Types of Payoffs

Extant studies on the Knesset and coalition governments [Nachmias 1974, Hobolt & Karp 2010]
suggest that the payoffs to members of the governing coalition mainly come in two forms, influence
and control.

The influence is a less tangible yet effective capability to control the Cabinet, upheld by the principle
of joint collective responsibility [Nachmias 1974, Goldberg 2004]. The principle serves not only as a
stabilizing function by encouraging (if not enforcing) consensus building among the members of the
governing coalition, but also reinforces the formateur’s dominance. For the scope of our work, we
consider the influence payoffs 69 as the enhanced capabilities for the member parties to influence
policy-making process both in the Knesset and government.

The control is a more institutionalized form of payoffs, associated with the allocation of posts in the
Knesset and the Cabinet. Various chairmanships in the Knesset often bear great procedural influence
over the legislation process. These Cabinet posts vary in significance based on their functions and
budgets. In fiscal year 2017, the 5 largest ministries by budget 70 (out of 30 ministries in total)

The influence payoffs might often be favorably distributed towards the formateur [Ansolabehere et al. 2005, Silva 2016]. Nevertheless, it is fair
to suggest that all members of the governing coalition receive some levels of the influence payoff.

69

70 The five largest ministries by budget in fiscal year 2017 were: (Ministry of) Education, Defense, Health, Public Security and Justice. The five
ministries jointly controlled NIS 157,643,196,000 out of the year’s regular budget of NIS 319,811,843,000.
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controlled nearly 50% of the regular government budget. For the scope of our work, we consider the

control payoffs as the capabilities to control certain functions of the government and access to their
respective budgets.

We argue that the two forms of payoffs, influence and control, can be collectively treated as one
constant-sum payoff to the governing coalition, in addition to the expected utilities payoff to individual
members based on spatial-utility factors (objective positions, coalition landscape and normalized

power). This additional, constant-sum payoff is distributed among all members of the governing
coalition regardless of their objective positions, coalition landscape or normalized power; its
distribution to individual members should be governed by Gamson’s Law in principle, while subject to
a potential bargaining process in the non-homogeneous setting.

Bargaining in A NonNon-Homogenous Setting

In Section 2.2.3, we reviewed Gamson’s Law of Proportionality [Gamson 1961] which states that the
allocation of cabinet posts is predominately determined by the share of seats in the legislature; it
further concludes that there is no formateur advantage in the bargaining process since the rewards
are shared proportionally. At the time, we elected not to delve into details of the theory since we were
primarily interested homogenous games where a formateur is absent. The Gamson’s Law serves as an
empirical observation that helps extend our model to a non-homogenous setting since it proposes a
clear distribution pattern of additional payoffs associated with the governing coalition.

Some studies in recent years [Schnose 2016, Falcó-Gimeno & Indridason 2013, Cutler et al. 2016]
present findings in different parliamentary democracies that contradicts Gamson’s Law. In particular,
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Schnose [Schnose 2016] argues that when a formateur party has weak bargaining power, it is better
off by over-compensating a coalition partner for stability considerations; Falcó-Gimeno and
Indridason [Falcó-Gimeno & Indridason 2013] suggest that many allocations depart “systematically”
from perfect proportionality, and the “regression” towards Gamson’s Law occurs only when the
formateur fails to exploit its advantage.

However, we believe these findings fail to credibly challenge our interpretation of the Gamson’s Law
in the context of coalition formation. First, the focus on allocation of cabinet posts neglects the
differences in value between the posts within a portfolio. This particular omission in both recent
studies [Schnose 2016, Falcó-Gimeno & Indridason 2013] and the original work [Gamson 1961] leads
to deviation from a perfect proportional distribution. Additionally, we argue that the foremost
advantage given to a formateur is its ability to select the most favorable composition for the governing
coalition based on stability and utility considerations. Further, we believe while the formateur may
either reward itself or some coalition partner more than what strict proportional allocation postulates,
the overall distribution should not deviate greatly from the Gamson’s Law.
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9.2.3 Plausible Adaptations to the Coalition Dynamics Model

Now that we have established the two unique elements of the coalition formation process in the
Knesset, we outline changes to the existing model to incorporate the duo’s impact on coalition
dynamics. Specifically, we address ways to incorporate the non-homogeneity and additional payoffs
into the model.

NonNon-Homogeneity and Formateur

To deal with the non-homogeneity nature of the setting due to the prominent role of the formateur, we
may well omit the path-dependency considerations for coalition dynamics since the formateur actively
evaluates and proposes feasible coalition constructs. Instead, we focus on an exhaustive search of all

internally stable coalition proposals for which no member of the governing coalition may be better off
by leaving the coalition.

We further propose three ranking mechanisms to reflect the formateur’s exclusive right to construct
the governing coalition to maximizes its self-interest, from the set of all feasible coalition proposal. In
later analysis we intend to compare the highly ranked scenarios with real-world outcomes so as to
evaluate the reliability of our predictions.

The first two rankings are largely based on utility considerations, with reference to the results from
spatial-utility computations and the additional payoffs from the governing coalition:

•

Ranking by formateur’s share of utility payoffs from the proposed coalition, which consists of
its expected spatial-utility payoffs plus its share of the additional payoffs proportionally
distributed following Gamson’s Law;
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•

Ranking by the aggregated utility payoffs of all members in the proposed coalition, which is
the sum of each member’s expected utilities payoff from coalition membership and the
constant-sum payoffs for the governing coalition.

While the ranking based on the formateur’s share of utility is fairly self-explanatory, we find it
necessary to provide some reasoning for our second ranking mechanism. When computing for the
formateur’s share of utility, we assume a strict enactment of the Gamson’s Law in the scenario, and
deny the formateur of any power to re-distribute utility payoffs within the governing coalition.
However, we find it more inclusive to also study a somewhat relaxed version of the former, by consider
the aggregated utility payoffs. This ranking based on aggregated utility payoffs would help us better
understand the preferences of the formateur when it is allowed to actively influence the distribution
in the bargaining process.

Further, as many studies [Ofek & Meydani 2016, Chazan 2005, Yonah 2000] suggest that robustness71
is also an important factor for the formateur’s decision on forming the governing coalition, we
proposed a third ranking mechanism based on stability:

•

Ranking with consideration to the coalition’s robustness estimated on its likelihood of
dissolution.

Specifically, we measure a coalition’s robustness by the share of its reachable states that lead to its
dissolution up to multiple levels. So that the robustness of a given coalition € up to R-step reachable
states maybe expressed as:

Most prior literatures mention the concept as “stability”, but we choose the term “robustness” here to avoid confusion with the stability concept
in our Coalition Dynamics framework.

71
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\„ (R) = 1 −

8„ (R)
¬„ (R)

Equation 9.1

where 8„ (R) is the number of R-step reachable states from € when the size of the governing coalition

drops below the threshold (60 or less); and ¬„ (R) is the total number of R-step reachable states.
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Additional Payoffs

To describe the additional payoffs associated with governing coalitions, we introduce the unit step

function (also known as the Heaviside function, defined as S(h) =

Í

Í

max{h, 0} for h ≠ 0 ) which

returns a constant value if the input variable exceeds a certain threshold. In the context of the Knesset
where a simple majority of 61 or more seats is required to form the governing coalition, we define the

additional payoffs to any coalition € as:
óŸ™ (€) = [Ÿ™ ⋅ S[|€| − 60]

Equation 9.2

where [Ÿ™ is the constant-sum payoffs to the governing coalition, |€| is the size of the coalition, and the
S[h] is alternative form of the unit step function for a discrete variable, such that
S[|€| − 60] = ]

|€| ≤ 60
|€| > 60

0,
1,

Equation 9.3

Following Gamson’s Law, we further stipulate that each coalition member in € to receive its share of
the additional payoffs based on its relative size in the coalition, such that for a member ` ∈ €, its share
|¢|

of the óŸ™ (€) can be expressed as óŸ™,¢ (€) = óŸ™ (€) ⋅ |„| where |`| is the size (number of seats) of the
member `.
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9.3 Data Sources and Methodology

To model the formation of governing coalitions in the 19th and 20th Knesset, we gather data for (1)

objective positions of individual parties, (2) their respective power represented as the number of seats
won, and (3) the real-world coalition outcome, i.e. the governing coalition formed in both terms of the
Knesset.

Power and RealReal-world Coalition Outcome

We use the official Knesset Archives [The Knesset 2019], to build our dataset on the number of seats
(a reasonable proxy for power) for every party and the governing coalition’s composition in each
Knesset term. The details of this dataset are then cross-validated from alternative public sources
[Shamir 2017, Ofek & Meydani 2016] and confirmed to be accurate. There is no inherent ambiguity or
inaccuracy in this particular dataset. We list the election results and the composition of the
government from the 19th and 20th Knesset in Table 9.1 – 9.4.
Name of list
Likud Yisrael Beitenu
Yesh Atid
Israel Labor Party
Habayit Hayehudi
Shas
United Torah Judaism
Hatenua
Meretz
United Arab List
Hadash
National Democratic Assembly Balad
Kadima

Number of valid
votes
885,163
543,458
432,118
345,985
331,868
195,892
189,167
172,403
138,450
113,439
97,030

% of total
votes
23.34
14.33
11.39
9.12
8.75
5.16
4.99
4.55
3.65
2.99
2.56

Number of
seats
31
19
15
12
11
7
6
6
4
4
3

78,974

2.08

2

Table 9.1: Election Results of the 19th Knesset
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Governing Coalition Member
Likud Yisrael Beitenu
Yesh Atid
Habayit Hayehudi
Hatenua
Total Seat Count

Number of seats
31
19
12
6
68

Table 9.2: The Initial Composition72 of the 33rd Government of Israel, formed from the 19th Knesset

Name of list
Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime
Minister
Zionist Camp Chaired by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni
Joint List (Hadash, National Democratic Assembly,
Arab Movement for Renewal, United Arab List)
Yesh Atid Chaired by Yair Lapid
Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon
Habayit Hayehudi Chaired by Naftali Bennett
Shas
Yisrael Beitenu Chaired by Avigdor Liberman
United Torah Judaism
Israel's Left

Number of
valid votes
985,408

% of total
votes
23.40

Number of
seats
30

786,313
446,583

18.67
10.61

24
13

371,602
315,360
283,910
241,613
214,906
210,143
165,529

8.82
7.49
6.74
5.74
5.10
4.99
3.93

11
10
8
7
6
6
5

Table 9.3: Election Results of the 20th Knesset

Governing Coalition Member
Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister
Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon
Habayit Hayehudi Chaired by Naftali Bennett
Shas
United Torah Judaism
Total Seat Count

Number of seats
30
10
8
7
6
61

Table 9.4: The Initial Composition of the 34th Government of Israel, formed from the 20th Knesset

The members of the governing coalition may join or exit during the term of a Knesset, sometimes leading to dissolution of government ahead of
schedule. We therefore use the initial composition of the government as the “coalition outcome”.

72
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Objective Positions

We build our dataset on the ideological positions of individual parties from respective studies on the
Knesset’s political landscape in the specific term, since the prominent themes of debate and elected
parties evolve from term to term.

•

For the 19th Knesset,
Knesset we rely on data from Krouwel et al. [Krouwel et al. 2013]. They place
different parties in a two-dimensional political landscape based on the studies conducted at
the Kieskompas (Dutch for “Electoral Compass”), a for-profit research organization embedded
in the academic community of the VU University Amsterdam. The organization operates
internationally and has data points from over 45 million people in over 40 countries since its
inception in 2006. Their team of experts decomposes each political party’s official documents
into answers to some 30 statements about different political issues, and further maps the
answers onto two prominent themes to construct the political parties’ objective positions
[Kieskompas 2019]. The two dimensions in their study are “security and religion” and “policy

positions on the economy, welfare, human rights, law and governability”.
•

For the 20th Knesset,
Knesset we look into the study by Ofek & Meydani [Ofek & Meydani 2016]. Similar
to the Kieskompas, the duo conducted analysis of the political parties’ manifestos, and
computed the objective positions (referred to as “ideal points” in their original work) by using
formulating the answers to 11 statements in public opinion surveys. It is particularly worth
noting that they share the perspective of this work on how the negotiated position of a
coalition can be computed with the members’ size and ideal points, employing the center of

mass concept73 from classical mechanics. They further validated the ideological positions of
the parties and the coalition with a group of expert researchers on Israeli politics. The two
dimensions in this study are “national security” and “role of religion in everyday life”.

73

The utility-related definitions and notations may be revisited in Section 3.2.2 of this work.
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Weighted vs. Unweighted Scenario

Neither groups of the aforementioned researchers seem to have concerned themselves with the
analysis on how individual parties might have different priorities over separate objective dimensions.
A more careful review of their respective work suggests that the two groups independently, yet both
believe that the proposed dimensions are of comparable, if not equivalent, salience to the parties in
the scenario.

We therefore conduct our spatial-utility analysis in the unweighted setting.
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9.4 Experimental Design

Through the experiment, we intend to generate three ranked list of feasible governing coalition
proposals.

•

Rankings by formateur’s share of utility payoffs from the proposed coalition;

•

Ranking by the aggregated utility payoffs of all members in the proposed coalition;

•

Ranking with consideration to the coalition’s robustness estimated on its likelihood of
dissolution.

While we have already explained the technical details of how we construct each ranking previously,
we find it necessary to explain the methods employed to evaluate the robustness of a governing

coalition proposal here at length. We do because the robustness concept proposed in the Knesset
context differs from the stability mentioned in Section 4.4.2 where we explored the cycles and

equilibria in coalition dynamics.
In the context of our Coalition Dynamics framework, we consider an outcome to be stable if and only
if no coalition or members of a coalition is interested in deviating from the outcome. The stability
concept describes a state of the overall coalition topology and considers the utility changes for all
members of every coalition in the given coalition topology. In contrast, the robustness of a governing
coalition proposal solely evaluates the likelihood of dissolution based on the proportion of ensuing
states that leads to insufficient membership in the governing coalition. Additionally, we propose two
independent robustness metrics based on reachability and difference concepts detailed in Section
3.2.1.

•

One-player reachable based on individual utility considerations (the canonical definition of
reachability in this work);
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•

One-player difference without consideration for utility payoffs (a less strict definition of
reachability).

Additionally, we evaluate the impact of the constant-sum payoffs [Ÿ™ on the coalition formation, by
adjusting its value in different runs of the simulations. Subsequently in the output analysis, we assess
the ranked position of the real-world coalition outcome both in isolation and in combination of the
ranked lists to validate the model’s capability to make sensible predictions and explanations. We list
the configurations for the simulations in Table 9.5, along with the rationale for the choices. The detailed
list of input parameters may be found in Appendix B.9.
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Row/Parameter Name

Value / Setup

Simulation Mode

Single-state

Number of Objectives

2

Use Weight

No

Number of Agents

12 / 10

Alpha Constant

2.7

Voting Style

Formateur-Approved
Acceptance, At-Will
Departure

Value of Additional ConstantSum Payoffs

Varied

Power Considerations in
Computing Expected Utility

Notes
The “single-state” configuration generates a set pre-defined
utility values for the coalition of interest.
Two major sources of conflict in the scenario have been
identified (for both the 19th and 20th Knesset)

We do not consider the impact of weights in the scenario.
A total of 12 agents exist for the 19th Knesset scenario, and 10
for the 20th Knesset scenario.
The tuning parameter for the Expected Utility Function, as
mentioned in Section 5.3.3, “A Minor Adjustment to the
Baseline Model”. The recommended value is 2.7 for scenarios
with no more than 3 objective dimensions.
The agents in this scenario may only join the governing
coalition at the formateur’s approval, but may leave at its own
free will.
We set explore the preferences for governing coalition
proposals at varied values of [Ÿ™

Step Function

We set the power factor to be 1 if the size of the coalition
exceeds the threshold (greater than 60 total seats), and 0
otherwise when computing for the expected utility

Table 9.5: Configuration Page Parameters
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9.5 Output Analysis

Through the simulations for the 19th and 20th Knesset, we construct ranked lists based on the
aforementioned methodologies (formateur’s utility payoffs, aggregated utility payoffs and robustness)
at varying values of constant-sum payoffs [Ÿ™ on the coalition formation. In this section, we examine
the rankings for the real-world coalition outcome in top ° results produced from each methodology.
We also examine the differences in rankings for the real-world coalition outcome and discuss probable
explanations such observations.

The inclusion of the real-world coalition outcome in the top ° results serves as a reasonable measure
of the model’s predictive power. Further, we argue that a smaller value of °, compared to the total
number of possible coalition structures, corresponds to a stronger predictive power of the model.

For each term of the Knesset, we first examine the rankings produced from both utility considerations.
As we determine the more accurate ranking such that the real-world coalition outcome receives a
higher ranking, we examine the robustness of individual coalition outcomes.
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9.5.1 The Nineteenth Knesset

The political groups at the inception of the 19th Knesset, marked by “agent id” as their notation used
throughout the simulations are listed in Table 9.6; the real-world coalition outcome, as exhibited in
Table 9.2, includes Likud Yisrael Beitenu (an electoral alliance formed by Likud and Yisrael Beitenu),

Yesh Atid, Habayit Hayehudi (The Jewish Home) and Hatenua. Accordingly, the governing coalition
formed is represented as the set {0, 1, 3, 6} in the rankings.

Agent ID
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

Political Group

Size

Yesh Atid

19

Likud Yisrael Beitenu
Israel Labor Party
Habayit Hayehudi
Shas

United Torah Judaism
Hatenua
Meretz

31
15
12
11
7
6
6

United Arab List

4

Hadash

National Democratic Assembly - Balad
Kadima

4
3
2

Table 9.6: Agent IDs used in Simulations for the Political Groups in the 19th Knesset

In the given Knesset context, there are a total of 4,095 possible proposals, and 1,595 of them are

probable proposals in which (1) the formateur is present and (2) the size of the proposed coalition
meets the condition (more than 60 MKs) to form a governing coalition.
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The Ranking by Aggregated Utility Payoffs

The aggregated utility payoffs for each coalition proposal consist of two parts: (1) the sum of the
member’s expected utility payoffs from the spatial-utility considerations, and the (2) constant-sum
utility payoffs to the governing coalition. It becomes obvious that for all 1,595 probable coalition
proposals, the constant-sum payoffs [Ÿ™ is added consistently to all of them independent of the
coalition construct. Therefore, the changes in the value of [Ÿ™ do not impact the ranking by aggregated
utility payoffs; accordingly, one ranking is sufficient for varying values of [Ÿ™ . We present the ranking
based on aggregated utility payoffs in Table 9.7. This ranking contains the top 30 probable proposals
with their respective aggregated utility payoffs.
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ranking

rank_descending

AUP values

1

{0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 11}

9.61

2

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11}

9.53

3

{0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11}

9.48

4

{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11}

9.18

5

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11}

9.08

6

{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11}

8.77

7

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11}

8.75

8

{0, 1, 4, 5, 6, 11}

8.69

9

{0, 1, 4, 5, 11}

8.41

10

{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 11}

8.37

11

{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11}

8.25

12

{0, 1, 3, 4, 5}

8.25

13

{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11}

8.21

14

{0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11}

8.19

15

{0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 11}

8.15

16

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11}

8.07

17

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11}

8.01

18

{0, 1, 3, 5, 6, 11}

7.96

19

{0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11}

7.94

20

{0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6}

7.92

21

{0, 1, 3, 5, 11}

7.92

22

{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}

7.89

23

{0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11}

7.88

24

{0, 1, 3, 4, 11}

7.82

25

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}

7.77

26

{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11}

7.76

27

{0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11}

7.69

28

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11}

7.68

29

{0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11}

7.66

30

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11}

7.63

Table 9.7: Top 30 Coalition Proposals by Aggregated Utility Payoffs in the 19th Knesset

We observe that the real-world coalition outcome, {0, 1, 3, 6}, is missing from the top 30 list above. It
is actually ranked at the 360th place out of 1,595 probable proposals (top 23.1%).
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The Ranking by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs

The formateur’s share of utility payoffs for each coalition proposal consist of two parts: (1) the
formateur’s expected utility payoffs from the spatial-utility considerations, and the (2) allocated share
from the constant-sum utility payoffs. Since the allocation of the constant-sum payoffs [Ÿ™ depends on
the formateur’s relative size to the proposed coalition, the changes in the value of [Ÿ™ would impact
the ranking by aggregated utility payoffs; accordingly, we present the rankings for top 30 probable
proposals based on formateur’s share of utility payoffs at varying values of [Ÿ™ in Table 9.8 – 9.9; the
column names can be interpreted using following rules:

•

F_x_RANK_DESCENDING:
F_x_RANK_DESCENDING the ranked list of coalition proposals for [Ÿ™ = h;

•

F_x_UNA
F_x_UNA:
UNA a Boolean value indicating whether all members of the proposed coalition receives
a positive combined utility payoff, for [Ÿ™ = h, assuming a unanimous approval is required to
form a governing coalition, this field should be “True” for the proposal to be valid.

From the rankings at varying values of [Ÿ™ , we find the real-world coalition outcome to be amongst the
top 30 probable proposals for of [Ÿ™ = 0, 1, 2. Specifically, it ranks 12th for [Ÿ™ = 0, 18th for [Ÿ™ = 1, and
28th for [Ÿ™ = 2. With increased value of [Ÿ™ , the ranking of the real-world coalition outcome drops, as
the spatial-utility considerations becomes increasingly less important compared to the payoffs from
the governing coalition – and the strategy for the formateur becomes more biased towards forming a
“minimum winning coalition” with just enough MKs.

If we are to take “voting” into consideration and require all members of the proposed coalition to
receive a positive utility payoff, the real-world coalition outcome is considered valid for [Ÿ™ = 2. This
effectively promotes its ranking to the 8th out of 1,595 probable proposals (top 0.50%).
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ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

f_0_rank_descending
{0, 1, 3}
{0, 1, 3, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 5}
{0, 1, 3, 4}
{0, 1, 3, 5, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 4, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 6}
{0, 1, 10, 3}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 1, 3, 4, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10}
{0, 1, 3, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 6, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 11}
{0, 1, 11, 4}
{0, 1, 3, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 4, 6}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 8, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 4, 6, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 1, 3, 4, 10}

f_0_una
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE

f_1_rank_descending
{0, 1, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10}
{0, 1, 3, 5}
{0, 1, 11, 4}
{0, 1, 10, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 5, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 4}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 1, 3, 4, 11}

f_1_una
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE

f_2_rank_descending
{0, 1, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5}
{0, 1, 3, 11}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10}
{0, 1, 11, 4}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10}
{0, 1, 10, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 1, 3, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 3, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 1, 3, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}

f_2_una
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE

Table 9.8: Top 30 Coalition Proposals by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs, [Ÿ™ ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3] in the 19th Knesset

f_3_rank_descending
{0, 1, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 1, 3, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 11}
{0, 1, 11, 4}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11}
{0, 1, 10, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 1, 3, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}
{0, 1, 3, 5}
{0, 1, 3, 10, 11}

f_3_una
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE

326

ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

f_5_rank_descending
{0, 1, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 11}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10}
{0, 1, 3, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10}
{0, 1, 11, 4}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11}
{0, 1, 5, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 10, 3}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11}
{0, 1, 5, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 10}
{0, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11}

f_5_una
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE

f_10_rank_descending
{0, 3, 4, 5}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 1, 3}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11}
{0, 1, 5, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 10}
{0, 1, 11, 4}
{0, 1, 3, 11}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11}
{0, 1, 5, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11}
{0, 1, 5, 10, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11}
{0, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 10}
{0, 1, 6, 10, 11}

f_10_una
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE

Table 9.9: Top 30 Coalition Proposals by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs, [Ÿ™ ∈ [5, 10] in the 19th Knesset
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Considerations for Robustness

Thus far, we have established that the ranking by formateur’s share of utility payoffs serves as a far better
predictor for the coalition outcome. Now we examine the desirability of the top 8 valid coalition proposals by
their robustness in Table 9.10. The column names can be interpreted using following rules:

F_2_Sx_ROBUST:
F_2_Sx_ROBUST for the ranked proposals at [Ÿ™ = 2: if h members of the proposed coalition were to

•

defect, if the remaining members constitute more than 60 MKs such that a dissolution is avoided;
F_2_Ux_ROBUST:
_2_Ux_ROBUST for the ranked proposals at [Ÿ™ = 2: if h members of the proposed coalition were to

•

defect, if the remaining members constitute more than 60 MKs such that a dissolution is avoided. We
further assign a probability for the presumed defection by examining the utility payoffs to the
hypothetical “defectors” in question. Essentially, the lower an agent’s utility payoffs are, the more likely
it is to defect. The details of this computation can be found in Appendix B.10.

By a variety of robustness measures, the real-world coalition outcome, {0, 1, 3, 6}, ranks 4th, 4th, 8th and 8th
respectively among the top 8 valid proposals ranked by formateur’s utility payoffs. It is fair to state that the
real-world coalition is not the most stable among the set. It is therefore not surprising that we witness the
premature end of the real-world coalitions in the 19th Knesset.

ranking

f_2_rank_descending
1

{0, 1, 3}

3

{0, 3, 4, 5}

4

{0, 1, 3, 11}

5

{0, 1, 4}

6

{0, 3, 4, 5, 11}

9

f_2_s1_robust

f_2_s2_robust
0

f_2_u1_robust

f_2_u2_robust

f_2_una

0

0.894932681

0.716755615

TRUE

0

0

0.890659517

0.629284234

TRUE

0.25

0.1

0.870833885

0.222898823

TRUE

0

0

0.958845353

0.88154747

TRUE

0.2

0.066666667

0.90216471

0.048904797

TRUE

{0, 1, 11, 4}

0.25

0.1

0.945507216

0.414774182

TRUE

21

{0, 1, 3, 5}

0.25

0.1

0.868341843

0.474336665

TRUE

28

{0, 1, 3, 6}

0.25

0.1

0.768957428

9.07E-08

TRUE

Table 9.10: Robustness for the top 8 Valid Coalition Proposals by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs in the 19th Knesset
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9.5.2 The Twentieth Knesset

The political groups at the inception of the 20th Knesset are listed in Table 9.11; the real-world coalition
outcome, as exhibited in Table 9.4, includes Likud, Kulanu, Habayit Hayehudi (The Jewish Home), Shas and

United Torah Judaism. Accordingly, the governing coalition formed is represented as the set {0, 4, 5, 6, 8} in the
rankings.

Agent ID
0
1
2

Political Group

Size

Zionist Camp Chaired by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni

24

Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister

3

Joint List (Hadash, National Democratic Assembly, Arab
Movement for Renewal, United Arab List)
Yesh Atid Chaired by Yair Lapid

5

Habayit Hayehudi Chaired by Naftali Bennett

4
6
7
8
9

Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon
Shas

Yisrael Beitenu Chaired by Avigdor Liberman
United Torah Judaism
Israel's Left

30
13
11
10
8
7
6
6
5

Table 9.11: Agent IDs used in Simulations for the Political Groups in the 20th Knesset

In the given Knesset context, there are a total of 1,023 possible proposals, of which 387 are probable.
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The Ranking by Aggregated Utility Payoffs

We present the ranking based on aggregated utility payoffs in Table 9.12 below. This ranking contains top 30
probable proposals with their respective aggregated utility payoffs.

ranking

f_0_rank_descending

f_0_values

1

{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}

1.999612925

2

{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}

1.997423902

3

{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}

1.996649763

4

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}

5

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}

1.993930579

6

{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}

1.989364132

7

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}

1.9861625

8

{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}

1.983998184

9

{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}

1.983826691

1.9952825

10

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}

1.98241448

11

{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9}

1.982045992

12

{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}

1.981542115

13

{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}

1.980688258

14

{0, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9}

15

{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}

1.977456342

16

{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}

1.976601758

17

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9}

1.976360137

18

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8}

1.973628125

19

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}

1.973551886

20

{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9}

1.973404128

21

{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}

1.972235352

22

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}

1.971441432

23

{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9}

1.971172433

24

{0, 1, 5, 7, 8}

1.969822595

25

{0, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8}

26

{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}

1.968869927

27

{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}

1.965901653

28

{0, 1, 4, 5}

1.961264792

29

{0, 1, 4, 5, 7}

1.960527633

30

{0, 1, 5}

1.960108554

1.97947449

1.96973213

Table 9.12: Top 30 Coalition Proposals by Aggregated Utility Payoffs in the 20th Knesset
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We observe that the real-world coalition outcome, {0, 4, 5, 6, 8}, is missing from the top 30 list above. It is
actually ranked at the 95th place out of 387 probable proposals (top 24.5%).
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The Ranking by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs

We present the rankings for top 30 probable proposals based on formateur’s share of utility payoffs at varying
values of [Ÿ™ in Table 9.13 – 9.14. The column names can be interpreted using the same rules outlined in the
preceding section, where we presented the findings for the 19th Knesset in detail.

From the rankings at varying values of [Ÿ™ , we find the real-world coalition outcome to be amongst the top 30
probable proposals for of [Ÿ™ = 2, 3, 5, 10. Specifically, it ranks 19th for [Ÿ™ = 2, 13th for [Ÿ™ = 3, 8th for [Ÿ™ = 5
and 6th for [Ÿ™ = 10. We observe the same increase in bias towards a “minimum winning coalition” strategy as
the utility payoffs from the governing coalition increases.

Recalling the observations for the 19th Knesset case, we believe the choice of [Ÿ™ = 2 should be a reasonable
approximation, as it reflects a balance between the spatial-utility payoffs and the governing coalition payoffs
such that the real-world outcomes are ranked reasonably high for both terms of the Knesset.

Similarly, we take “voting” into consideration – the real-world coalition outcome is then promoted the 17th out

of 387 probable proposals (top 4.39%).
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ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

f_0_rank_descending
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 1, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 1, 4, 5}
{0, 1, 4, 5, 7}
{0, 1, 5}

f_0_una
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE

f_1_rank_descending
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 1, 5}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 1, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 1, 5, 7}

f_1_una
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

f_2_rank_descending
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 1, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 1, 6}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 1, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 9}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 1, 5, 7}

f_2_una
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE

Table 9.13: Top 30 Coalition Proposals by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs, [Ÿ™ ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3] in the 20th Knesset

f_3_rank_descending
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 1, 5}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}
{0, 1, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 2, 4, 5}

f_3_una
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
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ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

f_5_rank_descending
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 1, 5}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 9}
{0, 1, 6}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}
{0, 2, 4, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 2, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9}

f_5_una
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE

f_10_rank_descending
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 4, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 1, 6}
{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 1, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 8, 9}
{0, 2, 4, 5}
{0, 3, 4, 7, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}
{0, 3, 4, 6, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}
{0, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9}
{0, 2, 5, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}
{0, 2, 6, 8, 9}
{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}
{0, 1, 4}
{0, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8}
{0, 2, 5, 6, 8}
{0, 2, 3, 6}
{0, 2, 5, 6, 7}

f_10_una
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE

Table 9.14: Top 30 Coalition Proposals by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs, [Ÿ™ ∈ [5, 10] in the 20th Knesset
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Considerations for Robustness

Now we examine the robustness of the top 8 valid coalition proposals in Table 9.15.

ranking

f_2_rank_descending

f_2_s1_robust

f_2_s2_robust

f_2_u1_robust

f_2_u2_robust

1

{0, 3, 5, 6, 7}

0

0

0.128230023

3.47E-05

2

{0, 4, 5, 6, 7}

0

0

0.262241036

0.001240233

3

{0, 3, 5, 6, 9}

0

0

0

0

5

{0, 3, 5, 6, 8}

0

0

0.087807243

5.22E-06

6

{0, 1, 5}

0

0

0.600417413

0.216451119

7

{0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8}

0.333333333

0.095238095

0.477150179

4.35E-06

8

{0, 3, 4, 5, 8}

0

0

0.136490839

4.74E-05

9

{0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}

0.333333333

0.095238095

0.26651726

5.88E-07

10

{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}

0.333333333

0.095238095

0.432761586

3.37E-05

11

{0, 3, 4, 6, 7}

0

0

0.181195973

0.000195318

12

{0, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9}

0.333333333

0.095238095

0.094322435

7.06E-12

13

{0, 3, 4, 5, 7}

0

0

0.433634844

0.015332778

14

{0, 3, 4, 5, 6}

0

0

0.165571166

0.00012443

15

{0, 3, 4, 8, 9}

0

0

0.01470947

6.89E-10

16

{0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}

0.166666667

0.047619048

0.210818532

0

18

{0, 3, 4, 5, 9}

0

0

0.028199459

1.78E-08

19

{0, 4, 5, 6, 8}

0

0

0.253735261

0.00105173

Table 9.15: Robustness for the top 17 Valid Coalition Proposals by Formateur’s Utility Payoffs in the 20th Knesset

By a variety of robustness measures, the real-world coalition outcome, {0, 4, 5, 6, 8}, ranks consistently
at the bottom among the top 17 valid proposals ranked by formateur’s utility payoffs. It is fair to say
that the real-world coalition appears quite fragile by our robustness measure.
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9.5.3 Findings and Reflections from the 19th and 20th Knesset

The observations from both terms of the Knesset independently suggest that the ranking by

formateur’s utility payoffs is a strong predictor for the coalition outcome, with the real-world
coalitions ranked in the top 0.5% and 4.39% of all probable coalition proposals respectively. In
comparison, the predictive power of the ranking by aggregated utility payoffs is significantly weaker.
This is a foreseeable observation which confirms the intuition that the formateur tends to construct
the governing coalition that maximizes its self-interest rather than that of the group – either because
it does not care beyond its self-interest, or that it has limited influence over the distribution process as
suggested by Gamson’s Law.

We also find that from a robustness standpoint, neither of the two real-world governing coalitions are
considered particularly robust against potential defections of its members. This holds true for both
when we do and do not consider the impact of utilities on agent behaviors. This observation is further
corroborated by the facts that both governing coalitions were changed ahead of their full 4-year term:
the 33rd Government (from the 19th Knesset) was dissolved after two years; and the 34th Government
(from the 20th Knesset) had an added member (Yisrael Beitenu) in 2016, who later again left the
governing coalition in 2018.

At closing, we acknowledge there are several factors that could have contributed to the deviations
between the real-world coalition outcome and the model’s predictions. To name a few: (1) inherent
inaccuracies in our data points for objective positions; (2) lack of information transparency amongst
the political groups; (3) fluctuations in utility allocation during the bargaining process; and (4) the
formateur’s bias or error in evaluating different coalition proposals. Nevertheless, such deviations
should be limited in significance, as the top ° results based on formateur’s utility payoffs remain a
reliable predictor of likely coalition outcomes.
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Chapter 10 Case Study: The 2008 U.S. Presidential Election
In this chapter, we carry out retrodictive analysis for the United States Presidential Election in 2008.
We begin by reviewing some basic elements of the election process and the historical background. First,
we present a detailed analysis of the scenario and the challenges imposed by its complexity. We then
describe the data collection process, along with our parameter design that allows proper
implementation of our Coalition Dynamics model. Accordingly, a special experimental configuration is
introduced for the scenario due to the large number of agents (72 distinct socio-demographic voter
groups). The experiment’s output is validated against known historical data at closing.

10.1 Background

The election of President and Vice President of the United States is an indirect election in which the
U.S. citizens (at least 18 years old) from 50 U.S. states and District of Columbia cast ballots for the
Electoral College. The members of the Electoral College from each state then cast their ballots
uniformly, according to the popular vote results in their respective states (with rare exceptions
[Whittington 2017]) and decide on the election’s final result. The election occurs every four years.

Due to the two-term limit on president introduced in 1947 (the Twenty-Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution), the re-election only occurs when the sitting president has served only one term in office.
In the 2008 U.S. Election, the incumbent president, G.W. Bush of the Republican Party was ineligible
for re-election due to this imposed term limit. Of the two major political parties, the Democratic Party
nominee was Barack Obama, and the Republic Party nominee was John McCain. With 365 vs. 173
Electoral Vote (and 52.93% vs. 45.65% nationwide popular vote) [Federal Election Commission 2008],
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Barack Obama defeated the Republican Party nominee and became the 44th President of the United
States.

Major Political Issues of Debate in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election

Institutions collecting national opinion data during election years typically have their own board
members (usually consisting of prominent scholars of the field) who review the survey and decide on
the set of questions that are most contentious and relevant in the election year. For this scenario, we
adopt the set of 6 political issues from the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) 2008.

The reasoning for this choice is rather simple. The panel of NAES 2008, led by the Annenberg Public
Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, is well equipped with domain knowledge to curate the
set of political issues most relevant to the election in 2008. Furthermore, any meaningful utility
computation in our coalition dynamics model would always require sufficient reliable data on
objective positions – and the inclusion of a particular political issue in NAES 2008 guarantees the data
sufficiency and reliability. Accordingly, the 6 prominent political issues of debate are chosen as the
corresponding objective dimensions along which we position individual groups in the scenario:

•

Gay Marriage: the group’s level of support for homosexual marriage.

•

Iraq War: the group’s level of support for continued engagement in the Iraq war.

•

Immigration: the group’s level of support for immigration.

•

Free Trade: the group’s level of support for free trade.

•

Abortion: the group’s level of support for accessibility to abortion.

•

Economy: whether the group believes a certain candidate would improve economy.

10.2 Scenario
Scenario Analysis
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Two prominent characteristics of the scenario make it infeasible to apply our coalition dynamics model
directly without modification. In this section, we discuss the implications of the indirect nature of the
U.S. Presidential Election and the static nature of the candidates’ policy positions.

The Indirect Nature of the U.S. Presidential Election

The indirect nature of the U.S. Presidential Election has significant implications in this particular
scenario [Ross & Josephson 1996]. First, the existence of the intermediate, the Electoral College, means
that the winner of the election (by number of Electoral votes) does not necessarily have to win the
popular vote – an uncommon yet possible situation that has occurred twice in the past two decades.
Second, the minimum votes per state skews the Electoral votes per capita in different states (there are
approximately 160,000 people per Electoral vote in Wyoming vs. over 600,000 people per Electoral
vote in California [Federal Election Commission 2008]).

Clearly, the existence of Electoral College would undermine the validity and robustness of any attempt
to predict the election outcome without detailed state-by-state analysis. However, in order to ensure
the integrity of the model, we need sufficient data on relevant input parameters such as objective
positions and size for each socio-demographic group in the region of analysis. Unfortunately, the scale
of data required for each state (segmented by socio-demographic characteristics) exceeds the number
of available data points from our primary source (National Annenberg Election Survey 2008 [NAES
team, Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania 2008]).

With this constraint in mind, we decide on a different approach for this scenario. Specifically, our
predictive modeling focuses solely on popular vote counts; in addition, we also consolidate the data
points from each state into four geographic regions (Northeast, West, South and Midwest) based on
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traditional Census grouping practices. This approach allows us to have sufficient number of data points
per socio-demographic group and produce meaningful results for proper validation.

The Static Nature of the Candidates’
Candidates’ Policy Positions

One noticeable difference between this scenario and typical coalition-forming processes is the static
nature of the candidates’ policy positions. With the plethora of media coverage providing truthful and
reliable information about candidates’ policy positions, both candidate must settle on a clear set of
policy positions and consistently communicate them to all segments of the electorate [Polsby et al.
2008, Jessee 2009]. While the candidate’s team may devise a certain set of positions that appeals to
the greatest number of voters74, once the set of policy positions become public during a campaign, it is
rarely altered before the election is over [Adams & Merrill 2008].

Accordingly, several premises of the proposed coalition dynamics model become invalid in this
scenario:

•

Absence of actual Coalition Dynamics:
Dynamics the socio-demographic groups are not to form any
coalition amongst themselves and win an election, but only to select one of the two
candidates with fixed objective positions.

•

Absence of Negotiation in the Objective Space: the decision of the group to vote for
(conceptually similar to “form a coalition with”) one candidate over another does not alter
the “realizable positions” for the group or the candidate. Both candidates, in theory, shall
simply enforce the policy positions as communicated after winning the election.

74 Due to the existence of the Electoral College, in practice the candidates would often attempt to formulate policy positions that optimize their
chances of winning the “swing states”, rather than the popular vote.
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Due to these deviations, it is most likely be futile to study the full-scale of coalition dynamics using the
existing framework. Instead, our focus of analysis in this scenario is on the spatial and utility aspects
of our model. Given the scale and reliability of available data, we are confident that the analysis would
help yield meaningful insights to establish partial validity of the proposed framework.
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10.3 Data Collection and Methodology

In the field of political science, American National Election Studies (ANES) data are the most widely
used and longest-standing public opinion survey. However, in the 2008 election year, the Annenberg
Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania collected a rather impressive set of panel data
to explore campaign dynamics and evolving political issues of debate. For the integrity of our work,
data sufficiency for different groups segmented by socio-demographic characteristics is a major
concern. The National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) 2008 consists of interviews with a nationally
representative random sample of 29,985 respondents, dwarfing the number of respondents in the
ANES 2008 (N = 2,322 pre-election and N = 2,102 post-election).

Per recommendation of the subject matter expert on this project, we select a subset of the NAES 2008
data (16,242 participants in pre-election and post-election interview waves) for two reasons:

•

Most voters do not pay attention to politics or have enough knowledge about the
candidates until the election is imminent;

•

Voters do not know who the presidential candidates are until the end of the party
conventions in late August – early September of 2008.

Objective Positions

The individual objective positions are constructed based on their response to a set of questions related
to the political issues of debate in the NAES 2008 survey. Specifically, a survey question presents the
individual with 3-4 options corresponding to incremental levels of support for (or opposition towards)
a particular stance on the political issue.
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For example, on the issue of free trade, the survey question and choices are as following:

Question:
do you favor or oppose the federal government in Washington negotiating more free trade
agreements like NAFTA?
Choices:
(1) strongly favor, (2) somewhat favor, (3) somewhat oppose, (4) strongly oppose

The choices are numbered incrementally from “support” to “oppose”, the dichotomy in the particular
issue. Therefore, by assuming uniform incremental distance, we can easily convert the raw response
into the objective position of the individual on the issue by normalizing it to the model’s [−1,1] range.
In the specific example above, let ]w,• ∈ {1,2,3,4} be the choice given by individual W to the question on
issue ”. We may write the objective position of individual W to the question on objective dimension ” as

¨

rw,• = ]w,• −
µ

·
µ

Equation 10.1

The mean position of group € on objective dimension ” is defined as

r„,• =

1

-r„,• -
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Ë ]w,•
w∈„

Equation 10.2

Group Segmentation by SocioSocio-Demographic Characteristics

We segment 16,242 individuals selected from NAES 2008 into 72 socio-demographic groups, based on
4 sets of characteristics available: party identification, education level, race and region of residence.
The specific individual group characteristics can be found in Appendix B.8. Here, we briefly discuss the
motivations for this approach.

Needless to say, the primary motivation for segmentation is to create meaningful socio-demographic
groups with coherent in-group objective positions in the proposed coalition dynamics framework.
Since a faction leader who normally dictates the group’s objective positions is absent in this scenario,
the most logical approximation to a group’s objective position should be the mean of each individuals’
objective positions in the group. Accordingly, a reasonable and efficient segmentation method would
follow the 4 socio-demographic characteristics set forth. As the data in Appendix B.8 show, we do
indeed observe higher level in-group coherence of objective positions for groups constructed using the
method. The in-group coherence is critical to the meaningfulness of the groups produced by the
segmentation method of choice.

Another motivation for the chosen segmentation method lies beyond the need to conform to existing
framework’s input parameters. The voting decision at individual level is often subjected to a wide
range of factors beyond socio-demographic characteristics or objective positions, and the variance and
noise from these unobserved factors can likely undermine the robustness and validity of our predictive
analysis for an individual. Therefore, meaningful grouping of the individuals becomes necessary to
reduce the variance. Furthermore, this approach also bears certain similarity to the Monte Carlo
parameterization method used for our computational modeling in Chapter 5. Essentially, the
individuals in a group with shared socio-demographic characteristics may be conceptually treated as
a single simulation run with certain controlled input parameters and other parameters properly
randomized. We then apply the PCMA method (introduced in Section 6.4.4.2) to analyze the
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relationship between input parameters of interest and the group’s mean output (collective voting
result).

Weights on Different Objective Dimensions

Unfortunately, reliable data on how strongly individual voters care about particular political issues do
not exist in NAES 2008. Therefore, we conduct majority of the spatial-utility analysis in the unweighted
setting. However, our subject matter expert on the project helped to create a dichotomous variable to
indicate those who consider economy most important at the time of election (based on aggregated
data in NAES 2008). Collectively, the mean of this variable reflects the proportion of the group’s
members who place strong weights on the objective dimension of economy. Despite possible
inaccuracies of this artificially constructed weight parameter, we have nevertheless decided to also
include weighted setting for spatial-utility analysis in this scenario.

The Objective Positions of the two Presidential Candidates

For the 6 selected political issues of debate between the two candidates, we are able to locate credible
reports 75 from major media outlets on their publicly expressed stances throughout the campaign
season in 2008. With some basic analysis and interpretation, we map the candidates’ statements to
specific choices in the survey questions on these political issues. We provide the mapped candidate
positions along with the survey questions and choices in Table 10.1 – 10.2.

75

The New York Times feature page available via: https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/president/issues/iraq.html
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A closer look at Table 10.1 reveals a predicament for our analysis. It appears that the exact mapping of
the candidates’ statements to the available choices in survey questions might be a rather evasive goal
in this scenario. As their carefully prepared statements on different political issues often fall
somewhere between the available choices. Also, despite our best effort, there certainly are some
inaccuracies introduced by our manual mapping. Recalling the sensitivity of utility values given
moderate fluctuation in distance, we should be rightly concerned that the margin of error in objective
position values produced from this manual mapping process will significantly undermine the
robustness of our analysis.

We adopt a data-driven approach to produce a more reliable estimate of the candidates’ objective
positions. Essentially, we would select the two groups with highest proportional voting (near 100%)
for the candidate and compute the mean positions of the two as an estimate of the favored candidate’s
objective positions. The argument is simple: at the macro-level, the group’s preference for a certain
candidate is associated with the proximity between the group’s objective position and that of the
candidate.

The source data for the four relevant groups selected through this approach is presented in Table 10.3.
Each group’s aggregated score on any particular issue is the mean of the group members’ response
scores (a discrete value for each questionnaire question) from the survey. We then apply the proposed
estimation method to construct both candidates’ objective positions for our experimental
configurations.
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Issue
Gay
Marriage

Iraq War

Immigration

Free Trade

Abortion

Economy

Obama, statement

Says he would repeal the Defense of Marriage Act
and voted against the Federal Marriage
Amendment. As stated on the Obama campaign
Web site, he supports full civil unions that "give
same-sex couples equal legal rights and privileges
as married couples, including the right to assist
their loved ones in times of emergency as well as
equal health insurance, employment benefits, and
property and adoption rights."
Says America must shift its defense resources from
Iraq to Afghanistan, which he sees as ground zero
for any war on terrorism. He says he would remove
one or two brigades a month from Iraq, and get all
combat troops out within 16 months. “The only
troops I will keep in Iraq will perform the limited
missions of protecting our diplomats and carrying
out targeted strikes on Al Qaeda,” he said last year.
He also promised a diplomatic initiative with
regional allies, and even foes — read Iran — to seek
a more stable Iraq.
Supports a path to legalization for illegal
immigrants that includes learning English and
paying fines. He would toughen penalties for hiring
illegal immigrants. He voted for a fence along the
Mexican border.

Takes a position on trade that has been defined, for
better or worse, by his criticism of NAFTA during a
bitter Democratic primary, when he called for the
pact to be renegotiated to protect the environment
and workers’ rights.

Opposes any constitutional amendment to
overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Roe vs.
Wade. Disagreed with Supreme Court ruling to
uphold the "Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act." Did
not cast a vote on Prohibiting Funds for Groups
that Perform Abortions amendment in 2007.

Wants to immediately enact a set of tax cuts for
individuals and businesses to help cope with the
current crisis. He would ban most home
foreclosures for 90 days. He blames deregulation
for the financial crisis.

Obama,
choice
range
2-3

McCain, statement

1-2

Says America must pursue victory in Iraq
first, and worry about bringing troops home
after. He has sharply criticized Mr. Obama’s
timeline for withdrawal, arguing that
American generals must have the flexibility to
decide for themselves when withdrawal
would be possible.

3-4

2-3

3-4

N/A

Believes the institution of marriage is a union
between one man and one woman. Voted for
the Defense of Marriage Act but voted against
the Federal Marriage Amendment. Says
states and local governments should set their
own marriage policies.

Helped write the 2007 immigration bill
supporting a path to legalization for illegal
immigrants that includes learning English
and paying fines, but said earlier this year
that he would no longer vote for his own bill.
He voted for a fence along the Mexican
border.
Has a record as a staunch advocate of free
trade; he supported efforts to expand and
strengthen NAFTA. Even in politically hostile
places like Michigan, he has urged voters to
accept the reality of a global economy.
Experts say he has deviated little from the
Bush administration on specific trade deals,
except by emphasizing “trade adjustment
assistance,” a mechanism designed to
cushion displaced workers.
Voted for the Prohibit Partial Birth Abortion
bill in 2003 and "yes" for Prohibiting Funds
for Groups that Perform Abortions
amendment in 2007. Believes Roe vs. Wade
is a flawed decision that must be overturned.
Supports Supreme Court ruling upholding
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act.
Would purchase troubled mortgages directly
from financial institutions and restructure
them. He wants to cut the capital gains tax
rate. He blames lobbyists for the financial
crisis.

Table 10.1: Candidate Statements and Corresponding Choices to Survey Questions
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McCain,
choice
range
1-2

3

2-3

3-4

1-2

N/A

Issue
Gay Marriage

Survey Question
There has been much talk recently about
whether gays and lesbians should have the
legal right to marry someone of the same sex.
Which of the following options comes closest
to your position on this issue?

Iraq War

Which of the following plans for United States
policy in Iraq comes closest to your own
position?

Immigration

Please indicate whether you favor or oppose
the following proposal addressing
immigration. “Provide a path to citizenship
for some illegal aliens who agree to return to
their home country for a period of time and
pay substantial fines.”

Free Trade

Do you favor or oppose the federal
government in Washington negotiating more
free trade agreements like NAFTA?

Abortion

Which of the following options comes closest
to your view on abortion?

Economy

Thinking about the economy in the country as
a whole, would you say that over the past
year the nation's economy has gotten better,
stayed about the same, or gotten worse?

Survey Choices
1. I do not support any form of legal recognition of the
relationships of gay and lesbian couples.
2. I support civil unions or domestic partnerships, but not gay
marriage.
3. I support full marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples.

1.The US should withdraw all troops from Iraq as soon as
possible, regardless of conditions in Iraq.
2. The US should set a deadline for withdrawing its troops if the
Iraqi government doesn't show definite progress in training Iraqi
forces and controlling violence on its own.
3. The US should keep its troops in Iraq as long as is needed until
a stable democratic government is established there.
1. Strongly oppose
2. Somewhat oppose
3. Somewhat favor
4. Strongly favor

1. Strongly oppose
2. Somewhat oppose
3. Somewhat favor
4. Strongly favor
1. Abortion should not be permitted under any circumstances.
2. Abortion should not be permitted except in cases of rape,
incest, or when the life of the woman is at risk.
3. Abortion should be available, but with stricter limits than it is
now.
4. Abortion should be available to anyone who wants it.
1. Gotten a lot worse
2. Gotten a little worse
3. Stayed about the same
4. Gotten a little better
5. Gotten a lot better

Table 10.2: Survey Questions and Choices for 6 Political Issues

Group

# of Citizens
Per Each Group

Gay marriage

Free Trade

Abortion

Immigration

Iraq

Econ

1

321

1.704

2.277

2.573

2.654

2.397

1.530

Voted Obama
(1--value =Voted
(1
McCain)
0.097

2

594

1.515

2.186

2.283

2.527

2.390

1.619

0.093

60

749

2.699

2.460

3.712

2.799

1.736

1.105

0.885

70

179

2.197

2.305

3.311

2.718

1.670

1.145

0.866

Table 10.3: Source Data for 4 Relevant Groups Selected to Estimate Candidates’ Positions
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10.4 Experimental
Experimental Design

The spatial-utility analysis of the U.S. 2008 Presidential Election case study consists of two parts.

•

Unweighted Setting: analyze the relationship between group’s collective voting position
and its estimated realizable utility based on the mean objective positions without
weights

•

Weighted Setting: analyze the relationship between group’s collective voting position
and its estimated realizable utility based on the mean objective positions with weights
on economy

The main procedures for both analyses are similar. First, we determine the objective positions of the
two Presidential Candidates r , rÕ (Obama and McCain). Then, we compute the utility perception (in
both unweighted and weighted settings) from the group W’s perspective towards the two candidates’
positions, _w, , _w,Õ as input variables. Lastly, we treat the group’s collective voting decision ([w, ,
proportion of the group who voted for Obama) as the output variable and perform regression analysis.
By examining the input-output relationship, we then review and validate the spatial-utility aspect of
the proposed framework.

The details for each socio-demographic group can be found in Appendix A.2. Specifically, we list our
data-driven estimates for the two Presidential Candidates’ objective positions (pre-normalization) in
Table 10.4 below before concluding the preliminaries.

Candidate

Gay marriage

Free Trade

Abortion

Immigration

Iraq

Econ

McCain

1.61

2.23

2.42

2.59

2.39

1.57

Obama

2.45

2.38

3.51

2.76

1.70

1.12

Table 10.4: The Estimated Objective Positions (pre-normalization) for two Presidential Candidates in 2008, Obama and McCain
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10.5 Output Analysis

The primary focus of this section is to review the validity of the spatial-utility aspect in our coalition
dynamics model. Specifically, we are interested in establishing strong relationships between the
observed coalition dynamics (“to vote for a candidate”) and different composite utility values
computed via our framework. To begin, we list the list of input variables and output variables in Table
10.5 below. Additionally, we explore voter participation from the utility perspective.

Type
Input

Variables

Origin
normalized objective positions,
candidates’ objective positions

Unweighted Composite Utility of Group W’s Perception
towards Obama/McCain, _w, , _w,Õ

normalized objective positions,
candidates’ objective positions,
estimated weight factor on
economy

Weighted Composite Utility of Group W’s Perception
towards Obama/McCain, _L w, , _L w,Õ

Unweighted Obama-McCain Utility Difference for Group W,
k_w

Output

Weighted Obama-McCain Utility Difference for Group W, k_L w
Collective Voting, i.e. proportion of the group that voted for
Obama/McCain, [w, , [w,Õ

Group Participation Rate, i.e. proportion of the group that
voted, lw

We select a = 3 and get
¨
_w,• = 6 − a ⋅ dw,•
in the
unweighted setting with
6 objective dimensions
We introduce the weight
factor on economy
dimension, while keeping
the weights on all other
dimensions equal.

k_w = _w, − _w,Õ
k_L w = _L w, − _L w,Õ
[w, + [w,Õ ≈ 1

Source data parameter (“voted”)

Table 10.5: Input and Output Variables for U.S. Election 2008 Scenario
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Notes

The two candidates
combined receive more
than 98.5% of the
popular votes
nationwide.

Accordingly, the two hypotheses for validation are:

H1: The group is more likely to vote for a candidate if it perceives higher level of composite

•

utility towards the candidate.
H2: The group is more likely to participate in voting if it perceives a huge difference in

•

composite utility between two available candidates.

Due to the variations in input variable choice, we need to explore full range of possible pairwise
relationships through linear regression analysis. We include the comprehensive list of analyses in
Table 10.6 for both main hypotheses.

Hypotheses
S1

Analysis #
S1a

S1b

S1c

S1d

S2

S2b

S2b

Input Variable

Output Variable

Unweighted Composite Utility of Group W’s
Perception towards Obama, _w,

Collective Voting, i.e.
proportion of the group that
voted for Obama, [w,

Unweighted Composite Utility of Group W’s
Perception towards McCain, _w,Õ

Collective Voting, i.e.
proportion of the group that
voted for McCain, _w,Õ

Weighted Composite Utility of Group W’s
Perception towards Obama, _L w,
Weighted Composite Utility of Group W’s
Perception towards McCain, _L w,Õ
Unweighted Obama-McCain Utility Difference
for Group W, k_w
Weighted Obama-McCain Utility Difference
for Group W, k_L w

Table 10.6: Input-Output Pairs for S1 & S2
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Collective Voting, i.e.
proportion of the group that
voted for Obama, [w,
Collective Voting, i.e.
proportion of the group that
voted for McCain, _w,Õ
Group Participation Rate, i.e.
proportion of the group that
voted, lw

10.5.1 H1 Review and Validation

The scatter plots with fitted regression lines in Figure 10.1 a – d indicate prominent positive linear
relationship between the group’s perceived composite utility values and the collective voting decision.
This relationship is observed in both unweighted and weighted cases, for both candidates.

Figure 10.1 a: Scatter Plot with Fitted Regression Line for _w, , [w,

Figure 10.1 b: Scatter Plot with Fitted Regression Line for _w,Õ , [w,Õ

Figure 10.1 c: Scatter Plot with Fitted Regression Line for _L w, [w,

Figure 10.1 d: Scatter Plot with Fitted Regression Line for _L w,Õ , [w,Õ

Figure 10.1 a-d: Scatter Plots with Fitted Regression Line for Collective Voting Decision and Utility Values, Weighted and Unweighted
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In conjunction with the detailed results from regression analysis in Table 10.7, we can confidently
conclude that strong associations exist between all selected pairs of input-output variables, since all
uncovered associations are statistically significant at the chosen significance level of a = 10Á· .

Dataset

Slope

Intercept

Pearson’s r

p-value

std. error

_w,Õ , [w,Õ

0.0629

0.579

0.988

7.21e-35

0.00154

_w, , [w,
_L w, [w,

_L w,Õ , [w,Õ

0.0641
0.0491
0.0273

0.440
0.677
0.876

0.974
0.985
0.979

3.23e-28
8.11e-23
4.00e-30

0.00231
0.00135
0.00088

Table 10.7: Linear Regression Output for S1 a-d

In addition, we observe no significant difference in either goodness-of-fit (measured by Pearson’s r
values) or p-values among the associations in unweighted versus weighted setting. There are several
possible explanations for this similarity of results:

•

MultiMulti-colinearity: when the group perceives high utility from the candidate in a particular
objective dimension (being close to the candidate’s position), the group is likely to be
perceiving high utility from the candidate in all remaining objective dimensions. In the
presence of strong multi-colinearity, adjusting the weight factors in different objective
dimensions has little effect on the value of the composite utility.

•

Scale of the weight
weight factor: we might have failed to assign proper scale to the weight factor on
the economy objective dimension. However, since the introduced weight factor itself is only
an estimated value, it makes not much sense for us to alter it to artificially boost the goodnessof-fit.

Conclusion:
Conclusion at 0.001% level of significance, the output data provide sufficient evidence that:
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•

There is strong positive association between the group’s composite utility perception towards
the candidate and its collective voting on the candidate, in both weighted and unweighted
setting.

•

There is no conclusive finding on whether the introduction of weight factors helps to boost
the goodness-of-fit for the model.

We may conclude that the spatial-utility aspect of our proposed model passes the validation in this
section. We are able to retain H1 without explicitly mentioning causality.
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10.5.2 H2 Review and Validation

While the association between perceived utility difference and the voting participation rate for a group
does not directly contribute to the validation of our model, it does help further demonstrate the validity
of its core spatial-utility component.

The scatter plots with fitted regression lines in Figure 10.2 a – b indicate fairly positive association
between the group’s voting participation rate and its perceived utility difference between two
candidates in the unweighted setting. No conclusive finding can be drawn in the weighted setting.

Figure 10.2 b: Scatter Plot with Fitted Regression Line for k_L w , lw

Figure 10.2 a: Scatter Plot with Fitted Regression Line for k_w , lw

Figure 10.2 a-b: Scatter Plots with Fitted Regression Lines for k_w , lw amd k_L w , lw

Dataset
k_w , lw
k_L w , lw

Slope
0.0160
0.0010

Intercept
0.705
0.844

Pearson’s r
0.604
0.13

p-value
1.77E-5
0.408

std. error
0.00329
0.00122

Table 10.8: Linear Regression Output for S1 a-d

In conjunction with the results from regression analysis in Table 10.8, we can confidently conclude
that a fairly strong association exists between the group’s voting participation rate and its perceived
utility difference between two candidates in the unweighted setting. This association is statistically
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significant at the chosen significance level of a = 0.01. No statistically significant association can be
found in the weighted setting. We are able to retain H2 in the unweighted setting.

While this hypothesis on voting participation rate does not directly prove the validity of the spatialutility computations in our framework, it does re-affirm the credibility and value of our proposed
method for computing utility in the objective space.
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10.6 Findings and Reflections from the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election

In this chapter, we began by examining the scenario’s unique characteristics that challenges the basic
premises of the proposed coalition dynamics model. There are no actual events of coalition formation
in the voting process of the Presidential Election; the voters simply decide on the most preferred
candidate on the ballot. However, we find the case particularly intriguing for the sheer abundance and
credibility of the available data on objective positions and group behavior. Guided by a rising political
scientist in the field, we decided that the case would be fitting and wonderful investigation into the
spatial-utility aspect of the model.

To do so, we first identified 6 major political issues of debate from the National Annenberg Election
Survey (NAES) 2008 and explained our method to segment socio-demographic groups based on
relevant group characteristics. Variations of utility values were computed for each group, based on
their distance from estimated candidate positions. With simple yet intuitive regression-based analysis,
we were able to uncover strong positive association between the utility value (in both weighted and
unweighted setting) and the group’s collective voting behavior with high level of confidence. While the
findings do not directly entail predictions on coalition dynamics in the canonical sense, the strong
association between the computed utility values and group behavior re-affirms the validity of our
proposed spatial-utility computation method. In addition to this direct validation, the findings also
indirectly validate the utility-driven nature of decision-making that lies at the core of the rationality

assumption in our framework.
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Chapter 11 Conclusions
Conclusions
11.1 A Technical Review: Results,
Results, Findings and Learnings

A few years ago, we set out to build a theoretical framework to better understand the dynamics of
coalition formation. In particular, we believed in the potential of an agent-based approach and sought
to leverage computational modeling in this endeavor.

Naturally, we began by examining the coalition theories from the field of international relations, game
theory and bargaining, the spatial theory in the legislative competition setting, as well as a few agentbased modeling applications on the subject. It became clear to us that there were two prominent
limitations in the prevailing theories of coalition dynamics: the static game theory approach which
limits its scope of analysis to a singular event or decision, and the mathematical modeling approach
which fails to yield tractable solutions for complex scenarios. To address these limitations, we built a
coalition dynamics framework that consolidates the major theories in the extensive-form games
setting. In the presented framework, we are able to model complex scenarios with many agents and
issues of contention, derive analytical solutions, and deliver path-dependent solutions that entail a
comprehensive illustration of the coalition dynamics. We were further able to establish the its
predictive power through three independent case studies.

In Chapters 3 and 4, we first proposed the State Tree approach (Section 3.4) which significantly
reduces the size of event space for exploration, effectively voiding the need for Monte Carlo simulations
for fixed initial conditions while significantly improving the computational efficiency. Further, we
managed to derive analytical solutions for coalition dynamics for simpler scenarios (Section 4.3) and

characterize cycles and equilibrium in the proposed framework (Section 4.4). Through the
investigations, we achieved all of the goals set forth at the opening of this work.
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In Chapters 5 and 6, we performed sensitivity analysis under various themes of investigation and
uncovered emergent properties of the proposed coalition dynamics model through computational
modeling. Specifically, we discovered that (1) a more relaxed proposal-acceptance voting procedure

leads to greater level of dynamics in Section 6.4.1, (2) weighted scenarios tend to introduce more cyclic
behaviors in Section 6.4.2, (3) a greater number of objective dimensions introduces greater
complications in Section 6.4.3, (4) a more uniform power distribution leads to a more chaotic process
in Section 6.4.4, (5) a higher number of agents leads to more possible states and dynamics in Section
6.4.5, (6) different initial coalition structure leads to very different dynamics in Section 6.4.6, (7) a

coalition shall change as its leading agent’s power fluctuates in Section 6.5.1, (8) positions shifts of
agents in boundary zone have no noticeable impact compared to those of agents located closer to the
coalition’s negotiated position in Section 6.5.2, and (9) elimination of isolated agents (regardless of
power) does not cause coalition structure change in a stable state in Section 6.5.3. These discoveries
are generally aligned with the observations in the real-world coalition dynamics and collectively
confirm the structural validity of the proposed model.

In Chapter 8, we examined the model’s external validity by tracing entity behavior with two set of
experiments in the Syrian Civil War case study (Section 8.6). The predicted reactions of the agents in
our simulation experiments corresponds well with real-world observations when there was a change
in priority or power parameters. In the cross-model validation work (Section 8.7), we applied the
Minimum Winning Coalition (MWC) theory and the Spatial Theory model in the identical setting, and
were able to demonstrate their respective failings: the WMC theory model yielded predictions that are
far away from the real-world developments, while the Spatial Theory model only provided static
predictions without any considerations to path-dependency in an inherently evolving process. The
cross-model validation properly showcases the rigor of the proposed model, while providing an apt
illustration of the two limitations that motivated our work.
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In Chapter 9, we introduced an extension to the spatial-utility component of the model to account for
the existence of a formateur in the Knesset case. During historical data validation, we compared
different ranking mechanism against real-world outcomes, and were able to determine the formateur’s
utility payoffs as a strong predictor for the coalition outcome. Additionally, we introduced the concept
of robustness based on our path-dependent approach to understanding coalition dynamics; as a result,
we found that neither of the governing coalitions in the real world are sufficiently robust. This
particular observation is further confirmed as both coalitions ceased to exist prematurely (Section
9.5.3). The application in the Knesset case is a powerful testament to the extensibility and validity of
the model.

In Chapter 10, we studied the model’s spatial-utility component in isolation. This choice is primarily
motivated by the availability of reliable and accurate source data from the National Annenberg Election
Survey in 2008. The use of such survey data points mitigates any potential bias or noise introduced by
a highly manual input configuration process. The objective positions of individual voter groups are
purely determined by the aggregation of their survey responses, rather than any subject matter
expert’s opinion; their collective behaviors, reflected in the group’s voting decisions, are also directly
from the group itself. Not surprisingly, we were able to demonstrate the strong predictive power of
the derived utility values on the group’s collective behaviors. This unique case study thoroughly
reaffirms the validity of the model’s spatial-utility component.

A brief note on the contribution of this work is necessary. The proposed framework is the first to
consolidate both the power and multi-objective factors in the extensive-form game setting for the
study of coalition dynamics. The associated agent-based computational model is the first to provide

exhaustive, efficient and path-dependent solutions that enable large-scale simulation and proper
modeling of complex scenarios. Furthermore, the case studies in this work are among the few that
carry out systematic and quantitative investigations into real-world scenarios and produce reliable
insights on coalition dynamics.
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11.2 Insights from the Journey

The diverse and complementary nature of existing theories, as well as our painful realization on their
limitations, truly motivated us to search for an interdisciplinary approach to the problem. Here, we
would like to share three insights from this journey:

Analytical solutions are essential to the calibration and structural validation of the computational
model. Agent-based computational modeling does not void the need for analytical solutions [Lucas and
McGunnigle 2003]; the process of deriving analytical solutions compels us to interrogate the rigor of
our model and discover necessary improvements efficiently. Our work in Chapter 4 led to several
important revisions and calibration for the agent-based model; the analytical solutions further serve
as “base cases” in the structural validation process to verify proper implementation of the design.

Large-scale computational simulation calls for optimal exploration of the parameter and event space.
Computational simulations can easily become prohibitively expensive. Therefore, it is crucial for us to
efficiently explore the parameter space and identify a reasonable lower bound for the number of Monte
Carlo simulation runs. Additionally, we limit the simulation to a subspace of the event space based on
empirical considerations – with the proposed State Tree approach, we significantly reduced the
number of computations in a simulation run. This is achieved by simply containing the event space
exploration to a depth-limited set of reachable states from the initial state.

Empirical validation requires meticulous preparation, careful execution and cautious review.
Empirical validation of an agent-based model is inherently difficult due to the availability of data,
complexity of the real world, and the challenge to connect emerging macro-level patterns to microlevel agent behaviors. It took us tremendous effort to identify and build credible source data, design
relevant experiments and draw conservative conclusions on those findings.
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11.3 Validation and Future Work

The dynamics of coalition formation, while seemingly chaotic, can be quantitatively modeled and
explained under weak assumptions of rationality. We took two critical steps to validate the proposed
coalition dynamics model.

First, we surveyed many existing models from different fields and consolidated relevant theoretical
concepts to construct our theoretical framework. This creative process enabled us to examine the
proposed model, or at least part of it, with some comparable alternatives. Such comparisons are
extremely valuable for our structural validation and empirical validation work.

The next step is even more crucial as we implemented the theoretical framework in an agent-based
computational model. This is a truly powerful transformation as it brings scalable computational
capacity to a set of previously scattered ideas on coalition dynamics. Such ideas often defied
quantitative applications, but the agent-based computational model helps to hide the complexities and
produces meaningful results that previously would have required an incredible amount of analytical
work. Through our computational simulations in Chapter 6, we were able to verify the model’s
structural validity and make necessary calibration and adjustments. In Chapters 8 through 10, the
simulation experiments produced empirically testable results for all three scenarios. The findings from
the empirical validations suggest reasonable predictive power of the model, elevating it from an
interesting simulation to a credible framework to study coalition dynamics.

Having established its validity, we are confident to suggest that the model may be applied to study
coalition dynamics in any scenario in so far as (1) the basic premises of the model are valid and (2)
sufficient data exists for necessary model inputs. Specifically, with necessary tuning, the proposed
model should yield reliable and consistent utility values for respective coalition topologies and predict
detailed coalition dynamics from any initial condition.
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At last, we share some thoughts on possible directions of future research.

First, there is definitely room for more in-depth investigations on the spatial-utility relationships.
Specific concepts including power, realizable and expected utilities, likelihood of fulfillment and their
interactions should be further studied and polished. Additionally, systematic empirical studies can be
carried out to build a more scalable and efficient calibration process. In retrospect, estimating the
appropriate values for input parameters can sometimes be a more challenging task than running the
simulation itself; and it should become more manageable. Furthermore, recent machine learning
methods can be introduced for a more intelligent and efficient exploration of the parameter space.
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Appendix

APPENDIX

ITEM

A.176

Description of the StateSim platform

A.2

Data Report for the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election case study (Kim 2016)

B.1

GAMS output for the 3-agent scenario

B.2

Documentation and code for the Coalition Dynamics Simulation module

B.3

Configuration files for various experiment setup in Table 5.9

B.4

Complete set of raw output files from the experiments in Table 5.9

B.5

Validation and verification procedures in Python Notebook format

B.6

Source data for the Syrian Civil War case study

B.7

Configuration files for the Syrian Civil War simulation experiments

B.8

Source data for the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election case study

B.9

Source data for the Knesset governing coalitions case study

B.10

Computation method for defection estimation based on utility

With the exception of Appendix A.1, all remaining appendix items are made available online instead, at
https://github.com/dqs2017/dissertation_appendix
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A.1 Information on StateSim Platform
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I. StateSimEngine Overview
StateSim allows users to efficiently and accurately model the major factions in different regions of the world with highly descriptive traits
including their resources, leaders, and followers plus the values and
norms that guide their behavior.
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II. StateSimComponents
i. Groups
Groups have a hierarchy of leaders and followers that form into coalitions around various issues that cause instabilities in the region.

iii. Followers

The Matrix of Dynamic Alliances
Dynamic

Weaker

Equal

Greater
Resources

Alliances a,b

Resources

Resources

Bad

TARGET

TARGET

RISK

NEUTRAL

NEUTRAL

NEUTRAL

PROTEGE

ALLY

ALLY

Relationship
Neutral

Followers support leaders based on congruence
with their values and satisfaction with leader actions.

Leaders and followers are cognitive agents who sense the world,
appraise it against their value systems (tuned to their culture and
personality), and choose actions. This shows the values and emotions of a radical insurgent leader right after ordering an attack.

Value System

Set of Actions

GSP Trees

Relationship
Good

Leader

Follower

Relationship

GSP Congruence

Ministries/Resources
Economic
Political

Lea der B

Fringe Follower C

Core Follower A

Leader A

- 3 Support

+ Merge

- 2 Exit Opposition

= Military Defense

- 1 Agree

= Economic Defense

0 Neutral

- Military Attack
- Economic Attack

Security

C ore Fol lowe r B

- 4 Sacrifice

+ Seek Approval

= Manage Resources

Frin g e Follo we r B

Fringe Follower A

+ Give Aid

1 Disagree
2 Join Opposition
3 Oppose
4 Fight Back

Eidelson Factors

Leaders manage resources through (corrupt)
ministers in order to improve their power
(vulnerability) relative to other groups and to
their followers.

Membership

Emotions of one Agent
Fringe Follower C

(in PMFserv)

F rin g e F ollo we r B

Core Follower C

ii. Leaders

Core Follower C
Co re Fol lo we r B

Leader C

Group Support
Lea d er B

Leader C

IV. History of StateSimApplications

V. StateSim

StateSim Engine was initially funded by AFOSR and an intel agency, later sponsored by DARPA for a series of validity assessments in a challenge grant.
i. DARPA/ICEWS 2008 Validity Assessment
The goal was quarterly forecasts of 5 Events Of Interest (EOIs) :
Rebellion/Separatism
Domestic Political Violence
State Repression

Insurgency/Coup
Inter-Group Violence

Embedded Apps
StateSim has also been embedded in apps
for the US Army, AID, and Pentagon.

Resulting Performance
Forecasting whether the 5 EOIs happened or
not in a given quarter in each country: Models were projected forward in time for 12
Quarters (2004-2006) x 5 EOIs x 4 Countries
= 240 backcasts
(mean of ~12 Monte Carlo runs for each
backcast). The results were:

Models Derived By Country Experts
Country experts filled out a questionnaire for specifying the parameters
of several country models. A country model contains about 30-40 socio
-cognitive agents in ~10 factions, influencing ~10,000 agents in a landscape

iv. PMFserv

Accuracy

Model
Generator
(CTTSO)

88%

Precision

68%

Recall

84%

Attack the Net/
Metis
(PEO STRI)

Ii. Additional Models Derived by Experts
Following the DARPA challenge, other agencies created more StateSim models.

NonKin Village/
DSF Game
(US AID)
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III. Output Metrics and Reports
The StateSim engine includes a model controller that can run scenario experiments, alternative courses of action, and policy what-ifs to compute outcome likelihoods for metrics of interest.
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